On Growth Two

35. Georgi A. Arbatov

Georgi A. Arbatov was born in the USSR in 1923. After studying history, he attended the Moscow Institute for International Relations. Professor Arbatov is, like Dr. Gvishiani, a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In 1968 he was appointed director of

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the newly founded Institute for the USA. He is one of the principal advisers of the present Secretary-General of the party, Leonid Brezhnev. He is always present at summit conferences, and traveled with Mr. Brezhnev to Washington, D.C., and to former President Nixon's home in San Clemente. He also stayed with his chief at Camp David. Professor Arbatov's writings include The Ideological Struggle in Present International Relations, The Nixon Doctrine, The USA: Modern Methods of Government, and The Technical Revolution and the Foreign Policy of the United States.

What were the principal motives which led to the foundation of the Institute for the USA by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1968?

In the course of the years 1960 to 1970, many new research institutes were established in this country, reflecting the general tendency to accelerate the development of the sciences, including the social sciences.

By special resolution of the General Committee of the party, passed in 1967, the social sciences were given extremely responsible tasks. This also led to the expansion of complex research regarding individual regions of the earth: The Far East, Latin America, Africa, and the USA. Naturally, the various aspects of the history, economy, geography, culture, and politics of the USA had been studied before in various academic institutions and universities. However, the need was felt for the realization of a more complex approach toward more complicated research about the United States, which also made it necessary to ensure a more coordinated and all-around study of this subject. To put it in a different way: We needed to bring specialists in the various fields of American studies into one single unit. In doing so, the Institute for the USA was founded in 1968 within the realm of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

You were present at summit meetings between Moscow and Washington. I am particularly referring to Party Leader Brehznev's visit to the USA in 1973. Can you compare the summit meetings of the past, such as the meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna, with the negotiations which took place in Washington and San Clemente?

When we talk of concrete aspects of these summits, it is difficult for me to compare them, since I was not working directly on problems concerning the USA in 1961. However, these meetings have given rise to real and considerable shifts in the relations between both countries and have been

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characterized by the signing of very important treaties and documents forming an important contribution to a lessening of international tension in general and particularly to a weakening of the threat of atomic war. The objective changes which were taking place in the world at large forcibly raised, during the early seventies, the question of a definite change from Cold War conditions to those of actual peaceful coexistence. These changes made it possible for serious and positive reversals of old policies to be achieved in many directions. At the same time it became possible to promote the question of European security and cooperation. The normalization of Soviet-American relations was in this connection extremely important. This, I feel, was the chief significance of the 1972 to 1973 summit meetings.

In 1961 the nonaligned nations passed a resolution in Belgrade which contained the decision that Nehru and Nkrumah were to go to Moscow, and Sukarno and Modibo Keita to Washington, to persuade leaders of the USSR and the USA to meet at regular intervals so as to discuss world problems and mutual cooperation in order to ease Cold War tensions. Would you say that the recent initiatives shown by the Soviet Union and the United States at last point to this direction?

Allowing for the fact that this initiative of the nonaligned nations was directed toward an easing of international tension, I can reply to your question in the affirmative. To remind ourselves of this initiative is useful for another reason, too. It underlines the importance of the normalization in the relations between the USSR and the USA - and not only for these two nations, but also for all other nations, for the cause of peace and for a healthier international situation in general.

This also underlines once more how unfounded the efforts are which are made by certain forces in representing the normalization of relations between the USSR and the USA as an ‘agreement between superpowers’ which might be detrimental to the interests of other countries. In this connection I would remind you of the important maxim contained in the document concerning the basic principles of the mutual relations between the USSR and the USA which was signed on May 29, 1972, during the first visit of President Nixon to Moscow. It stressed the fact that ‘the development of Soviet-American relations is not solely directed at their own countries and their own interests.’ It is important that we particularly bear this factor in mind because a successful battle against the threat of an atomic war requires the active efforts of all nations as well as their support in reducing tensions.

I would add to this that experience has shown that regular meetings

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between the leaders of the USSR and the USA have turned out to be extremely useful for consolidating peace and normalizing the international situation. We would be very pleased if these meetings were to become a firm tradition, just like, of course, meetings held between leaders of various other countries, which likewise aim at a strengthening of peace.

Do you attach special importance to this kind of personal diplomacy at the highest level, such as the use of the hot line between Moscow and Washington?

When I was recently received by the Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, in Tokyo, he pointed at a white telephone on his desk, saying it was his hot line to Nixon. Naturally, as Marxists, we attach the greatest importance to objective factors - objective tendencies and processes of an economic and social-political nature. But this does not mean that we deny the importance of activities shown by political leaders who are the heads of political movements, parties, and states. Objective factors are also obtained by the activities of these movements and parties and by national policies which in many instances, means by the activities of their leaders. In doing so, the completeness with which the objective needs of society are revealed by the activities of these leaders, their political positions, and sometimes also their personal characteristics can play a considerable part in the historical process. These general philosophic principles also determine our relation to the part that is played by politicians in foreign politics and diplomacy. When there is any question of negotiations or efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions and work out agreements, it cannot be done in any other way than as you expressed it: the personal way, which means that the realization of these matters has to take place through adequately authorized politicians and leaders. From this point of view we also appreciate the top-level meetings which take place in the present circumstances. Efforts to improve relations among countries are required at various levels and, in this sense, the creation of a mutual understanding at levels of top leadership is a very important aspect of this process: particularly when most important and most complicated political questions are involved. As far as the hot line is concerned, it is useful, even though it is only a technical auxiliary.

In this connection the effectiveness of discussions by telephone or telex under certain exceptional circumstances depends in many respects on the level of mutual understanding and confidence that has already been reached previously by those involved in earlier discussions.

It is clear that a hot line is first of all a necessity among the atomic powers.

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Yet, analogous hot lines between Moscow on the one hand and Peking, Tokyo, or possibly even Cairo might be necessary.

The reply to your question is implicit in the question itself. The creation of all possible guarantees, including technical means such as the hot line, which aim at the prevention of the possibility - including the accidental possibility - of an atomic conflict, is very important indeed. Particularly when it concerns the great nuclear powers, especially the USSR and the USA, which have more than ninety percent of the nuclear arsenal at their disposal. The reliability of this direct communication between the capitals of the two countries was heightened by the conclusion of a special agreement between the USSR and the USA on September 30, 1971. Under this agreement the channels of direct contact between Moscow and Washington were doubled and reinforced as a result of communication through satellites.

At the same time, a well-known treaty was concluded between the two countries which provided in a number of cases direct protection against accidental or nonsanctioned use of atomic weapons. But the task of preventing an atomic war cannot remain restricted to these technical measures.

The threat of this kind of war is implicit in existing international tensions themselves or in the crisis situation, which still is smoldering in various parts of the world. During an unlimited arms race this could well lead to a nuclear confrontation. This is why the reversal from a state of cold war to a state of relaxation and peaceful coexistence which has now begun to set in is a very important development indeed. For the same reason, changing relations between the USSR and the USA, as well as the conclusion of treaties promoting normal and businesslike relations are of very great importance. In this context I would particularly like to stress the agreement to prevent an atomic war which was signed between the USSR and the USA in Washington on June 22, 1973, during the official visit of Leonid Brehznev to Washington, D.C. In accordance with this treaty the two parties agreed that they would not act in a way that a situation could arise which might lead to a dangerous sharpening of their natural relations; that they would prevent military confrontations and would exclude the possibility of an atomic war between them or between one of their countries and other nations. This agreement is a further important development and realization of the principles of peaceful coexistence in the atomic age.

In the international sphere, the Soviet Union invariably follows a constructive line in the settlement of international problems, and we consistently support the principles of peaceful coexistence of nations with different social structures. In this connection we might speak of a very extensive

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range of steps which could be taken in order to promote the strengthening of peace and security among nations. This concerns both the collective steps to be taken, in which a great number of states should participate, as well as steps taken between individual nations that aim at the same time objective. Naturally, this does not exclude the improvement in telephone systems or in other contacts between capitals.

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michel Jobert has cynically remarked that in spite of the new friendship between your country and the USA the rivalry between the two ‘super poker-players’ continues to exist.

A comparison of the present international situation with poker playing is completely incorrect in my opinion. And the cynicism which you mentioned is entirely out of place when discussing questions of preventing an atomic war and preserving the peace. Such comparisons are essentially incorrect because they presuppose a situation of a ‘game resulting in zero,’ a game in which one party gains as much as the other loses. On the contrary, the policy of détente reflects a situation of an entirely different nature, a situation in which all parties stand to gain, in the same way as when in a situation of tension and war all parties concerned stand to lose. When speaking about relations between the USSR and the USA, even considering the most favorable development of events, there will always be unavoidable elements of struggle, or, as you put it, of competition, side by side with the growing elements of mutual understanding and collaboration.

This is understandable. After all, the USSR and the USA represent opposing social systems. They are the two most powerful representatives of these two systems on the world stage. They cannot be otherwise than separated, not only on account of their profound differences, but also because of the serious contrasts they expose in so many different fields. However, this fact should not give rise to skepticism, let alone to cynicism, when appraising the significance of a normalization of relations between these two countries or between the two social systems - the socialist and the capitalist system, taken as a whole.

Essentially, the question that concerns us is what method will be followed in solving the objectively existing contrasts and in what channels the unavoidable struggle between the two systems will be guided. Here, various ways are open to us. One of them is the way of military confrontation, the arms race, and dangerous political crises. But there is also another way: the way of peaceful coexistence in which the rivalry between the two systems in various fields - their ideological struggle - may be combined with a many-

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sided and mutually profitable collaboration. Unavoidable disagreements will be solved by negotiations and, instead of an unrestricted arms race, a course might be chosen which is directed toward a reduction of armaments and even at complete disarmament.

In this way, the question concerning the form that the struggle may take cannot be a scholastic problem of secondary importance. The difference between the various forms may mean the difference between war and peace, between a pointless waste of enormous material expenditure in the arms race and constructive rivalry which is not limited by enmity and which goes hand in hand with a wide, mutually profitable cooperation. In addition, the question is not only one of transferring the struggle which takes place in the world to a nonmilitary sphere. What is also important is that the methods and forms according to which states are to act within the nonmilitary sphere attain a useful significance. For instance: In the economic sphere the struggle could be conducted with the weapons of blockades, discrimination, and various actions directed at the economic undermining of the other party. But the same struggle could also be conducted in the form of fair competition, which is essentially constructive and does not exclude extensive international collaboration. In the same way, an ideological struggle can be conducted with the help of the entire arsenal of psychological warfare, including lies, slander, breeding distrust, hatred, and various undermining actions. But this struggle, too, could take other forms, like a discussion on the principles of two world-philosophies: their values, the basic problems of our era, and the best ways in which these problems might be solved.

Finally, even during the years of the Cold War, the struggle was conducted in many nonmilitary spheres - in the fields of economics, politics, ideologies - but always following the Cold War methods. The US arsenal, for instance, included trade restrictions, discriminating practices, psychological warfare, and undermining propaganda. If a process of positive change leaves all these tactics behind and leads to restrictions in the sphere of the military struggle, it will not mean that the cold war will be over forever. After all, this ‘war’ was called the ‘Cold War’ because it was mainly conducted in nonmilitary spheres.

In order to put a real end to the Cold War, détente and the normalization of relations have to be confirmed by abandoning those forms and methods which have been manifesting themselves. If this is done, wide prospects will be open to the USSR and the USA as well as, generally speaking, to the socialist countries on the one side and the capitalist countries on the other, in spite of all their contrasts and differences, and these prospects will lead to a reinforcement of peace and the development of genuine collaboration.

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Llewellyn Thompson, former US ambassador in Moscow, said that conducting negotiations with the Soviet Union was like playing roulette: ‘There is not a single necessary connection between casting the ball and the result.’¹

I must admit that I am not familiar with these words of Mr. Thompson. It is hard for me to judge to what extent they were correctly quoted. As I do not know the game of roulette, I must also admit that I do not entirely understand the words which you ascribe to him. But I know very well that Ambassador Thompson was in favor of improving relations between the USSR and the USA. He believed that such an improvement was possible, and he aimed at contributing toward it.

I should like to come back once more to the subject as to whether or not you agree with some authoritative sources in Washington who assume that the personal contacts which have taken place during the last few years between Mr. Brehznev and Richard Nixon contributed toward preventing a worsening in the relations between Moscow and Washington: for instance, during the military actions in the Middle East in October, 1973.²

This question can be answered in the affirmative. The fact that the events in the Middle East in 1973 took place in a spirit of détente concerning international relations in general and in the relations between the USSR and the USA in particular, has undoubtedly contributed toward preventing an escalation of the conflict and avoiding a dangerous confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. There is no doubt that in a situation of international tension, a combined Soviet-American initiative would hardly have been possible, whereas today such an initiative was supported by other states and led to well-known resolutions by the UN Security Council, which ensured a cease-fire in the Middle East as well as creating favorable conditions for a peaceful settlement in this extremely explosive area. For the same reason it is very difficult for me not to agree with President Nixon, who declared in October, 1973, ‘Essentially I am of the opinion that... if it had not been for our efforts toward easing tension, a serious conflict might have flared up in the Middle East [between the USSR and the USA]. Thanks to this course such a conflict was prevented.’

Leonid Brehznev recently said in a speech, ‘Our wish is that all the nondiscussed matters between all the people of the European continent be formulated unanimously, sincerely, wholeheartedly, and without the help of diplomacy.’ Do you think it possible that such an aim might be achieved before the year 2000, now that Europe is divided by questions such as the

1 See The New York Times Magazine, January 21, 1973, ‘Nixon's way with the Russians,’ by Henry Brandon.

2 During the official visit of Mr. Nixon to Moscow in the summer of 1974, observers noted that while the US President was referring to the importance of his personal contacts with Mr. Brehznev, the Soviets, in accordance with their standard practice, deleted any such references on a personal basis from official statements concerning the meetings.

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tactics and aims of détente, disarmament, restrictions in the arms race, mutual restriction of military forces, economic collaboration or, and last but not least, the approach between East and West within the European framework, while there still exist such conflicting points of view in relation to the social structure of our various societies?

To know the principles that are involved in the speech to which you are referring, made by Brehznev at the International Congress of Peaceful Forces in Moscow in 1973, one has to quote this particular part of his speech somewhat further. It continued: ‘I mean, for instance, such principles as those concerning the immunity of the territories of all the states of Europe, the immunity of their frontiers, not using force or threats of force in the relations between the states, nonintervention in one another's internal affairs, and achieving a development in the mutual cooperation in various fields on this basis.’

It appears to me that these principles contain nothing that would make it impossible for all the states of Europe to agree upon or which might be contrary to their interests, in spite of all social, political, and ideological differences between some European countries and others. I am even prepared to say that in the present circumstances there are no acceptable alternatives to these principles. Let us put the question like this: If these are not the correct principles, what other principles could then form a basis for the policy to be followed by European powers? Would it be through territorial claims or attempts to change the existing situation by force? After all, this is the sure way that leads to war, not a cold war, but a hot war. We now can say that these principles are already in existence and that they are being given new strength and are receiving an increasingly concrete meaning. For instance: Is there not much talk about the remarkable rapprochement which has taken place during the last few years in the relations of the socialist countries with Western Europe? One only has to think of the treaties concluded by the USSR, Poland, the DDR, and Czechoslovakia with the German Federal Republic, which particularly are based on the earlier-mentioned principles. All this does not, of course, mean the resolution of the international situation in general, including that of Europe, takes place by itself, automatically as it were, without any struggle or difficulties, or without the obstinate opposition of those who are interested, for various reasons, in the existence of international tension and an increased arms race. For this reason it is necessary to overcome this opposition in order to achieve a further continuation of the process of improving our relations. For, after all, at stake are the most deeply rooted interests of all

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European countries and of the entire world. In the present circumstances this task has a better chance of being realized than has ever been the case before.

A particularly important matter appears to be the one that Mr. Brehznev brought up in the same speech, that is, when he spoke of the need for the principles governing the relations between the European states ‘to form part of the daily practice of European life and of the psychology of the European nations.’ What methods would we have to use in order to influence the thinking of Europeans, or for that matter of Soviets and Americans, to properly prepare them for the gradual acceptance of principles of mutual relations which would guarantee a harmonious development toward the year 2000?

It appears that the enormous work itself which was done during the preparation of the discussions on questions of European security and collaboration has promoted, to a certain extent, the psychology of the European nations and has, in the practice of international relations, strengthened the principles of peaceful coexistence. After all, this work involved political parties and movements, and hundreds of nongovernmental organizations.

These principles were extensively discussed on radio, television, and in the press. All this, we can say, stimulated the taking root of certain ideas and principles in the social awareness. It stimulated a new psychological climate which has made the maneuvres of the opponents of détente on the European continent more difficult. It hardly needs to be said that new successes on the way to creating a European security system - essentially the first regional security system - in which both the socialist and capitalist countries participate, will further strengthen this new psychology of European nations, the psychology of peaceful coexistence and the strict and voluntary observance of its principles. The same can be said about the concrete steps that were taken to reinforce the collaboration between individual states, and the governmental and social organizations of Europe, the USA, and Canada in solving the general European problems such as the protection of our environment, the creation of a single energy system for Europe, and so on. It would also promote the strengthening of a new psychology of European nations and the reinforcing of principles of peaceful coexistence in the practice of external European relations. I also think that the development of economic contacts, more intensive cultural and scientific exchanges, more frequent meetings between the people working in society, the trade unions, state organizations, and of tourism; in other words, of the general sphere of continuous contacts at various levels, which are not coupled with actions

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giving rise to the suspicion of undermining activities, would also reinforce this new psychology of European nations. We welcome further contributions by the USA and Canada, as non-European powers, toward changing Europe into a continent offering peace and a mutually profitable collaboration.

Are you of the opinion that it is possible to achieve a sincere and mutual understanding between Europe, the USSR, and the USA - industrialized countries - on the question of disarmament, which would free enormous financial resources for helping our fellow men in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in raising their living conditions?

Yes, in my opinion it is possible to create far more understanding for these problems when states with various social systems allow themselves to be guided in their mutual relations by the principles of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have put forward a range of constructive proposals concerning these matters. I would remind you of one of these proposals: the one proposed by the USSR and adopted by the UN General Assembly to reduce by ten percent the military budgets of states that are permanent members of the Security Council and to spend part of these resources to assist underdeveloped countries.

In view of your own experience with the Americans - you regularly visit the USA and your institute receives practically all the American scientific publications - are you optimistic concerning the chances of an improvement in the relations, a rapprochement, between the future generations of your country and America?

As a scientific worker who is officially engaged in studying the USA and the Soviet-American relations, I must be realistic. I can see both the positive and negative sides of the present American policy and the trend of its future development. It seems to me that the general balance of these pros and cons give more and more rise to a certain optimism. In relations between the two countries, and in international relations as a whole, a number of important positive changes have already been achieved. As for the future, I am firmly convinced that this belongs to the relations of peaceful coexistence and not to relations appropriate to the Cold War. There is adequate evidence that Cold War relations are not only fruitless but also dangerous to the interests of all nations. The future lies in peaceful coexistence and elaborate international collaboration, and more and more importance will therefore be given to those problems which can only be solved by the combined efforts of many states. These problems are, for example, the protection of our natural environment, rational use of the energy resources of the earth and oceans,

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the development of food production on a scale adequate to secure the lives of a growing world population, and a solution of global problems such as regulating the weather. Naturally, the processes of positive changes in international relations, including those between the USSR and the USA, will meet with the resistance of opponents of détente. A way will have to be found to get through this complicated and sometimes fierce struggle. There are also quite considerable problems resulting from the years of the Cold War, which has left its traces in the general awareness, not only among professional politicians but also in certain social circles. In our study of the USA, my colleagues of the institute and I can see this quite clearly. It concerns widespread prejudices in regard to the USSR, suspicion, insufficient knowledge, and the wish not to become familiar with the actual position and possibilities of the other party. But in this respect changes are also taking place and a fading of old prejudices is now under way. We may assume that this process will be accelerated in the future. The generation which is now growing up in America has important advantages in this respect, for it is less infected with the prejudices dating from the Cold War. This generation is growing up in circumstances in which the futility of atomic warfare and military solutions is more and more understood. The wave of dissatisfaction with the war in Vietnam which got hold of the American young people at the end of the sixties and during the early seventies is important evidence in this respect. All this means hope for us that a new American generation will be even more interested in strengthening peace, in the complete liquidation of all leftovers from the Cold War, and in changing international relations on the basis of peace, coexistence, and collaboration.

As far as our Soviet citizens are concerned, and I include the older generation, which bore the burdens of the Second World War - a war which demanded the lives of twenty million of our people - it is also greatly in favor of a policy which aims at strengthening peace and extending international cooperation. There is no doubt that likewise the young people of the Soviet Union - our new generation - hold on to these ideals and will be consistent supporters of improving relations between the USSR and all other countries, including the United States of America.