On Growth Two

9., 10., 11. Mikhail Sladkovsky, Andrei P. Markov, Anatoly M. Malukhin^*

Mikhail Sladkovsky was born November 21, 1906, in the Siberian village of Klukwennaja. He was graduated in economics from the State University for the Far East at Vladivostok in 1930. In 1966 he became director of the Institute for the Far Eastern Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Professor Sladkovsky has written numerous books, among which are A History of Economic Relations between the USSR and China, The Foreign Policy of China, and China and Japan.

Andrei P. Markov was born in 1915 in Siberia. He was graduated from the Pedagogical Institute in Irkutsk and from the School of High Diplomacy in Moscow, and has been a journalist-observer of interna-

* The following three interviews are presented as one unit since they took place in a tripartite meeting in the Far Eastern Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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tional problems. Professor Markov is a researcher at the Far Eastern Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Among his publications are Alliance Against Peace in Asia, Japan on the Road to Rearmament, Japanese Militarism (co-author), and From Antiimperialism to Antisocialism.

Professor Anatoly M. Malukhin was born in Russia in 1911. In 1932 he was graduated from the Moscow Engineering Institute and from 1933 to 1936 he worked for the Soviet railway system. From 1937 through 1943 he was a journalist, after which he joined the School for Diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. He worked in the Foreign Office from 1947 to 1968. Over the years he has specialized in Chinese affairs and in 1969 was nominated China specialist of the Far Eastern Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

A few years ago, during a visit to Moscow, I asked my friend Olga Chechotkina of Pravda, ‘What is Russia's principal problem in Asia?’ To my surprise her answer was not China, as I had anticipated, but Japan.

PROFESSOR SLADKOVSKY

I think that the importance of any country is determined by a number of factors and not by a single one. If we were to speak from a point of view of the development of our economic relations, naturally Japan would occupy a very important position. Here we enjoy the prospect of an important expansion in our relations. But when we are talking from a political point of view, then naturally China occupies a certain position in our considerations, since it is no secret that the present Chinese leaders have created a fairly tense atmosphere along our frontiers over the past years, which was aggravated by the general situation. But actually it is not so much China itself that we are concerned with. We have historical and centuries-old relations and traditions with this nation. We have no real differences with China. The situation was aggravated mainly as a result of Mao Tse-tung coming to power and pursuing a clearly anti-Soviet policy. From the point of view of the present political situation, the problem of our relations with China has a certain, or perhaps even a fairly significant importance.

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President Sukarno of Indonesia has often said to me, ‘We have strong ties with the Dutch but we despise Dutch imperialism.’ What you are saying reminds me of this: ‘We are against Maoism but we are for the Chinese people.’

Exactly. You have phrased your remark correctly in saying that we are having problems and that the entire dispute going on at present between us and the Chinese leaders is not related to China itself, but to the Mao Tse-tung government. I should mention in this connection that the policies pursued by Mao Tse-tung are not only anti-Russian but also anti-Chinese. They are contrary to the fundamental interests of China. And here you quite rightly conclude that we should make a distinction between relations we maintain with politicians and those maintained with the people they represent. We should make this distinction in connection with fundamental interests which every nation shares with any other nation.

Considerable confusion has arisen about the disappearance of Marshal Lin Piao, who was known to have adopted a friendlier attitude to ward the Soviet Union. He crashed in an airplane in Mongolia, according to the Peking authorities, but the Soviet authorities have said that they have not found his remains.

According to all the information that has come in, Lin Piao was indeed killed, but the exact circumstances are unknown to me as well as to my institute. It is, of course, clear that Lin Piao is no longer alive but this may be due to several reasons. Various explanations may be given for this. In my opinion - and this refers not only to Lin Piao but to the entire situation in China, where political instability continues to prevail - the main cause of the Lin Piao incident was that the general line of the Communist Party, which was laid down in China in the beginning of the fifties, was destroyed. It was an eighteen-year-old line which aimed at the building up of socialism in China. Mao Tse-tung has destroyed this general policy. He spoiled the relations with the Soviet Union and other countries. In view of this, our assistance and aid came to an end. The social construction of China was thus further delayed. However, Mao Tse-tung did not really determine a new line, nor did he offer an alternative to socialism. As a result not only the Lin Piao incident was created, but a whole range of events came into being which characterize the political instability of that country. We know nothing about a special program designed by Lin Piao, but I can well imagine that when people see that one program is canceled without being replaced by a new one, they will ask themselves the question: How are we to continue?

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And then, we see that in 1972 a fairly abrupt change took place, originated by the Mao regime, in the field of foreign relations. On the one hand, the anti-Soviet attitude was strengthened and on the other hand friendship with large imperialist countries was cultivated.

It is known that Lin Piao was the chief of the Chinese army. It is also known that the army, in the course of many years, was familiarized with anti-imperialist slogans, in which the United States and imperialism, were the principle enemies. When it was then suddenly announced at the Ninth Party Congress and soon thereafter that the Soviet Union had now become enemy number one, I think that even among many people who are politically neutral great surprise arose. These sudden changes might also have caused certain feelings in army circles, the more since it was raised on the basis of such a different orientation. I think that we should not look upon the question of Lin Piao solely from the point of view of where his remains were found or trying to reconstruct the exact way in which he was killed, for this is a political matter. It is a question which is characteristic of the political instability which has arisen as a result of the destruction of the general line of the Communist Party and furthermore as a result of the absence of a clear political program for the future.

PROFESSOR MARKOV

I can give you my personal opinion. Maybe not even my colleagues will agree with this. My opinion on Lin Piao is as follows: Personally speaking, and therefore not representing the opinion of the institute in this case, I have never thought that Lin Piao could be a true supporter of Mao Tse-tung. Lin Piao was very ill and could play practically no active role in the life of the army any longer, and certainly not in that of the country. The general feeling in the army was still more or less known to him, but in relation to the political life of the country he was already absolutely isolated. In my opinion, Mao exploited Lin Piao's authority, because the marshal was someone with a great deal of importance. He was a hero dating back from the years of the civil war in the twenties and thirties and, finally, he was the main military figure during the decisive stage of the civil war during 1947, 1948, and 1949. He was commander of the principal armed forces, which were operating in Manchuria and we, in the Soviet Union, actually helped this army. Later it was this army that saw to it that the rest of Manchuria was dealt the final blow. Lin Piao became a national hero. His prestige was impressive, very great indeed. When Mao Tse-tung and his group destroyed the party, they had to call in the army, and for reinforcing their influence in

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the army, they needed Lin Piao's authority. But I repeat: anyone who knew Lin Piao would never have seriously considered him as a successor to Mao Tse-tung. He was too sick a man for this.

Regarding your remark concerning the importance of Japan. I belong to a study group making a special study of Japan. We are of the opinion that that nation is playing a very distinct role, in many respects a leading role, in the future of Asia. Professor Sladkovsky has mentioned the importance of Japan, its economic and technical potential. I should mention the Japanese ability for hard work. Japan possesses an enormous knowledge of Asia and has direct contacts with all Asian countries. It has a very great need for such contacts and for good commercial, political, strategic, and other relations. All this turns Japan into one of the claimants for leading, possibly the leading position in Asia. How can Japan gain such a position? It is known that there are circles in Japan who are of the opinion that the way that formerly was followed by Japan, that is to say the use of military force and political influence, is the best way of maintaining its status in that part of the world and that this mode of conduct is the best answer to its national aspirations. These circles are of the opinion that an active policy of rebirth, of a return to the Asian political scene, will offer Japan the best opportunities of achieving these desired results, particularly by following the earlier-mentioned policy. But the political opportunities for Japan to display such initiatives in Asia in the future are extremely limited indeed. For the relations with the Asian countries that are Japan's neighbors must be undertaken cautiously. There are many reasons for this. Consequently, the possibilities for Japan to find a common ‘language’ with its Asiatic neighbors are extremely limited. Apparently, that is why the way which Japan has now chosen to follow - to develop economic contacts with these countries and to expand its own economic possibilities - will be precisely the way which will yield the most positive results for Japan. However, these results have become more doubtful recently since this policy - the so-called economic-diplomatic policy - is basically imperialistic. It is a policy aimed at the confirmation, by means of economic strength, of Japanese domination over the countries surrounding it. Therefore, a strong movement is making itself felt in Japan, or to put it more precisely, there is an interest developing to strengthen Japan's influence in Asia in other ways. For instance, one interest wishes to follow the proposal by the Soviet Union in creating a system of collective security. The purpose here is that normal mutual relations should be created between Japan and its neighbors, both in political and economic respects. For only such relations could form a sound basis to enable Japan to create the

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situation that is needed to develop normal economic and political contacts with surrounding countries, and permit Japan to continue the road to prosperity in the future.

The Dutch were in Indonesia for centuries and when the liberation of Asia, which had been predicted by Lenin, took place in 1945 we in the Netherlands had no other answer to the Asian's call for liberty than to send in an imperialist army. We taught how to plant quinine, coffee, and tea, and how to tap rubber from trees, but there was never any real communication with Indonesians. Is not Russia facing the same problems in its communication with modern China? In the USA quite a fad has exploded among young people, even at secondary schools, to learn Mandarin Chinese. What is the situation like in the Soviet Union and is the same kind of interest in China shown by your young people?

PROFESSOR SLADKOVSKY

In our country the interest in China did not reveal itself suddenly. The relations with the various countries of Asia have shown different developments, but in regard to our interest in our principal neighbor, China, I must say that our knowledge has grown over the course of the centuries. It is therefore not a new phenomenon. It is well known that the basis for studying Chinese was once to be found among the Russian clergy. The first ecclesiastical mission to China left in the seventeenth century. In this country we once had experts on China among the clergy and, in later years, particularly after the October revolution, much sympathy for China was shown in this country. This was based mainly on political sympathy. We, the working people of Russia, showed great sympathy with China after we had taken over power in this country. Our leader, Vladimir Ilich [Lenin], taught us this. He often talked of our international obligation to assist to struggling nations, including China. I think our greatest interest, that is to say, a new move in the direction of strengthening our relations with China, took place during the twenties, when a widely organized democratic revolution started there, and when the Chinese revolutionary, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, turned to us for help.

I myself, for instance, worked at the University of Shanghai during the Chinese revolution in 1926. We, the Russians, were moved by feelings of wishing to help the Chinese people on the basis of our political principles. Afterward certain rifts developed. This happened after the end of the year 1927. Our relations were spoiled as a result of Chiang Kai-shek adopting a more or less similar attitude to that being taken by Mao Tse-tung; an

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anti-Soviet attitude. Chiang accused the Soviet Union of ‘red imperialism,’ while Mao Tse-tung is now calling us ‘socialist imperialists.’ When we look at the two statements, it appears that they coincide. I can give as an example a speech delivered by Chiang Kai-shek. As far as I remember, it was an address dating back to July, 1929, at one of the meetings organized by the leaders of the Kuomintang. If, today, you look at texts of the latest speeches delivered by Maoist leaders, you will see that the language is the same. Already in the late twenties our relations were spoiled, particularly as a result of this fierce anti-Soviet campaign. This was followed by the Japanese attack in 1931. China was subjected to great trials and the Soviet Union again started supporting the Chinese. This meant a revival in our relations. It also implied an expansion in our contacts in the field of science, and so forth. Our people traveled to China again. Our military specialists advised and helped and so did our scientists. But World War Two again caused an interruption in our relations with China. When we ourselves were engaged in a serious war, the full attention of our people and scientists was, of course, directed toward a solution of our most important problem: the struggle in Europe. Immediately after the war our interest in China and in the East increased again, especially when a new wave of liberation by the people occurred in places such as China, Japan, and Vietnam. Our interest grew and was shown particularly by our young people. And, in a matter of speaking, our people witnessed a rebirth of all those feelings which they had experienced at the beginning of our revolution: a wish to help another nation fighting for its national and social independence. We actively participated and lent our cooperation in the building of a socialist society in these Asian countries. Naturally, this required a very large extension of our relations as well as vast preparations. After the year 1958 when Mao Tse-tung - I don't have to tell you the whole history, which is sufficiently known - caused a rift in the relations with the Soviet Union. This was not the fault of the Soviet Union, but the result of the policies followed by Mao Tse-Tung. This line is best described as a chauvinistic policy followed by a big power aspiring to political hegemony. Our relations were significantly upset, and this was naturally reflected in the preparations made by our specialists. Nevertheless, because China is a neighbor and a reality for us, and because our politicians cannot ignore her, we continue to study China and to prepare our young people to study Chinese language and civilization. We base our decisions on our belief in the future. We know that there have been high and low tides in our relations with China before and that there always was anti-Sovietism whenever a counter revolution predominated. This was the case from 1927 to 1931. It was likewise the case during World War Two when the situation

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on the fronts was bad. At that time the Kuomintang displayed an anti-Soviet attitude. We believe that in the future the Asian peoples, including the Chinese, will maintain friendly relations with us.

And yet, as regards communicating with Asians - I have just arrived from Japan and it is probably more true there than anywhere else in the world - one can learn a language, study a culture, in Moscow, Jakarta, or in Amsterdam, but it does not mean that one is laying a foundation for a genuine contact with people on the other side of the world, or sympathizing with their way of thinking, feeling, or behaving.

PROFESSOR MALUKHIN

I believe that the way of thinking of the Chinese, of the Chinese people, is in principle no different from the thinking of Europeans or of people anywhere else. There are certainly no great differences in China. We, the Soviet people, have convinced ourselves of this in the course of ten or even more years' work in China, particularly after the foundation of the People's Republic of China. A common language was found between us. And let me say something about the language barrier. There was no such barrier, no such stumbling block, between the Soviet people and their Chinese friends during the fifties. The Soviet people and their Chinese friends soon found a common language. A businesslike language, a political language.¹

PROFESSOR SLADKOVSKY

There are several schools of sinology, with various approaches. Among them are the traditionalists, found, I believe mostly in the United States. The essence of this school is that the Chinese way of thinking, their traditions and customs, place a limitation on the growth of knowledge in that nation. Some adherents of this school even say that the Chinese are not accessible to modern social-political doctrines. The traditionalists explain everything - even the present political instability - with the hypothesis that socialism has not found fertile soil in China and that the chaos created by Mao Tse-tung, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, were actually reactions against socialism. We do not share this opinion, nor do the enlightened Chinese. Sun Yat-Sen, one of the greatest politicans and philosophers of the present century, did not believe this, and he was a thinker who possessed a thorough knowledge of Chinese tradition. He was followed by the first Marxist teachers, Li Ta-chao, Chen Tu-hsin, and Ch'ü Ts'iu-po, who rejected the prejudice that implied the Chinese way of thinking is limited and not open to new ideas. They called this notion an insult to the

1 The author begs to disagree completely on this point, on reasons based on many years of experience in visiting Asia, notably Japan, or while living in Indonesia.

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Chinese people. The experience of the Chinese revolution has shown that the Chinese are a very capable nation and that they are responsive to new ideas - and are also capable of realizing their progressive ideas. Apart from this, it would of course be wrong to deny that the traditions - the ancient traditions - including reactionary ones, have a certain influence on the Chinese consciousness. But revolutions, and particularly socialist revolutions, are chiefly aimed at destroying such traditions, after which socialism will lead the nation to the peak of its civilization. In this respect - and I repeat this - we do not share views which postulate tradition as the chief determining factor in the Chinese awareness. We believe that those traditions have already been outlived in many respects and that the Chinese are entering the modern era in which they are, among others, very much aware of the existence of modern doctrines, science, and civilization.

PROFESSOR MALUKHIN

The Western press is filled with discussions which claim that the Chinese are having difficulties in adopting Marxism. But this is incorrect. The twenties, and even the years that followed, showed that Chinese soil, if I may so put it, produced genuine Marxists - international Communists who made Marxism their own in an excellent way and who closely followed the teaching of Marx and Lenin. But Mao Tse-tung, his aides, and the men surrounding them collided with the Chinese Marxists, with the leaders of the revolutionary movement in China, with the Communists. Their names are well known: Li Ta-chao, Ch'ü Ts'iu-po, P'eng Pai, and others.

Amongst these reflections in the Western press there are detailed theories claiming that the Soviet Union is encircling China. The reporters interpret the visit paid by Leonid Brezhnev to India [in October, 1973] in this sense. How does the Soviet Union see its future relations with Asia; with India, China, and Japan?

PROFESSOR SLADKOVSKY

My point of view in regard to our relations with these countries and the situation in these countries is as follows. It is said in Europe and America, sometimes even with a certain fear, that China and India are very heavily populated countries - China with its 800 million and India with its 600 million inhabitants - and their views toward these heavily populated areas are formulated on this basis. This concentration of population does not make us afraid. I myself, as a scientist, and my colleagues as well, believe that

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such fears are unfounded; that these countries have very large resources available and that they will, moreover, be able to ensure their future prosperity. An added reflection is that China and India have many domestic problems, a great many indeed. It seems to me that they are not interested in expansion abroad. As a case in point, China represents only about five percent of the world turnover of goods. What does this mean? It means that the major problems are domestic. China has no urge, no necessity, to occupy itself with foreign expansion. I believe that the situation in India is the same. India has many internal problems which remain unsolved after a prolonged period of colonial rule. For a long time to come the principal task of these countries will be the solution of their domestic problems. In view of the fact that we share the feelings of these oppressed peoples and that we are in favor of peaceful coexistence, we hope for peaceful and fruitful relations with India, China, and Japan. If you noted the speeches made by Comrade Brezhnev - he spoke in Tashkent and also on other occasions - there is one sentence in all these speeches that reflects our attitude, which is that everything and all depends on the Chinese leaders themselves. If they would only cease their extremism and end their speculations on war!

I will tell you how this situation can be explained. Why is China so politically unstable? Why is it talking of war? The reason is that Mao Tse-tung and his group wish their country to be a great power. They want hegemony over the rest of Asia, but their resources are weak, and this absence of a real economic basis for expansion is forcing them to follow an unconsidered, adventurous policy, a policy which counts on war and is based on the question of how countries can be brought into conflict with each other or how various provocations may be used so as to create tensions. But all this scheming is of a passing nature and does not correspond to the true interests of the Chinese people. That is why we believe that China will ultimately return to the road of peaceful coexistence, with our country; with others. But I must say that in assessing the situation for the next few years, I cannot see any clear perspectives; only a gloomy future for China. Mao Tse-tung is exploiting the fact that he enjoys great power. The population is huge. He is constantly changing the leadership. Persons who have had some experience are dismissed from their posts and he replaces them by completely immature people, by young people. He manipulates millions of the youth, and this enables him to create political instability, which will be fairly prolonged.

PROFESSOR MARKOV

I am convinced that prospects for the development of relations between

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Japan and the USSR are excellent. The fact that Japan and the Soviet Union are close neighbors makes it imperative to maintain the very best relations and to try to further develop these contacts. After all, experience has convinced us that relations of another nature would only seriously harm our mutual interests.

The present process of exploitation of the vaste areas of Siberia, as well as those eastern regions of the USSR in which enormous riches in oil, gas, coal, iron ore, copper, and other natural resources have remained largely underdeveloped, could offer Japan an opportunity to supply its industry with raw materials under favorable conditions. Furthermore, at a time when the energy crisis is sharpening and raw materials and fuels are becoming more expensive, this situation gains special significance for Japan. While at the same time, close cooperation with Japan in the exploration of resources in Siberia and parts of the eastern Soviet Union is also to us in the USSR of great importance, since it simplifies and speeds up a most complicated task.

Robert McNamara of the World Bank pointed out in 1972 that nations of the so-called Third World already owed no less than seventy billion dollars to the rich states, which meant that they were having to pay annual interest of seven billion. This amount has since risen to well over eighty billion. The gap between the rich and the poor countries is ever widening. What should the nations of the West or the socialist countries of Eastern Europe do to end this alarming and worsening situation?

PROFESSOR SLADKOVSKY

The debt which you mentioned and which McNamara was probably discussing concerns investments abroad. Foreign investments in the form of loans, in the form of direct investments in industry, all these investments together do, in fact, represent the amount which McNamara was discussing. A debt. The main problem is how to raise the economies of developing lands. Seventy billion is a large sum in itself, but when we talk of the whole world the amount is not particularly large. The economic advancement of these countries is connected with the raising of their economies. The chief damage that was caused to these former colonial countries by imperialism was that imperialism prevented their industrial development. The imperialist powers took only raw materials. The result was barter trade of an unequal nature. Roughly estimated, and on a world scale, the selling prices of these raw materials were unequal to the extent of four to five times when compared to the prices of the industrial equipment. Here we find the element of exploitation. This is why the well-being of the former colonial countries is

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not served by extending loans or gifts from rich countries. The underdeveloped nations must be given the opportunity to build up their own national industries; not merely offered a chance to export their precious raw materials for industrial processing abroad. We in the USSR are already following this kind of policy. In return for our loans we do not expect raw materials, but industrial products. Naturally, each country exports raw materials - we ourselves are exporting many - but, in addition, they should be allowed to pay in industrial products.

PROFESSOR MARKOV

This debt of seventy or eighty billion dollars did not, of course, arise suddenly, but as a result of a process which took place over a long period of time and as a result of mutual political and economic relations which were not based on equality between the rich capitalist countries and the developing countries, the countries of the Third World. There is only one way out - the liquidation of the unequal principles which still form the basis of relations between the countries concerned, and by the creation of normal mutual relations which are at present championed by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as by the developing countries themselves. UNCTAD is also calling for the establishment of principles to improve and establish mutual relations between the underdeveloped and the developed countries on a basis of equality. The help from the developed countries should also aim at assisting the underdeveloped countries in order, as Professor Sladkovsky has said earlier, to create their own national economy, their own heavy industry; in other words, to lay the basis for their own national economy, which would enable them to become independent, both politically and economically. It is well known that the Soviet Union has recently introduced an initiative at the United Nations which aims at the reduction by developed, rich nations of their military budgets by ten percent, so this money, or part of the money which would be saved in this way, could be spent in rendering economic aid to underdeveloped countries. I think that such an initiative and such a policy would help these countries to emerge from the difficult position in which they find themselves.

Last month, while in New Delhi, I asked Madame Indira Gandhi how hopeful she was for the future - particularly that of the children of India - and her answer was a very positive one. What is the attitude of your institute and your research workers toward the population problem, the problem of food, and similar problems of Asia as far as the future is concerned?

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PROFESSOR SLADKOVSKY

In China, and India as well, about thirty percent of the available land is used at the moment, since only this percentage is suitable for agriculture. The remaining seventy percent could also possibly be used, but only if a great deal of capital were invested. A plan existed which would have taken twelve years to put through and which would have meant that this agricultural area would have been extended very considerably. At the moment 110 million hectares are cultivated in China. Harvesting in China takes place a few times, sometimes only once. On an average, they bring in one and a half harvests. This means that they are actually harvesting cereals. A not too big jump forward would mean that the area might be increased to 220 to 250 million hectares within five to ten years. The available land for agriculture could therefore be doubled. This means that the Chinese might some day have 375 million hectares from which harvests could be obtained. The present harvesting yield in China is an average of fourteen centners, a centner being 100 kilograms, per hectare. This is very low indeed. According to plans which the Chinese drew up at one time, they saw a possibility of increasing the yield in the near future to twenty centners per hectare. If you multiply this it would mean that this area would enable the Chinese to harvest 250 million hectares. If the cultivated area were thus increased and the average yield of the harvest increased, the Chinese would be able to ensure food supplies sufficient for about two thousand million people.

And how do you see this in Japan?

PROFESSOR SLADKOVSKY

If you take Japan as an example, you will see that, as the people's prosperity increases, the proportion of food changes. We assume that the demand for cereals is becoming smaller. Japan once suffered from a shortage of rice, but today she has a surplus of about ten to eleven million tons of rice every year. Japan can meet her domestic demands although she has a very mall amount of land available. The example of Japan will show you that even when there is considerable population growth, there is no real starvation problem. If we go back to India - and I am sorry to say that I cannot mention the exact figures as far as India is concerned - if the necessary work were done, mainly in connection with controlling the rivers there, the Indians could considerably expand their cultivated areas and increase their harvest yields during the next ten or fifteen years. There are

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more problems in India concerning agriculture than, for instance, in China, but nevertheless, according to my estimates and those of colleagues, there is every possibility of solving the food problem in India. I am therefore of the opinion that the prospects in these countries are favorable.

So you share the optimism shown by Indira Gandhi?

PROFESSOR SLADKOVSKY

Yes, if this was Mrs. Gandhi's answer, I completely agree with her views and with her conviction that all these problems can be solved.