Texts concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands

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58 A humble discourse and simple exposition of the only means of protecting from now on these poor oppressed Netherlands from further destruction and how to end soon this deplorable war, 1583 ¹

The author describes the situation in the summer of 1583. The discourse was probably written a little earlier than Document 59, although it appears later in the Knuttel catalogue.

Is it not ridiculous that the States of the united provinces (and especially those of Brabant, where most of the enemy forces are concentrated) are so slow in coming to decisions, although in war it is necessary to react with the utmost speed? Is it not more than six months since the deputies of the States General began to deliberate day after day at Antwerp? But so far they have not decided whether or not they will accept His Highness again,² a decision on which so much depends. Why were the king of Spain's interests here so damaged? It was because the king did not appoint a new governor quickly after the death of the Great Commander³ but allowed the Netherlands to be ruled by the States, who because of their jealousy for each other quickly started to quarrel among themselves in total disorder.

Is it not obvious that all our money or at least the greater part of it, is used to pay the unreasonable fees of the deputies and a vast number of useless commissaries? We must realise that people who can earn money so easily, do not want a short war; they seek rather to run up their expense accounts with travelling expenses or rather fees, travelling to and fro to their constituents as long as money is to hand, to fill their purses. The covetous and wilful men who are ruling us know quite well whether I tell the truth. Should we be surprised that the prince of Orange⁴ and other

1 Een ootmoedich vertooch ende eenvoudighe verclaringhe van den eenighe middel, waer deur men voordaen dese arme bedructe Nederlanden sal behoeden van voorder verwoestinghe, ende deser elendigher krijch haest een eynde maken (Knuttel, no. 658).

2 In March 1583 the States General concluded a provisional arrangement with Anjou but in June he left the country.

3 Requesens died in March 1576. Don John did not arrive in the Netherlands until November of that year.

4 In fact after Anjou's coup of 17 January 1583 the prince of Orange controlled central government together with the States General.

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honest noblemen are aggrieved to see this miserable and slack government and that they do not attend the meetings of the States General as willingly and as often as they used to? It is sad for them to see that a pensionary⁵ or some other mediocrity will dare to speak and argue about military affairs with considerable boldness and very little information and will wilfully oppose every sensible suggestion. Is it anything other than their wish to run up their expense accounts which makes them so bold and audacious? The reason they say with such pleasure that they have not been fully empowered by their masters to take decisions without reporting back to their constituents is simply that they do not want to have such power. Yet they are wrong and what they say is unjust and damages the reputation and honour of their constituents. For in fact deputies are entitled to take definitive decisions, if they wish, and to exceed their instructions. By unnecessarily prolonging the session of the States, to the detriment of the provinces, they seek only their private profit.

Would to God that all honest, wise magistrates and the commonalty of all the towns understood better the intentions of such persons, and reflected deeply upon them; they would then soon realise what these persons have in view and how craftily they try to satisfy the public's wishes when only trifles are involved while leaving undecided important matters on which the prosperity of the country depends. I would that every one knew them as well as they know themselves, so that honest people would no longer be deceived by them. Nevertheless it is quite easy to see what sort of men they are. Look at the state they keep, and compare the wealth they possess now with what it was five or six years ago, before they were in good faith appointed by the burghers to their present office and rank.

Has anyone ever seen or heard of pensionaries, merchants and commoners taking part in discussions on military affairs and sitting on the council of war side by side with the nobility and soldiery, whose job this has always been and who have usually been entrusted with such matters? Has any one ever seen or heard of affairs of state, on which the country depends, being entrusted to such persons? It seems to me, if I am not mistaken, that trade gives the merchants quite enough to do and that the magistrates would have more than enough to do if they only served the commonalty as they should.

If some one should reply that the nobility have not been faithful to the commonalty and that that is why the people have been forced to take control too, my answer is: It is true that the greater part of the nobility and

5 A town-official with legal training.

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other court dignitaries did not support us and committed grave and ugly errors. They should have treated us and the public cause more faithfully than they did. Yet that is no reason for sensible commoners, for the councillors of all the towns, and especially for the broad council of Antwerp,⁶ to permit the rank and authority of those who have proved to be faithful and have remained with us, to be so boldly and disrespectfully encroached upon and the affairs of war and state to be dealt with by inexperienced persons whose knowledge is based only on hearsay. Should we then be so surprised when affairs of state and the war go so badly? Can we really believe that jealousy has not developed because of this suspicion between the nobility and the commonalty? We must not forget that the nobles too are persons who care for their honour and reputation. I am talking of the nobility and old court dignitaries, who are faithful to us and whom the commonalty cannot justly accuse of disloyalty. We should remember that they have always been annoyed, and still are, at the way they are treated and are therefore delighted to see our affairs go wrong although they do not thereby profit themselves.

Let us for God's sake take control before it is too late and repair the damage. From now on let every one keep within the range of his intellect and his trade. Let the nobility and the experienced officers, who have proved to be faithful (being of the religion) administer and conduct the affairs of state and war, together with the leading and most experienced burghers of the towns - those who are more endowed with intellect than with property. Let the magistrates, pensionaries and other town officials guard the customs, rights and privileges of their towns. Let them ensure that order is maintained, that the good are protected and the wicked chastised without favour or respect of persons. This will require all their time and energy. By doing this they will be honoured by the commonalty and their towns will flourish. Let the merchant keep to trade and watch his purse. And if from now on everyone sticks to his own trade, with the help of the Lord everything will undoubtedly thrive.

Is it surprising that the enemy is so sure of himself that he needs hardly pay any attention to us and holds his ground firmly? It is not, for he knows that our affairs of state and war and decrees about the soldiers' pay are entrusted to merchants and inexperienced persons and that the men who have traditionally and for many years dealt with that sort of business are now made subordinate to them. I repeat, and in the end I will be

6 Until then Antwerp had been the residence of the States General. It then turned against the prince of Orange and in July 1583 forced him to leave for Middelburg.

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proved right, that if the war, the administration of justice,⁷ the collecting and spending of money are not very soon managed more satisfactorily by men of greater authority than merchants or commoners, it will not be possible for the provinces, especially Brabant and Flanders, to drive the enemy out of the regions and the towns he now holds.⁸ We know that in the course of time the enemy will take all the remaining towns and fortresses in the Southern Netherlands, and that all the other united provinces will then be in mortal danger. Ultimately (which God forbid) we will all have to bend to the Spanish yoke. All this because of our own bad government and innovations. I say before God that I do not say this to condemn the merchants, pensionaries or commoners (for I myself am one of them) but only that things may change for the better and turn out well.

7 The Dutch text has ‘justicie’ which may be a misprint for ‘policie’: political affairs.

8 A number of smaller towns in Brabant and Flanders were conquered by Parma's troops during this year.