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13. Shinkichi Eto
Professor Shinkichi Eto was born November 16, 1923, in Mukden, China. He was graduated in law at the University of Tokyo in 1948. From 1949 to 1953 he worked at the Institute of Oriental Culture at the same university. In 1953 he was associate professor of political science at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. In 1967 Mr. Eto became professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo, where he is at present chairman of the International Relations Department. Among his recent publications in English are Moderation and Radicalism in the Chinese Revolution, Essays of Interpretation, and ‘Postwar Japanese and Chinese Relations,’ in Survey magazine.
In discussing Japan's position in today's world, forecasts were made that Japan will become even richer than the United States. Surely, Japan is becoming economically powerful. But you also need peace to survive, in order to guarantee a constant flow of raw materials and so forth. How do
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you expect Japan to handle this power in view of the rich natural resources of Southeast Asia and, for instance, a developing China?
The basic attitude of Japan since World War Two has been one of noninvolvement. In terms of international relations, it will remain so. Perhaps, under the overwhelming influence and impact of the United States, Japan at first leaned towards Nationalist China on Taiwan. After all, we were strongly tied to the security pact with Washington. With the acceptance of these two major involvements, Japan remained noncommittal vis-à-vis various international conflicts.
I feel that this basic attitude or political approach will continue in the 1970's and 1980's. The reasons for this are as follows: Japan will remain a house divided against itself in terms of domestic politics. The government cannot exert strong leadership in terms of external policies. When the government intends to make move A, the opposition certainly will take a stand anti-A. The balance then will end up being a decision with only a little bit of A. That's all. For instance, some Japanese politicians wanted to increase defense expenditures radically and rather swiftly. But the opposition has constantly opposed such measures. Consequently, national defense, or the increased rate of the defense budget, has been only very gradual. It remains at less than one percent of the gross national product.
Again, this linkage of domestic and external policies makes it impossible for Japan to pursue rather active and positive policies in the realm of international relations. That's the first reason. Secondly, sooner or later the LDP will lose its majority in the Lower House, the House of Representatives.
By LDP, you mean the Liberal Democratic Party.
Yes. A true coalition government in Japan will become possible either in the latter half of the 1970's or in the early 1980's. Then, surely, the existing policies of Japan will be changed. For instance: the opposition has been opposing all along the American-Japanese Security Treaty. They have also been opposing the present system of national defense. And, thirdly, they have been opposing the economic expansion of Japan in the less-developed countries.
Why is that?
I don't know. Ask them! Also, the opposition has been very suspicious of Japanese economic collaboration with less-developed countries. They have interpreted our present economic cooperation with developing lands -
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- like Brazil?
Yes - as economic imperialism. As soon as they are successful in forming a coalition government, there will be major changes in present policies.
And the third question I should raise in this respect is that nobody in Japan, including myself, knows what direction Japan should go in the international community. Some extremists are inclined to advocate their own ideological philosophy, but the big majority in Japan, the moderate and practical people, have no idea in what direction Japan should develop. For instance, our economic activities in the outside world have created ambivalent sentiments on the part of the recipient nations.
Like Thailand.
Exactly. Perhaps they owe a lot to Japanese economic activities in their country, following Japanese management and Japanese technology. Japanese money has been invested there and it has made an increase in the Thai per capita national income possible, but at the same time -
- they owe you too much and you possess too much.
Precisely. They often blame us for our overbearing presence there. Certainly the nationalist sentiments of the Thais have been injured by Japanese economic activities and increasing alienation has been the result. The majority of the Japanese people have no inkling of what the adequate speed of our economic expansion or collaboration in other nations should be. That is our problem. These are the three main reasons that Japan will not play an active role in the international community, at least for another few years.
But at the same time, with the support of Washington, it is suggested that Japan be given a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations.
Well, economically speaking, you could safely say Japan's role in the international community has been increasing. For instance, we have plenty of surplus in foreign currencies. Therefore, we are forced to spend a lot of money outside Japan. Likewise, we are forced to initiate capital investments abroad. But, on the other hand, I am not so optimistic about the increase of Japan's role, politically speaking, in the international community, for the basic reasons I have just explained, while in addition, the United Nations seems a very complicated organization. Perhaps the United States made a public statement to that effect, but I do not know whether Washington will make a concrete proposal.
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They did already.
No, no. They declared the intention, but they offered no concrete proposal as to how Japan should be invited as a permanent member of the Security Council. Surely, India or Brazil would not be too happy about it, while Italy, I understand, has been eyeing a seat as a permanent member for some time.
Italy would be ridiculous. Brazil and India, yes. France and Great Britain should be thrown out as permanent members, forth with. They represent the world power structure of 1945!
All right, that is your point of view. But objectively speaking, the possibility of Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council is not bright.
The young people of Japan, when I walk on the campus of Kyoto University, look like students in California - blue jeans, sweaters, driving about in their cars. But, to them, how much is surface glamor and how much is inner conviction that what comes from the United States is good for Japan? What lives in the hearts of your students?
That is a very good question. Since students belong to the intellectual set, let me talk about Japanese intellectuals. They have two major characteristics. First, Japanese intellectuals make a very clear distinction between what they really feel inside and what they talk about or write about in public. What they really feel includes some admiration - perhaps that is even too strong a word - for the white man, including Western Europeans and Americans.
Perhaps more hidden admiration, not manifested openly.
Best described by the psychological term ‘inferiority complex.’ Therefore, Japanese intellectuals are always eager to have contacts with, for instance, French culture, or, let us say, the American way of life. At the same time, the basic inferiority complex of Japanese intellectuals has made them hide their true sentiments vis-à-vis the non-Oriental. Because in their hearts they do criticize the United States and even like to think about the decline and downfall of European civilization. They like to discover defects and shortcomings in American society or Western society in general. It really is extremely difficult to discover the real and true feelings of Japanese intellectuals toward Western society. Let me give an example.
A very radical left-wing professor, who had been vocal about American imperialism and had written numerous articles against American activities in
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Asia, and who supported student riots enthusiastically, was contacted by the United States Information Service in Tokyo, which asked him to come to America and study there during a three-month tour. He immediately accepted and he did go to the United States. He had a pleasant journey, accompanied by a special interpreter provided by the State Department. Nevertheless, he continued to criticize America.
After his return to Japan?
Surely. Nonetheless I am convinced this professor is fond of Americans and of the American way of life.
But isn't it possible to be fond of America and Americans and be deadly opposed to the damned system, Nixon, and the corrupt politics of that kind of world?
That is true. Well, Nixon is, let us say, a different matter. This is just a scandal and people do not like scandals. But, I would say, some of these critics of the American way of life and the system of private initiative - the American capitalistic system - seem to be fond of the luxuries offered by the system. At the same time, if they are invited by Peking, they are equally delighted to visit the People's Republic of China, but the moment they leave the country and reach Hong Kong, most of them comment that they are extremely happy to be out of that state again. They compare China to a military ballet, and complain about its totalitarian system, but when they return to Tokyo, they will address people in public and unanimously praise China for its various accomplishments. They never criticize the Peking rulers in public. Now, this is a very good contrast by which to portray Japanese intellectuals, no matter how left-wing or how right-wing they may feel politically.
Therefore, we as international relation experts nowadays pay very much attention to the basic psychological structures of various nations. Without trying to analyze various nations psychologically, and study their behavior patterns, we cannot analyze international relations anymore. And I think this is particularly true in trying to analyze the Japanese people.
In my few trips to Japan, I have learned that much about the ‘computer’ in Japanese heads.
The Japanese psychology should be compared to an onion: you peel one layer and another appears. Then, peel that one and another presents itself. And each layer differs from the other.
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What matters is the linkage between these layers.
Right.
But what is the attitude of your students toward Japan, not only insofar as it expands into an economic giant, but also their feelings about Japan's international obligations on the political front?
They are very puzzled. When they are very young, like the freshmen in the universities, they are very romantic and idealistic. I would say more than ninety percent of the freshmen in our universities are against the rearmament of Japan. They are against power politics and against corruption in Japanese business and political circles. They are extremely enthusiastic about pursuing righteousness and justice in the community. But once they become juniors, they begin to realize how complicated the reality of the human society in this world is. Some will become conservative and more realistic. I would say that when they become seniors, ninety percent of the students are busy trying to find a good job, visiting various private firms, taking government exams, and most of them have become very realistic. Therefore, the problem is this: how to reconcile their idealism and romanticism with reality. After all, corruption certainly exists even in the government. Look at government officials - all of them are wealthy! Even Prime Minister Tanaka has not hesitated to give money to journalists. Or let me rephrase this statement: even Tanaka has not hesitated to spend plenty of money for his own political purposes. Also, externally, Japan is confronted continuously with various kinds of power politics. Sometimes Japan even has to cope with blackmail directed at us by weak powers.
Like the Arabs?
Indeed. The Arab countries are protesting our friendly relations with Israel. Also, when President Sukarno of Indonesia provoked a clash about Irian-Barat [West New Guinea] with the Dutch, his government vehemently protested the visit of a Dutch aircraft carrier to Yokohama harbor. Finally, the Japanese government decided to yield to Sukarno. That is an example of blackmail by weak powers.
Perhaps. But Sukarno apparently was not that weak, if he succeeded in forcing his will upon Japan. Which nation was weak, Japan or Indonesia, or Sukarno for that matter?
Indonesia is weak compared to Japan.
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Japan was the weakest because it gave in!
Exactly. And that is what puzzles young Japanese students the most. They begin to realize how dirty world-politics are and they sometimes wish they could get rid of that world.
By the time they themselves become politicians they will behave as their fathers do now and be corrupt, no?
Precisely. That is the change that takes place in human beings constantly. We have always seen it in Japan.
What I find hard to understand is that so many democratic governments maintain close and profitable relations with some of the most corrupt and inhuman regimes in Southeast Asia today, like Thailand, before the recent coup, or Sukarno's Indonesia, where first hundreds of thousands of peasants were slaughtered by the fascists and then many thousands more were imprisoned indefinitely in concentration camps. No wonder Japan, too, runs into difficulties with the masses of Southeast Asia.
I do not wish to make any comment as to whether or not the governments of Thailand and Indonesia are corrupt. What kind of policy and what kind of government they have is solely their business.
What I wish to stress here is the fact that the Japanese people had a period of 220 years of complete seclusion, from 1639 to 1854, in addition to the geographical isolation inherent in an island country. The Japanese people are not used to dealing with the various cultural conflicts that occur when different cultures meet. They have a tendency to be oblivious to the culture, thinking, and behavior patterns of other peoples, with the exception of West Europeans and the Chinese. Since the Japanese people were located along the periphery of the sphere of influence of the Chinese Han civilization until the 1850's, and have been located in the periphery of Western civilization's sphere since, they have developed an inferiority-complex psychology toward these two cultures.
What disturbs me is a prevailing tendency among the Japanese to be polite, generous, and flexible when dealing with the Chinese and Westerners, but self-centered, arrogant, and inflexible toward other peoples. Unless these characteristics can be corrected, I do not think we can solve the anti-Japanese problem in Asia.
How do you see the development of communication between Japanese
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youths - you help to raise them - and the hundreds of millions of Chinese youngsters being brainwashed by methods inspired by Mao?
That is a very good question, too. Let me take the example of Kissinger's feelings about Japanese and Chinese leaders. Prior to his going to Peking I am sure Kissinger harbored a very suspicious state of mind vis-à-vis the Peking rulers, including Chou En-lai. But as soon as he began to examine various international problems with Chou En-lai, both of them discovered that they held the same point of view, namely, power politics. Both of them discovered that they had the same strong intentions of pursuing their own national interests. No matter how convincingly Chou spoke about the moral problems of our age, it was all just window dressing. Another peel, and under the layer there was that old power-politics-oriented state-of-mind.
Kissinger became fascinated by Chou En-lai, whereas, in talking with Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira, he couldn't find a common ground. Therefore, I am sure the United States and the People's Republic of China will be able to continue a substantial dialogue. On the other hand I am very worried indeed about a future dialogue between the Japanese and Chinese peoples. On the surface, both nations are talking of moral problems, of Asian liberation movements -
- of airline communications.
Yes - and of economic collaboration. But I do not think there is a common ground for further detailed discussions. Misunderstandings will take place sooner or later, and misunderstandings between the two nations could easily create political conflicts. I am very much worried about this. I am still young, so I do not like to see these kinds of future conflicts between China and Japan develop. In our department, we will continue to be detached and try to analyze Chinese-Japanese relations so as to find a way to avoid future conflicts. After all, that is my obligation as a scholar.
Are you training students to know the maximum about the new China? Do they learn to speak Chinese?
Yes, certainly. I have been doing my best to recruit first-rate university students for the field of Asian studies, and, in particular, China studies.
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