Listening to the silent majority

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Against this background, particularly from April 27-29, 1989, Cape Town was especially interesting when South Africa, Angola and Cuba - with the us and ussr as interested observers - were meeting for further discussion of the transfer from swa to independent Namibia. I had hoped Anatoly Adamishin would come, but Moscow dispatched roving ambassador Viacheslav Ustinov to the rsa. On April 28 I discussed the matter of sending arms and terror weapons to the anc with him. Ambassador Ustinov began by responding that he had informed Mr Neil van Heerden about the sa press continuously misquoting statements by Soviet officials, the standard Soviet evasive tactic when they cover up

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double-talk. He further said that the Soviet government considered the anc to be the future for South Africa.^52. Then he stressed that the United Nations had passed a resolution that made it legal to send arms to liberation movements. Moscow considered the anc as such. So I asked ambassador Ustinov where in his mind lay the demarcation line between a legitimate liberation movement and a terrorist organisation. ‘Where would the anc be,’ the diplomat replied, ‘if it did not continue to fight? I am sure that if the government in Pretoria offered negotiations, the anc would accept.’

‘Where in the world,’ I said, ‘do self-respecting governments negotiate with terrorists?’ I also pointed out that I was sure that Pretoria would negotiate with the anc once this faction renounced violent action. ‘But isn't it totally unjustified that Nelson Mandela is still in jail?’ asked the envoy, changing the subject. As I am familiar with these tricks all I said was, ‘I would have let him go long ago, but as long as Mr Mandela favors an armed struggle, he is delaying his ordeal by choice. But, tell me, Mr Ambassador, what about the plo? It used to be a terrorist organisation, but lately it has foresworn terrorism and even Washington has entered into pourparlers with them. Why don't Soviet diplomats impress upon the anc to make a similar move?’ I also asked the ambassador how his government would react if foreign nations supplied terror weapons to freedom movements in Estonia, Georgia, Armenia or Uzbekistan? That remark caused another switch, this time to Afghanistan. On the basis of my conversation with him, I was hardly surprised that, having returned to Moscow, ambassador Ustinov accused South Africa of interfering in Namibian affairs ‘jumping at every chance to put a spoke in the wheels of swapo’. I just don't see how anyone can evaluate the Soviet side as ‘ideally situated’ to bring peace in Southern Africa, as Pieter Nel of Stellenbosch seems to be doing.

52. Which I consider nonsense born out of ignorance of South African realities