Bon voyage, Majesteit!
(1995)–Willem Oltmans–
Auteursrechtelijk beschermd
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DURING HOUR AND TEN MINUTE CONVERSATION WITH GEN NASUTION THIS MORNING, I MADE MAJOR POINTS IN REFTEL. I SAID I CAME IN SPIRIT OF FRIEND OF INDONESIA WHO SAW STORM CLOUDS ON HORIZON AND WHO BELIEVED IN OLD ADAGE, AN OUNCE OF PRVENTION IS WORTH POUND OF CURE. NASUTION LISTENED SOBERLY FOR HALF AN HOUR AS I PAINTED PICTURE OF CRITICAL ECONOMIC SITUATION, COLLISION COURSE ON WHICH GO I, SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION THAT MIGHT DEVELOP IF BANGKOK TALKS PAILED AND OBVIOUS FACT THAT SITUATION APPEARED TO BE PLAYING INTO HANDS OF PKI THREATENING HIS OWN STATED OBJECTIVES FOR INDONESIA AND LEADING TO POSSIBLE SERIOUS BREACH WITH FREE WORLD AND SPECIFICALLY US. INTENT DOWN THE LINE REMINDING NASUTION AMENDMENTS OF AID LEGISLATION MIGHT SOON FORCE US TO CANCEL ALL AID TO INDONESIA AS WELL AS ANZUS TREATY OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD APPLY IF AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND FORCES BECAME INVOLVED. NASUTION SAID HE DID NOT DISAGREE WITH MY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION WHICH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY HE REGARDED AS MOST SERIOUS. HE REMINDED ME THAT MONTHS AGO HE HAD STATED HIS PESSIMISTIC OUTLOOK OVER THE MALAYSIA PROBLEM AND HIS CONVICTION THAT THE MANILA-TOKYO TALKS COULD NOT RPT NOT ACTUALLY SOLVE PROBLEM. HE ADMITTED FRANKLY CONFRONTATION WAS HURTING COMMENT: MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT NASUTION WAS IMPRESSED AND SOBERED THOUGH NOT SURPRISED BY SERIOUS VIEW WE WERE TAKING OF CURRENT SITUATION. ALTHOUGH HE CAREFULLY AVOIDED COMMENT ON EFFECT DEVELOPMENTS MIGHT HAVE ON USINDO RELATIONS, HE OBVIOUSLY FULLY GRASPED IMPLICATIONS AND I AM CONFIDENT THIS PART OF CONVERSATION WILL BE PASSED ON. NASUTION DEMONSTRATED COMPLETE FAMILIARITY WITH SERIOUSNESS OF ECONOMIC AND FOOD SITUATION (VOLUNTEERED TEN PER CENT OF JAPANESE GOING HUNGRY) AND MADE NO ATTEMPT TO GLOSS OVER ITS IMPLICATION. I EMERGED WITH FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS:
HE AVOIDED LIKE THE PLAGUE ANY DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE MILITARY TAKEOVER, EVEN THOUGH THIS HOVERED IN AIR THOROUGHOUT TALK, AND AT NO TIME DID HE PICK UP OBVIOUS HINTS OF US SUPPORT IN TIME OF CRISIS. I INTEND CONTINUE THIS TYPE OF CONVERSATION WITH OTHER MILITARY LEADERS, FIRST WITH GEN YANI. AT OPENING OF CONVERSATION I PRESENTED AUTOGRAPHED PHOTOGRAPH OF NASUTION ON MEETING PRES JOHNSON FOR WHICH NASUTION EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION. GP-3. JONES MV NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 3/6/64, 9:20 AM. ADVANCE COPY TO S/S0, 3/6/64, 8:41 AM. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS ----------PROBIBITED UNLESS ‘UNCLASSIFIED’ Lyndon Baines Johnson Library COPY | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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-------------------- TOLD ME TODAY IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ARMY IS DEVELOPING SPECIFIC PLANS FOR TAKEOVER OF GOVERNEMENT MOMENT SUKARNO STEPS OFF STAGE. --- had just COME FROM MEETING WITH GENERAL PARMAN WHO HAD DISCUSSED PLANS WITH HIM.-------------------- said that ALTHOUGH PLANNING WAS BEING DONE ON CONTIGENCY BASES WITH AN EYE TO POST-SUKARNO ERA STRONG SENTIMENT EXISTED AMONG IMPORTANT SEGMENT TOP MILITARY COMMAND FOR TAKEOVER PRIOR DEMISE SUKARNO. WHETHER THIS HAPPENED WOULD DEPEND UPON EVENTS OF NEXT FEW WEEKS CONFLICTING PRESSURES WERE BUILDING UP TO SUCH A PITCH THAT IN HIS OWN OPINION ARMY MIGHT BE FORCED TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN NEXT 30 TO 60 DAYS TO OFFSET PKI MOVES. COMMUNISTS WERE BUILDING UP PARAMILITARY FORCES AND BEGINNING TO ARM THESE FORCES, HE SAID. ARMY INTELLIGENCE WAS AWARE OF THESE LOCATIONS, HOWEVER, AND PLANS CONTEMPLATED IMMEDIATE ISOLATION OF THESE CENTERS WHEN MOMENT FOR ACTION ARRIVED. THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO SENTIMENT AMONG ANY OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO MOVE AGAINST SUKARNO, HOWEVER ---------- emphasized ---------- IF MILITARY WERE FORCED TO MOVE IN NEAR FUTURE, WHILE THEY MIGHT PRESENT SUKARNO WITH FAIT ACCOMPLI, COUP WOULD BE HANDLED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PRESERVE SUKARNO'S LEADERSHIP INTACT EVEN THOSE WHO WERE CRITICIZING SUKARNO'S LEADERSHIP, SAID, WERE CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF ANY COUP SUCCEEDING AGAINST SUKARNO. HE WAS STILL BELOVED OF THE MASSES.
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Central intelligence agency
26 January 1965 SUBJECT: Principal problems and Prospects in Indonesia
Summary
We are now faced not only with known and growing danger from Sukarno, but with the uncertainties of possible Indonesia without Sukarno. If this ailing dictator abould indeed die in the near future, his bequart to Indonesia would be international outlawry, economic near-chaos, and to Communist domination. 'Yet if Sukarno lives on for acces time to the chance of the Communist Party (PKI) to assume power will probably continue to improve. We do not believe that a Communist Indonesia is imminent, or that Sukarno will initiate war. In our view however, there is sufficient chaos of such developments over the next year or two warrant especial --- intelligence and planning attention. The beginnings of a scramble for succession to Sukarno are already evident. Should Sukarno leave the ---------- in the near future, we believe that the initial struggle to replace him would be won by Army and non-Communist. ----------; though Communists would continue to play an important role. Such a governement would probably continue to be anti-US, ---------- and a threat to peace. Furthermore, unless the non-Communist leaders displayed more back----------, effectiveness, and ---------- than they have to date the charces of eventual PKI ---------- of Indonesia would quickly mount.
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The under secretary of state Washington
SECRET
March 18, 1965
Memorandum for the president
Subject: Proposed Mission for Ellsworth Bunker to Indonesia
Our relations with Indonesia are on the verge of falling apart. Sukarno is turning more and more toward the Communist PKI. The Army, which has been the traditional countervailing force, has its own problems of internal cohesion.
Within the past few days the situation has grown increasingly more ominous. Not only has the management of the American rubber plants been taken over, but there are dangers of an imminent seizure of the American oil companies.
Under these circumstances, Secretary Rusk and I feel it essential to get a clear, objective reading of the situation.
Ambassador Jones has been in Djakarta for seven years. He is tired and worried. He has done everything possible to advance American interests through his close personal relations with Sukarno, but that line seems pretty well played out.
Before we recommend to you some of the hard decisions that may be required over the next few weeks we think it would be valuable to have Ellsworth Bunker make a fresh and objective reading of the situation. After he had reported his conclusions we would be in a better position to advise whether
We recommend, therefore, that Ambassador Bunker be asked to pay a brief visit to Djakarta. He is prepared to leave next Wednesday. His mission would have the following objectives:
If you think well of this idea, we will prepare a draft letter from you to Sukarno which Ambassador Bunker could deliver. Meanwhile, the mere fact that Sukarno knew that Ambassador Bunker was proposing to visit Djakarta on your behalf could have a stabilizing effect. George W. Ball
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Central intelligence agency Intelligence Information Cable
COUNTRY INDONESIA DATE OF 14 MAY 1965
subject belief of senior indonesian dipomat that indonesia will sever diplomatic relations with united states by august 1965
1. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY SEVER DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THREE MONTHS, DESPITE THE ---------- ALLEVIATION OF STRAIN BETWEEN THE TWO
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PP RUEHCR DE RUMJBT 373A 2611735 ZNY SSSSS P 081415Z PM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA TO RUEKER/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 923 INFO RUERDA/DOC UNN RUMPAG/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 88 RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 55 RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 92 RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 152 RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 97 RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 265 HUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 99 STATE GRNC BT SECRET OCT 8
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
1. ONE WEEK HAS PASSED SINCE MASSACRE TOP ARMY LEADERSHIP IN OCT 1 PRE-DAWN COUP. IT NOW INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT PKI AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP CLEARLY IMPLICATED AND THAT SUKARNO HIMSELF PROBABLY AT LEAST AWARE OF ACTIONS PLANNED BY 30 SEPT MOVEMENT. SITUATION STILL FLUID, BUT FOLLOWING SEEK TO US MOST ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE:
A. COMMUNISTS ARE NOW ON THE RUN FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS IN INDONESIA. AIDIT'S WHEREABOUT NOT RPT NOT KNOWN AND RALLYING CALL TODAY AMONG NON-COMMUNIST
B. AT SAME TIME, VIRTUALLY ALL MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN ORGANIZATIONS HAVE RALLIED BEHIND ARMY, AND EVEN PNI, WHICH LONG -------------------- -------------------- -------------------- -------------------- FACTOR IS EXISTENCE OF GOOD PKI UNDERGROUND NETWORK WHICH COULD IN ANY EVENT CONTINUE CAUSE TROUBLE FOR ARMY.
3. WHILE KIAPMA (ANTI-FOREIGN MILITARY BASES CONFERECE SCREDULED OPEN OCT ---) MIGHT PROVIDE MEANS FOR SUKARNO ATTEMPT RALLY NEKOLIM SPIRIT AND DROWN INTERNAL DISAGREEMENT IN BIGGER INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN, CONDITIONS IN CITY, INCLUDING STRICT 12-HOUR CURFEW, ARE NOT CONDUCIVE TO ENTERTAINING FOREIGN VISITORS OR HOLDING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.
4. ARMY NOW HAS DECIDED EDGE. QUESTION IS, WHAT WILL ARMY DO WITH ITS ADVANTAGE? IT LIKELY ARMY WILL COLLECT EVIDENCE OF INVOLVEMENT PKI AND ITS OTHER ENEMIES IN 30 SEPT AFFAIR. IT MAY WELL FIND EVIDENCE THAT SUKARNO INVOLVED, AND IF SO THIS MIGHT FORCE LESS OBSTINATE LINE. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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 PAGE FIVE RUMJBT 373A SECRET
Note: Advance Copy to S/S-O at 1:20 a.m., October 9 Passed NSA, USIA, USUN at 1:30 a.m., October 9
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