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25. Alexander Yefremov
Professor Alexander Yefremov was born in the USSR in 1921. He studied at the Institute for Foreign Languages in Moscow. From 1960 to 1961 he was editor of the magazine Za Rubjezem (Across the Border). From 1961 to 1965 he was associated with the Soviet Organization for foreign journalists and later became a member of the Board of the Soviet Journalists' Association. Since 1972 he has been secretary of the school responsible for the education of functionaries of the National Workers Union. Professor Yefremov is also chairman of the Council for Public Information, a subsidiary of the Soviet Peace Council. He has published several books, which include Behind the Curtain of Limited Wars and Europe and Nuclear Arms.
How does the Soviet Union interpret the word ‘détente?’
By ‘détente’ we mean, of course, the easing of international tensions so as to reduce the possibility of a military confrontation. This is the most important part. In addition, we mean the development of the widest possible cooperation in the political, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural fields. A détente cannot be limited to the termination of any military confrontation or a weakening of this confrontation. In order to be complete and lasting as well as irrevocable, such a relaxation must go hand in hand with an improvement in the atmosphere of confidence among states and nations. This is why we are of the opinion that a strengthening of this cooperation must be the main basis of détente. Experience gained during the last few years shows that groups who hold this opinion are more successful than those who maintain that it is necessary to begin with a military relaxation first. Experience shows that purely military peace without sufficient political preparation and without creating an atmosphere of trust cannot be a solid basis for détente. We have already witnessed some cases of unilateral reductions in armed forces by some parties, but political conflicts always continued, after which tensions quickly reappeared, while expenditures on arms and military equipment was increased again. This experience alone shows how important it is to create such conditions as to
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exclude the possibility of escalating military conflicts, escalating a tension which may lead to the use of violence in relations between states. That is why we attach great value to creating certain principles among states, such as the recognition of existing frontiers, the exclusion of the use of violence, or the threat of violence among states, as well as mutually beneficial cooperation and many other principles which are already reflected in agreements and treaties that have been arrived at between this country, the United States, France, the German Federal Republic, and a number of other countries. If these principles are not looked upon as scraps of paper, as mere empty words, but as a solid penetration into the psychology, not only of the states concerned, but of all nations, we may hold the opinion that a genuine relaxation will be guaranteed.
As to what we thought when the United States announced a military state of alarm [in October, 1973, after hostilities broke out in the Middle East] or an increased state of readiness of US military forces including nuclear weapons, I will tell you this. At the time I was present at the World Peace Congress in Moscow and I spoke to many colleagues, particularly from European countries, because I was working in the European Committee for Security, attended by some 400 representatives, mainly from European countries. There were also many representatives from Latin America, Africa, and Asia. When we exchanged opinions concerning this American action, the impression was gained that everyone was highly alarmed as a result of this situation. It goes without saying that such action is not in accordance with a general relaxation or détente. But there is also something else. This is my personal opinion and I have not yet come across this view in the official press, but I can share my opinion with you. Personally, I believe that this action by the American government was related in many ways to the internal situation in the United States, particularly to the Watergate affair. This is my conviction. During this period, when the position of President Nixon was extremely complicated, he felt the need of turning public attention from a complicated situation, and in so doing, to divert attention from widespread criticism addressed to him. Particularly during those days people were considering what had to be done about the tapes and so on. Everyone knows about this. Taking this into account, I personally was not very alarmed. But the fact is, of course, that a situation could develop which would be different from whatever some government had in mind when announcing a state of alarm. In such conditions, it should be remembered that factors will start operating which may
sometimes have an effect contrary to the original intention and the will of the government involved. A very dangerous situation might arise which might unexpectedly result in a con- | |
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flict destructive to our entire civilization. That is why such experiments are, naturally, extremely dangerous and, regardless of the question as to what brought the American government to declare the state of alarm, their action was in itself a great threat to peace. It is completely understandable that West European states were worried about the fact that they were not consulted on this matter. You probably know as well as I do that the announcement that American armies were to be brought into a state of preparedness was only made to the Allies in the morning, whereas the US armed forces had already been brought into a state of readiness before this announcement was made to other Western countries. I fully understand that West European representatives were surprised at this behavior. They considered it very strange that such an extremely important matter should have been decided upon by using the telephone for discussing it with such partners as Edward Heath, Willy Brandt, or Georges Pompidou. After all, it is no small affair when the largest military power, which is stationed all over the world and also has its bases on European territory, is brought into a state of alarm. This is why events during the days of the conflict in the Middle East in 1973 showed once more how extremely important it is that conditions should be created in which actions of this nature will never be repeated.
Professor Norbert Wiener once wrote that there can be no progress when information is not available. The opinion in the West is that a détente would have to mean more exchanges at cultural levels and, particularly, at in formative levels. This means not only sending the Bolshoi to the West but, for instance, allowing the publicity media to circulate freely. When I am in Moscow, it is impossible for me to obtain non-Communist foreign newspapers such as the New York Times, Le Monde, or the Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant.
An active cultural exchange is an extremely important factor for détente and for improving general cooperation among states. In this respect, the Soviet public is completely in favor of the widest possible development of cultural cooperation among the largest possible groups among populations; among scientists, painters, authors, poets, and so forth. I think you and I are optimistic in this respect and that our opinion is that the situation will develop in a way which corresponds with the interest of peace. However, we have certain doubts in this respect and I believe that these doubts should be understood in the West. In this country certain traditions were formed in the education of our young people and the education of our society. And, naturally, people in this country watch with apprehension at the possible arrival of outside propaganda in our society, which would lower the moral
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level of our population. We do not wish this to happen. We know particularly well the danger of the drug mania which we can at present observe in many nations, of many varieties of gangsterism, and of whims among the young which could lead, if introduced here, to highly undesirable consequences for our society. We are also against the dissemination of pornography, which is abundantly available in some places. In this respect we have formed our own traditions. When we speak of a guarantee in respect of a full exchange of information with the West, or when we approach the remaining questions from this point of view - taking the problem as a whole - I think that we will find a solution which will be in the interest of humanism and that of a further development of our civilization.
You recently established an office for copyrights in Moscow which may bring us a step nearer to the exchange of publications.
The manager of this new office is an old friend of mine, Boris Pankin. He used to be a journalist, like me. I have discussed these matters with him, and I think that the establishment of a new agency for copyrights in the Soviet Union will promote the exchange of literature between our countries and the West. Undoubtedly, this will bring some order to possible claims on either side and, in addition, it will assist in informing each other concerning new publications in the West and in the Soviet Union. I think that in this way much can be achieved. The public here attaches great value to the setting up of this office.
Last year a book of mine was published, called Europe and Nuclear Weapons. It was published in Moscow. But I have already received a copy published by the American government in Washington, D.C. It contains the complete text of some 400 pages. The book was reproduced by means of Xeroxes. The fact that we have no copyright agreements apparently makes it impossible for my book to be published in the West the normal way. Therefore, this is now being done in a semiclandestine way, if I may call it that. It seems to me that it could also be very important that opinions of our scientists be published on a larger scale in the West so that we may understand each other better.
Just as there, reigns confusion in our part of the world as to what the Soviet Union believes détente means, there are also many interpretations in regard to what your country and your government consider ‘concrete peaceful coexistence.’
Undoubtedly. We believe that in every society there is always a certain struggle going on between various groups and various classes - the history
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of mankind shows that such a struggle always went on - and that this struggle will undoubtedly exist in the future. By peaceful coexistence we mean that there are two kinds of states, each with its different social structure. In the one system - that of the capitalist states - there is private ownership of the means of production and in the other system - the socialist one - the communal ownership of the means of production is given priority. This is the main difference between the two systems. We are of the opinion that peaceful coexistence should mean that every country and each of these two systems will develop further and that the future will show which structure offers the best prospects, or which structure will be victorious, particularly as a result of such peaceful competition. When we recall the writings of Lenin on this point, we see that he said we should set an example through our economic policies and by our economic achievements. Most of our attention is devoted to this aim in order to ensure a higher standard of living and a greater satisfaction of the cultural and spiritual needs of our citizens. And, if we achieve greater successes in this respect - and we are convinced of these successes - this will, in our opinion, have a corresponding effect on states that still have a capitalist structure. It is no coincidence that if you look at Latin American nations or those in Africa and Asia, and the way in which they are developing, you see that they, too, are now trying everywhere to achieve state ownership of the means of production. This shows that in doing so more stable conditions for the development of the economy are created, so that economic crises will be avoided.
We think that peaceful coexistence particularly should mean that each system should have the opportunity to develop in whichever way it wants to and to show the way in which it can achieve these earlier-mentioned goals: a higher standard of living for all the population and the fulfillment of all its needs. This is what we mean by peaceful coexistence: each system is to have its own development, a development along various lines, but without ever forcing other parties to adopt the same ideas. We are against the export of revolution as we are against the export of counterrevolution.
And there is another matter to be raised on the subject of international relaxation within the framework of peaceful coexistence. For such a coexistence is only possible through means of a general relaxation. But this relaxation, let me repeat, must not only be accompanied by a weakening of military confrontation, but simultaneously by a development of the widest possible useful collaboration on either side in the fields of economy, science, technology, and culture.
On the subject of relaxation of tensions, the Secretary-General of NATO,
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my respected compatriot and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Luns, stressed this difference in the concept of ‘peaceful coexistence’ between our different parts of the world in the course of an interview with the American magazine Newsweek in 1972. He indicated that while the Soviet Union talks of peace, it was, in fact, only interested in war. This, then, is the opinion of the highest NATO official. Would Mr. Luns, then, be merely a purveyor of fairy tales?
The opinions of Mr. Luns concerning détente are nothing new. I remember his predecessor, Maulio Brosio, saying the same things on the eve of his departure as Secretary-General. In my book European Security and the NATO, I have elaborated on this question. I have paid attention to the statements by Brosio, who has described the myth of this Soviet threat in some detail. This myth has continuously played an important part in the history of NATO as a major dogma which has opened the possibility of realizing certain ideas of NATO. In my opinion, lessons of history are very instructive. It appears to me that whenever there was any question of any reduction in the arms race, it was always accompanied by a revival of the myth of threats by the Soviet Union. At the end of the first stage of the Cold War - I mean, at the end of the unfavorable developments in the beginning of the fifties - when there was some discussion concerning the possibility that the Soviet Union might attack Europe any day, I remember a statement in January, 1951, made by General Lauris Norstad that the question would not be whether there would be any war but in which month of the year 1951 the war would start. The point of view of the Supreme Commander of NATO thus was made crystal clear. And we are remember the statement by Thomas K. Finletter, the former Secretary of the United States Air Force, who also once began a book, Power and Politics, in a similar vein. He wrote that the day was near when the Russians would have sufficient bombs and planes available to start a sudden attack on the United States which was to destroy cities and the greater part of American industry. Naturally, the incorrectness of such statements was later recognized. In April, 1959, Marshall Montgomery, Deputy Commander in chief of the NATO forces, admitted that Russia had no intention of attacking the West, but this was only said at a very late stage.
In the meantime, the military expenditure of NATO rose during the years 1949 to 1954 from 18.7 billion dollars to 56.3 billion. This meant that in the course of five years it was raised more than three times. The second time we saw that the myth concerning a threat to the world by the East was again spread on a wide scale during the beginning of the sixties. We remember, for instance, the NATO Council in Oslo in 1961, when rumors concerning preparations for a Communist attack were circulated. A call was
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then made for a new round in the arms race. Then, in the sixties, we saw again that NATO expenditures rose by 10 billion dollars, which was again followed by Robert McNamara's admission that there had been no justification for this arms race since the date concerning Soviet military programs, which had formed the basis of the continuation of the arms race, had been completely incorrect, and the Soviet Union had not drawn up any part of such a gigantic military program. The whole affair had been a deliberate falsification. When we now look at the arguments used by Luns on this question we naturally no longer find such direct statements to the effect that the Soviet Union is about to play the part of a wolf attacking the West European Little Red Ridinghood. Naturally, nobody would write like this anymore, for it would be too naïve. The allegation of a Russian threat is now being made in a more disguised form by saying that the Soviet Union aims at creating a situation in which the Soviet sphere of influence will be able to spread gradually over Western Europe. The argument used by the British war office is particularly interesting. According to a theory raised by Mr. Peter Blaker, the Soviet Union does not want to develop normal relations with the capitalist countries as the Soviet Union would not want to put up with the existence of a Western society, as it sees no prospects for an economic war with the West. This assumption then leads to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is attaching greater importance to the use of violence and so the threat of the Soviet Union consists particularly in this use of violence. This in turn means that imaginary intentions are ascribed to the Soviet Union, in that the Soviet Union is supposedly building up a colossal military potential. I would like for the West to approach such statements more objectively, for in spite of the lessons of the past,
when data concerning military programs of the Soviet Union was falsified, these kinds of falsifications go even further. Let us recall, for instance, that President John F. Kennedy, when he came to the White House, had the data handed out by NATO checked. This data alleged that the Soviet Union had far more people under arms than NATO, that is to say, some 175 to 200 divisions. When these figures had been checked, Secretary of Defense McNamara informed Kennedy that the number of divisions was only half as large. Recently, we have again been hearing talk of enormous Soviet military programs, of a gigantic arms race, and so on. As compared to the usual standard of misrepresentations, these are most inventive fairy tales. It is now said, for instance, that the military expenditures of the Soviet Union - the figures were published by the London Institute for Strategic Studies, among others - amounted to 77 billion dollars for the year 1972. Therefore, these were supposed to be even higher than military expenditures by the United
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States, although it was known that America spent 79 billion on military purposes during 1972. The Soviet Union spent 17.9 billion roubles, in accordance with its budget. The interesting part is that the falsification of these figures is even to be found in military reports in the Western press. For instance, I recently looked through the Military Review in connection with an article I was preparing. This expert magazine stated as its immediate conclusion that military budgets of NATO countries are twenty percent higher than those of the Warsaw Pact countries and that the number of NATO divisions was higher than that of the USSR and its allies. You can see that statements alleging that the Soviet Union has a far larger military potential, and therefore constitutes a threat to the safety of the West, and that it is using the policy of relaxation to arm itself in the meantime, are even at times proven to be absurd and not to correspond with the actual facts in the military circles of some Western countries. Naturally, I understand Luns' intention, for he wishes to maintain at all costs the continuing increases in armaments expenditures. Here I must once more point out that after General Andrew J. Goodpaster, commander in chief of the NATO forces, had stated in 1970 that there was a massive Soviet power buildup in Europe, and after he had urged for a renewal of the armament race, military expeditures immediately went up. In 1971, military expenditures by European NATO countries rose by 1.3 billion dollars. In 1972 they rose by another 5.4 billion compared to the previous year. From these figures it is evident that this strong rise in military expenditures is coupled with the propaganda campaign concerning Soviet military threats. On this point we can say, of course, that every authority may say what it likes. But we should always consider the facts, and they are quite clear.
That the Soviet Union aims at a true relaxation is evident, not only from the official statements by the Soviet government, but also from concrete steps: concluding treaties on the restriction in the use of strategic nuclear weapons; the proposal which was made in Vienna at the Disarmament Conference in the course of the negotiations concerning disarmament; the proposal to reduce military expenditures by ten percent on the part of the countries that are permanent members of the Security Council; and many other proposals aimed at military relaxation. As far as stories concerning the Soviet threats are concerned, history confirmed a long time ago that these are propaganda cover-ups for the continuation of the arms race. I believe that we should aim very soberly and patiently, very realistically and quietly, at successful negotiations concerning military relaxation and a development of mutual cooperation. By doing so, the influence of this myth on the public at large will be weakened.
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Circles in the West claim that Moscow has no bona fide intentions in the disarmament negotiations, for your country refuses, for instance, to receive the former Secretary-General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, as a special envoy to discuss these matters. As a scientist, can you give me a personal opinion?
I will give you my personal opinion. I think that every government, when it is asked to talk to someone who has practically always expressed his doubts concerning the Soviet Union as regards the détente, who has always accused the other party of some unwillingness to start genuinely peaceful coexistence, and who has always been behind the arms race in order to try to continue this endless spiral of armaments; the selection of such a person as a representative of the entire Atlantic bloc in itself quite rightly raises doubts as to the sincerity of the mission and as to its chances of success. This is one side of the problem, which is connected with Brosio's personality. But I believe that there is another factor here, which is that we also had in mind the position of a number of other European states; that is to say that a discussion of the problems in connection with a reduction of forces should not be the sole prerogative of the existing blocs. About fifteen European states belong neither to NATO nor to the Warsaw Pact countries, so any discussions behind their backs would raise certain objections on the part of these countries which, in our opinion, might worsen the general atmosphere of the discussions. In my opinion, these two reasons are sufficiently convincing.
Taking into account the energy crisis, as well as the general economic problems of the world, don't you believe that disarmament should have priority over anything else in order to prevent mankind from wasting over 200 billion dollars a year on weapons of destruction?
Undoubtedly, the energy crisis in the Western countries is forcing people to reflect on many things, particularly on the question as to how the future should develop. And naturally one of the first and main steps in overcoming this crisis is a discontinuation of the military confrontation - in reducing armaments - which would result in gigantic savings. We are sufficiently aware that military expenditures at present amount to over 200 billion dollars a year. Naturally, if these funds were spent on peaceful development, it would be possible to fully utilize the resources which are present on earth. In addition, it occurs to me that the main road leading to a liquidation of this crisis should first of all be disarmament, and this should be combined with a simultaneous and large-scale economic cooperation initiative between states, even if they have adopted the most opposing social systems. Returning once more to peaceful coexistence and relaxation, it seems to me that a successful achievement of coexistence and détente will be the most effective
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guarantee for liquidating the results of the energy crisis and will also prevent a further deterioration of this crisis.
As you know, the MIT study Limits to Growth, has attracted attention in Western countries and others. Is there also concern in Soviet scientific circles over growth, population, regulation of natural resources, and how a more just distribution of the wealth might be achieved?
The question you raise is undoubtedly of tremendous importance for all countries, regardless of their social systems. Our scientists are thinking a great deal about it and much mutual consultation is taking place. If the solution of these problems cannot be realized in the immediate future, they will have very serious consequences, both of an ecological and demographic nature, and they may explode in some other more serious direction. But it appears to me that it is difficult at this moment to discuss a concrete solution. In any case, it is quite clear that it is necessary to organize an investigation of these problems in great detail and along very serious lines to which all scientists all over the world should contribute - scientists of the developing countries as well as of the socialist and capitalist countries - so that these problems can be judged concretely and fully so as to enable them to be submitted for further study in the United Nations. The problems should be tackled along a wide front. We naturally are not allowed to remain silent on these problems nor are we allowed to avoid them. Our scientists are prepared to make a great contribution in this field and personally I was very pleased that at the Congress of Peaceful Nations held in Moscow [1973] a special committee was doing serious work on our environment problems. Many interesting statements were made and our scientists are now looking closely at them so that they can be used in practical work done by our scientific institutes. I also think that these problems should afterward become the subject of a most profound and thorough analysis. Of course, our viewpoints vary concerning the way in which they should be solved, but it seems to us that if we are prepared to show sufficient goodwill and to carefully judge all factors involved, we will be able to find solutions which will ultimately satisfy all mankind.
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