Spektator. Jaargang 13

[p. 193]

A red card for Sies de Haan and Els Elffers^*
R.P. Botha

In their review of my Inleiding tot generatief taalonderzoek: Een methodologisch handboek (henceforth IGT), De Haan and Elffers (henceforth DeH&E) come to the verdict that ‘...Botha's boek IGT in de meeste opzichten tekort schiet’ [538]¹. The point of my reply will be that this verdict reflects negatively on DeH&E's review tactics rather than on IGT. To illustrate this point, I will consider below a representative number of the major criticisms levelled by DeH&E at IGT. Because the flaws in these criticisms are less than subtle, I can be short (and as sweet as DeH&E permit me to be)² The criticisms are represented as (1)-(8) below.

(1)	IGT adopts an unacceptable empiricist view of science which erroneously entails that every inquiry has to start from scratch (‘helemaal van voren af’) and that theories have to be created ex nihilo.
		[DeH&E 512ff.]

With (1) DeH&E knock out the bottom of their critique of IGT: it reveals just how thoroughly they misconstrue the content of the book. Crucial to the account of generative inquiry given in IGT, is the distinction between an aspect of a form of inquiry and a phase in an individual inquiry:

‘...een aspekt is een onderscheiden, niet-temporele, inhoudelijke eenheid; een fase is een temporele eenheid van handelingen en/of gebeurtenissen.’
[IGT 42]

IGT gives an account of logically distinct aspects of generative inquiry as a form of inquiry, NOT of temporally separable phases in individual generative inquiries. Though DeH&E profess to note this, they in fact read and criticize IGT as if it were giving an account of temporal phases in individual inquiries. They let the cat out of the bag at the very beginning of their review, when, in attempting to substantiate (1), they state:

‘In zijn hele opzet en spreektrant ademt IGT een empiristische wetenschapsvisie uit. Het beeld dat voor de lezer wordt opgeroepen is dat van de wetenschapper die omringd wordt door een onafzienbare zee van feiten, waaruit hij er een aantal selecteert om een theorie over op te stellen. Zo althans beschrijft Botha de fase [my italics - R.P.B.] van het kiezen van een onderzoeksdoelstelling in hoofdstuk 3.’
[512]

But IGT does not give an account of phases of inquiry - neither of ‘stappen’ in a temporal sense, as DeH&E seem to suggest - and by construing it as if it did so, fallacious criticisms such as (1) are generated.

To make things even worse for themselves, DeH&E clearly miscontrue IGT as an account of the properties of individual generative inquiries (as temporal sequences of events):

* I would like to thank Cecile le Roux and Walter Winckler for their respective contributions to this article.

1 Page references to the DeH&E review and to IGT will be given in square brackets.

2 I don't see any justification for subjecting DeH&E's discussion to microscopic analysis - analyzing the numerous misrepresentations, arbitrary claims, conceptual confusions, logical fallacies, etc. - in the way in which 1 dealt with critiques such as Dougherty 1975 (cf. Botha 1977) and Slezak 1981 (cf. Botha 1982a, 1982b.) Whereas the latter critical discussions were significant within the framework of a more general debate, DeH&E's discussion is not, at least not as far as I can see.

[p. 194]

‘Ons bezwaar tegen zijn [= Botha's - R.P.B.] model is dat het de zaken verkeerd weergeeft door het zo voor te stellen alsof elk onderzoek [my italics - R.P.B] helemaal van voren af aan begint en theorieën als het ware uit het niets tevoorschijn komen.’
[513]

How DeH&E can claim this about a book which proceeds from the following view of why scientists undertake inquiry in general, I leave to the reader to puzzle out:

‘Wetenschappelijk onderzoek wordt ondernomen omdat er in de wereld verschijnselen, gebeurtenissen zijn die onderzoekers als problematisch ervaren. Een onderzoeker ervaart iets als problematisch, wanneer hij binnen het kader van de bestaande voorraad kennis [italics added - R.P.B.] het voorkomen, de algemene aard of bizondere kenmerken ervan niet begrijpt.’
[IGT 47]

The existing stock of knowledge, obviously, is partly represented in the form of theories and IGT [76-79] explicitly claims that a theoretical element is an essential component of a problematic state of affairs.

If an account of logically distinct aspects of a form of inquiry is construed as an account of temporally separable phases in individual inquiries, it will obviously have defects such as (1) and will inevitably be characterized by a host of other fictitious flaws³. But why would responsible reviewers attempt such a construal? Why would judges at a dog show appraise the animals as if they were cats?

(2)	The account of generative inquiry given in IGT manifests a form of ‘atomism’ which causes obfuscation (‘versluiering’) and redundancy.
		[DeH&E 515-516]

DeH&E attempt to illustrate this criticism with reference to the notion ‘theory/theoretical’, which does not function as an ordering principle in IGT:

‘Nu Botha de centrale rol van theorieën in het wetenschappelijk bedrijf buiten beschouwing laat bij de ordening van de behandelde materie, klopt zijn aspectenschema daar niet mee: wat met elkaar samenhangt, wordt bij verschillende aspecten ondergebracht met versluiering en redundantie als gevolg.’
[515]

IGT errs when it specifies how each individual aspect of generative inquiry manifests the notion ‘theory’ - if DeH&E are to be believed.

An analogy may serve to clarify the quaintness of DeH&E's criticism (2). Consider the case of a biologist whose aim it is to systematically describe the anatomy of an animal body in terms of the structure of the organs/parts of which it consists. In his description of the heart, his description of the lungs, his description of the liver, his description of the brain, etc. he specifies, among other things, that the organ/part incorporates veins (or nerves) and describes the locus, structure and other properties of the veins (nerves) in the organ. Would it make sense to criticize the biologist's description of the body as ‘atomistic’, ‘badly fragmented’, ‘intolerably redundant’, etc. because of the fact that in the description of each constitutive organ/part it deals also with

3 Thus consider the following criticism of DeH&E's [513]: ‘Voor de hoofdaspecten schept Botha's voorbehoud een belangrijke vaagheid. Hij geeft namelijk niet aan welke als noodzakelijk moeten worden beschouwd voor elk [my italics - R.P.B.] onderzoek’. DeH&E fail to inform their readers that, even though IGT is not obliged to say anything about the matter, its final chapter ends with the following passage:

‘Zo lang bij een afzonderlijk taalkundig onderzoek een serieuze poging wordt ondernomen een bijdrage te leveren tot de verwezenlijking van de doelstellingen van generatief taalonderzoek, heeft het recht op de titel “generatief taalonderzoek”. In het geval van een grammatikaal onderzoek betekent dit dat het onderzoek direkt of indirekt moet bijdragen tot het opstellen van een generatieve grammatika van de betreffende taal. In het geval van een algemeen-linguïstisch onderzoek betekent dit, dat het onderzoek direkt of indirekt moet bijdragen tot het geven van een beperkende beschrijving van wat een mogelijke menselijke taal is.’ [403]

[p. 195]

the veins (nerves) in this organ/part? Would it make sense to say that the biologist should have described the individual organs/parts ‘holistically’ from the point of view of veins (nerves)? Would it, moreover, make sense to say that the biologist should have described the body itself ‘holistically’ without reference to its constituent organs/parts? These very questions can be raised in connection with DeH&E's criticism that IGT's description of generative inquiry (the body) in terms of its individual aspects (the organs/parts) is ‘atomistic’. If a logical distinction can be made between two aspects A and B (not to be confused with phases) of generative inquiry and if both A and B have a theoretical element E, how could a description of A and B be adequate without specifying how E is manifested in A and B?

DeH&E, moreover, fail to point out that in describing an individual (sub)aspect of generative inquiry, IGT takes pains to show how this (sub)aspect is related to others. Similarly, they fail to point out that the final chapter shows how the individual aspects treated in the preceding chapters are integrated within the whole⁴.

(3)	Because IGT does not proceed from a ‘holistic view’, it misses important ‘generalizations’ about (generative) inquiry.
		[DeH&E 516-517]

As a criticism of IGT, (3) is in a sense complementary to (2). DeH&E [516] attempt to justify (3) along the following lines:

‘Het centrale criterium dat bij elke afweging in het wetenschappelijk onderzoek de doorslag geeft, is het streven naar maximale generalisatie. Door de atomistische opzet van IGT komt dit nergens als algemeen punt naar voren. Bij alle onderdelen komt het generalisatiethema weliswaar aan de orde, maar steeds in een andere vermomming...’

These remarks and the passage following them are in more than one way disastrous for DeH&E. First, they clearly show how their brand of ‘holism’ generates obscurities. Thus, DeH&E's ‘generalization’ about the pursuit of ‘maximale generalisatie’ sadly lacks content. To give it a sufficiently precise content, it is necessary to spell out in a careful and detailed manner how the pursuit of ‘maximale generalisatie’ is manifested in the conduct of generative inquiry. One way of doing this, is to specify to what this pursuit boils down in those various logically distinct aspects of generative inquiry, the existence of which cannot be denied. Unless DeH&E can do this - or effect the required specification in a superior way - their ‘generalization’ will retain its present status of a hollow slogan.

Second, it is simply false to claim that ‘maximale generalisatie’, whatever that might be, represents the core of ‘het centrale criterium dat bij elke afweging in het wetenschappelijk onderzoek de doorslag geeft’. In generative inquiry, this is not the case: ‘het centrale criterium’ is that of truth, as is clear from both the earlier and later work of Chomsky⁵. As explained in IGT [e.g. 400], generality - in a number of specific forms - is valued only in so far as it is instrumental in the pursuit of truth and two other more fundamental philosophical values. This point has been re-emphasized recently by Chomsky (1982:30-31) is his explanation of why ‘it might be a really fundamental error to be guided too much by an effort to eliminate redundancy in developing ex-

4 In view of the content of §6.3 and §6.4 [pp. 139-174] of IGT, DeH&E's [515] claim that IGT has next to nothing to say about ‘het begrip “theorie”’ is rather misleading, to say the least.

5 Cf., e.g. Chomsky 1980a:104 ff. for a recent discussion of this point.

[p. 196]

planatory theories’, redundancy, of course, being a specific manifestation of non-generality.

Third, to its credit, IGT does not contain DeH&E's ‘generalization’ about ‘maximale generalisatie’. But DeH&E simply makes a false claim if they imply that IGT nowhere (‘nergens’) presents A generalization about the role of generalization/generality in generative inquiry. Thus, in the final chapter, IGT [398] formulates ‘het principe van methodologische algemeenheid’ as one of the four fundamental philosophical principles of generative inquiry:

‘(1)(d)Deze hypotetische beweringen - en de theorieën waarin ze geïntegreerd zijn - moeten zo algemeen mogelijk zijn⁶’.

IGT [399-400] proceeds to set out - by way of summary - how this principle is concretely manifested in the various main aspects of generative inquiry. Paragraph 12.1.1 of IGT thus makes nonsense of DeH&E's ‘nergens’ claim. It becomes increasingly difficult to shrug off the impression that DeH&E have (deliberately?) skipped the content of the final chapter of IGT.

In sum: if DeH&E's ‘holistic view’ of (generative) inquiry entails the formulation of empty ‘generalizations’ without due respect for the particulars of this inquiry, it is to the credit of IGT that it does not deal in this brand of ‘holism’.

(4)	IGT adopts an eclectic approach to the total field of philosophy of science (‘het totale veld van wetenschapstheoretische opvattingen’) and is not sufficiently concerned with coherence and consistency.
		[DeH&E 514, 533]

Obviously, a book that aims to provide a systematic description of the content of a form of inquiry requires an appropriate set of philosophical tools for doing this. In its preface, IGT [9] has the following to say about its choice of descriptive tools:

‘...die wetenschapsfilosofische opvattingen worden gepresenteerd, die een beschrijving geven van wat op een meta-wetenschappelijk vlak kenmerkend is voor generatieve taalkunde. Het is verder niet overbodig om erop te wijzen dat er geen wetenschapsfilosofische theorie bestaat zonder ernstige gebreken. Het is daarom onmogelijk de inhoud van een handboek zoals dit volledig aan te bieden binnen een enkel, monolitisch, homogeen, wetenschapsfilosofisch kader.’

From this quote it is clear that, had it been possible, IGT would have been written within the framework of a single theory of science. Because no such theory was available, the conceptual tools required for IGT's account of generative inquiry had to be drawn from various theories of science. Because of this unsatisfactory, but unavoidable, state of affairs, IGT had to be very modest about what it could claim for the account just mentioned: it could be no more than an informal, low-level description.

It is clear what a critic of such philosophical ‘eclecticism’ would have to do. He/she (or a he-she tandem) would have to show that there existed a sufficiently rich philosophical theory which lacked serious flaws which could have constituted a single source for the philosophical tools required for an account such as IGT's. DeH&E, however, fail to present this argument, thereby scuttling

6 The other three philosophical principles - considered by IGT to be more fundamental than [(1) (d)] - are formulated as follows:

‘(1)	(a)	De werkelijkheid heeft meer nivo's: problematische verschijnselen op een oppervlakkig nivo van deze werkelijkheid kunnen begrepen worden in termen van de eigenschappen van reële objekten op een dieper liggend nivo.
	(b)	Specifieke verschijnselen op het oppervlakkig nivo van deze werkelijkheid zijn dikwijls het resultaat van de interaktie van verschillende (fysische, psychische, biologische, enz.) systemen op het dieper liggend nivo.
	(c)	De hypotetische beweringen die de bovengenoemde objekten/systemen beschrijven moeten in beginsel toetsbaar zijn en feitelijk gerechtvaardigd.’

[p. 197]

their accusation of ‘eclecticism’⁷.

Consider now DeH&E's [533] allegation that the author of IGT represents a variety of philosophical views ‘...zonder dat hij zich bijzonder om coherentie en soms zelfs consistentie bekommert’. In the paragraphs following this claim, I have been unable to find the justification demanded by it.

First, DeH&E [533-534] express their puzzlement about the fact that IGT deals with problems about intuitive data/evidence in parts of the book that appear to them to be unrelated. But if one reads IGT as an account of temporally separable phases of individual generative inquiries and not of logically distinct aspects of generative inquiry in general, one is bound to be puzzled by the way in which the whole is organized. Second, DeH&E [534-535] have problems with IGT's notion ‘pretheoretical description’, problems springing from their illegitimate and unargued identification of ‘pre-theoretische beschrijvingen’ with ‘linguistische intuïties’. Third, DeH&E are critical of the status assigned in IGT to linguists' theoretical intuitions. I will return to the flawed nature of the latter criticism in the context of the discussion of (5) below. How all of this relates to the criticism of ‘eclecticism’ - and derivatively of incoherence and inconsistency - is left to the imagination of the reader.

(5)	IGT makes claims about fundamental features of (generative) inquiry which are not supported by the philosophical literature.
		[DeH&E (e.g.) 535]

Let us return to DeH&E's problem with the status of the theoretical intuitions of skilled linguists, intuitions about rules and structures of languages, linguistically significant generalizations, etc. With reference to these intuitions, DeH&E [535] ask:

‘over wat voor vreemde kennisbron gaat het hier, die verder nergens in de algemene wetenschapsleer voorkomt....?’

This question is a give-away: it reveals the paucity of DeH&E's knowledge of the philosophical literature which they pretend to know. Thus, intuition as a source of potential scientific knowledge is treated in a variety of technical studies in ‘de algemene wetenschapsleer’.

In my dissertation (Botha 1968:73-75), published more than fifteen years ago, a full paragraph was devoted to the discussion of the methodological status of intuition in other (non-linguistic) empirical sciences. In that discussion, it was noted that, for example, Popper (1965:31-32), Feigl (1965:354), Wild (1938), and Bunge (1962:14-15, 79-85, 92-97) accord intuition the status of a source of potential scientific knowledge. Bunge, in particular, presented a quite detailed analysis of this status of intuition.

Skipping a period of fifteen years and the literature produced in this interval, it may be noted that, more recently, Coward (1981a and 1981b) published two papers containing a systematic analysis of basis psychological and philosophical aspects of intuition as a source of potential (scientific) knowledge. And Newton-Smith (1981: 235) has reaffirmed the role which intuition plays in the judgment of theories, a role not essentially different from that of source of substantive scientific ideas:

7 In the seven years since IGT was written, there has not emerged an encompassing theory of science/scientific growth/scientific progress without serious limitations. Cf., e.g., Newton-Smith's (1981) recent account of the shortcomings of theories such as those of Popper, Lakatos, Feyerabend and Laudan. Newton-Smith's own theory has yet to be subjected to penetrating analysis. Incidentally, in the absence of an adequate homogeneous theory of science, the question arises as to how successfully DeH&E have avoided eclecticism in their own methodological writings.

[p. 198]

‘Reliance on judgment at this level, like any high-gain strategy, is a high-risk strategy, and happily we are rarely in the situation in which we have nothing to do but to follow our intuitions. But on occasion we have to, and one who ignores this will have a distorted picture of the scientific enterprise.’

Many of the works listed above contain references to further publications dealing with intuition as a source of potential (scientific) knowledge. As may be expected, different scholars have different ideas about the nature, mechanism(s), relative importance, etc. of intuition as a source of potential scientific knowledge. But the claim that ‘nergens in de algemene wetenschapsleer’ is anything to be found on intuition as a ‘vreemde kennisbron’, is really no more than a confession of ignorance⁸.

I have dealt in some detail with (5) because DeH&E's review contains many allegations (and insinuations) to the effect that IGT has been written in the absence of a proper knowledge/understanding of the relevant philosophical literature and that it presents a distorted picture of science in general. It is clear now with just how big a pinch of salt these claims should be taken.

(6)	IGT presents Botha's view of linguistics, a view which is untenable in various fundamental respects.
		[DeH&E 518-532]

The respects mentioned in (6) include, according to DeH&E, the ontological status of linguistic theories and the nature and functions of idealizations. Let us accept for the sake of argument that DeH&E are correct in every single one of their criticisms of ‘Botha's visie op de taalkunde’. Even under this assumption, DeH&E have failed to construct a real criticism of IGT. For, IGT does not present - as DeH&E misleadingly suggest - Botha's view of linguistics. IGT [9] aims at presenting Chomsky's view of linguistics and, moreover, restricts itself to ‘de klassieke’, Chomskyaanse opvattingen' of the mid-seventies.

This aim of IGT has an implication which is not particularly subtle, but which nevertheless seems to have escaped DeH&E: in order to criticize ‘IGT's view’ of linguistics, it must be shown that this view misrepresents Chomsky's view of linguistics in important respects. DeH&E, of course, make no attempt to do this. Rather, they repeatedly [e.g. 518. 525, 526, 528, 532] point out (a) to how large an extent Botha's view is identical to Chomsky's, (b) to how large an extent Botha's positions (‘standpunten’) are to be found in ‘TG-kringen’, (c) to how large an extent Botha's misconceptions are non-idiosyncratic but represent ‘in de TG gangbare misverstanden’. DeH&E's [538] summarizing conclusion, not unexpectedly, states ‘...[dat] Botha in het algemeen de transformationele orthodoxie volgt’. But to say these things, is to say that IGT has achieved what it set out to do⁹. DeH&E have made an elementary mistake: that of confusing the (imaginary) merits/defects of an approach to linguistics with the merits/defects of a representation of this approach.

‘Botha's visie op de taalkunde’ and his appraisal of Chomsky's view are to be found elsewhere, a point to which I return below in the context of discussing (8).

What, then, about the fundamental flaws which DeH&E claim to have found in Chomsky's views? We have assumed for the sake of argument alone that these represent real flaws. I must confess that I have no appetite for the

8 Though DeH&E have difficulty in accepting intuition as a source of substantive scientific knowledge, they [509] have no problem in accepting it as a source of metascientific knowledge about the nature of science. Do we have a small inconsistency here?

9 Having attempted over the years to first give an accurate representation of Chomsky's views before subjecting them to critical analysis, I know only too well that some of these views are subject to different interpretations. Thus, IGT may err in certain interpretations of Chomsky's views. But such incorrrect interpretations would by no means have the status of ‘Botha's visie op de taalkunde’, perhaps another point beyond DeH&E's grasp.

[p. 199]

laborious task of unravelling DeH&E's (mis-)analyses of Chomsky's views. There appears to be a sufficiently large number of ‘orthodox Chomskyans’ in Dutch linguistics who are quite capable of taking up arms for Chomsky¹⁰. I would like to make only one small point in this regard: it is strange that, in dealing with the alleged flaws in Chomsky's views, DeH&E do not take as their point of departure the most recent and most clear representations (and critiques) of Chomsky's views. Thus, they attempt to discuss problems in Chomsky's mentalism without having digested such studies as (Chomsky 1980a, 1980b) and (Botha 1980), all of which appeared well before the publication of their review. This failure on DeH&E's behalf, of course, does not exactly enhance the relevance of their criticisms.

(7)	IGT's account of generative inquiry isn't critical: it fails to elucidate problematic aspects of ‘TG-theorievorming’ from the point of view of philosophy of science.
		[DeH&E 511, 532, 534, 536]

(7) represents one of the most repetitive points in DeH&E's review. However, it is less than interesting because critical appraisal was expressly not selected as an aim for IGT.

First, it is argued in IGT [40] that a comprehensive critical appraisal of problematic aspects of generative inquiry logically presupposes a systematic explication of the nature of this form of inquiry, of its main aspects, and of the way in which these aspects are interrelated. Obviously, criticism in the absence of a good knowledge of what it is that is criticized produces smoke rather than light. DeH&E make no attempt to controvert this argument.

Second, in my opinion it is didactically unwise, for obvious reasons, to introduce a non-advanced student to a complex set of (methodological) principles while simultaneously overwhelming him/her with what appears to be serious limitations of these principles¹¹. Thus, the aims of systematic explication and intelligible criticism appear to lie beyond the scope of a single introductory volume¹². It is quite clear what DeH&E must do in this regard: they have to produce an introductory methodological textbook which sucessfully integrates precise and systematic explication with clear and comprehensive critical appraisal. Until this book has been produced, (7) will retain its present status of rethorical noncriticism.

(8)

IGT is representative of Botha's publications.

[DeH&E 538]

This claim by DeH&E, taken in conjunction with (7), entails that my other, (I presume) methodological, publications are also not critical of problematic aspects of generative inquiry. Moreover, it follows from (8) that my other methodological publications too ‘in de meeste opzichten tekort schiet[en]’.

But even the most superficial knowledge of my methodological publications cannot fail but to make it clear that (8) - a claim for which DeH&E present NO justification whatsoever - is simply false. IGT, in fact, is the least representative of my methodological publications, differing from the others in two basic respects. First, in regard to selection of materials and their structuring, it is the only publication with the didactic aim of being an introductory textbook. Second, and more important, in regard to tenor, IGT is, with a solitary exception, the only publication which restricts itself to neutral, non-evaluative exposition

10 Chomsky (1982:48-49) himself singles out Holland as one of the ‘major centers where interesting and important [generative - R.P.B.] work is going on.’

11 This is explicitly stated in the preface (p. x) of the English version of IGT. Notice that DeH&E [starred note, p. 538] present their review as a critical discussion not only of IGT but of the English version, entitled The conduct of linguistic inquiry, too.

12 In the relatively detailed ‘Geselekteerde literatuur’, IGT does, however, include many discussions which are critical of certain features of generative inquiry. This has been done deliberately to give the more advanced student an idea of how problematic some of the aspects of generative inquiry appear to be. DeH&E, however, carefully avoid crediting IGT for doing this.

[p. 200]

and which does not proceed to critical appraisal¹³.

The criticisms developed in my other publications may be incorrect, but that the main thrust of these works is critical cannot be denied. Over the years, the criticisms developed in these publications have earned me the displeasure of a variety of orthodox Chomskyans, including Chomsky (1976:10) himself, Dougherty (1975), Higgins (1976) and, recently, Slezak (1981). Other scholars - e.g., Green (1972), Brown (1973), Gopnik (1976), Kuiper (1977), Derwing (1979), and Bunge (1982) - by contrast, have not been unfavourably impressed by these criticisms. But DeH&E simply ask their readers to believe that, like the ‘representative’ IGT, these other publications are of an expository, non- critical nature. What do they hope to gain from such a misrepresentation? The intellectual game called ‘philosophy of linguistics’ is without question tough; it needn't be dirty though. Coming on top of the other illegitimate moves in their review, the misrepresentation embodied in (8) is a foul which should earn DeH&E a red card.

13 Both these points are made explicitly in the English version [p. x] of IGT (a book which DeH&E profess to have studied):

‘As regards the general nature of the discussion: this differs sharply from my other writings on methodological issues in generative grammar. Whereas these writings present in-depth analyses of small clusters of related methodological questions, the present textbook aims to be a more comprehensive, systematic discussion of a broad spectrum of topics. Moreover, whereas the general tenor of the discussion of the former writings is, on the whole, evaluative and critical, that of the latter work is of a neutral, non-evaluative, expository nature. These differences do not indicate that Saul has become Paul.’

The only other publication that is basically non-evaluative is Botha 1976.

[p. 201]

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[p. 202]

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