Texts concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands
(1974)–E.H. Kossmann, A.F. Mellink–53 Advice of the prince of Orange as to which course to take in the critical situation in which the Netherlands find themselves, 7 February 1583 Ga naar voetnoot1This advice was drawn up by the prince at the request of the magistracy of the town of Antwerp and presented in February 1583 to the States General there assembled. The prince discusses three possibilities after the failure of the duke of Anjou's attack on Antwerp on 17 January: (a) reconciliation with the king of Spain, (b) reconciliation with Anjou, (c) carrying on the war on their own. Religion can perhaps, if God helps us, be better maintained by negotiating with His Highness, the duke of Anjou, than otherwise, for it is very much to be feared that, if we do not negotiate, several churches in the small towns (which we cannot abandon without offending God) and perhaps also in large towns will be in danger because of our inability to help them. And if the towns which are in the duke's power,Ga naar voetnoot2 are turned over to the enemies, the exercise of the true religion will undoubtedly be totally forbidden there. This would be, of course, a very great loss for the churches of God. If some people say that negotiations with a prince who is not wholly of the true religion are inadmissible, I confess that I am not a great enough theologian to be able to solve this problem. Yet I see that no churches in Christendom have raised objections to such dealings. The churches of France, aided by French and German princes,Ga naar voetnoot3 have negotiated several | |
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times with their king; the Swiss have an alliance with each other in spite of being of different religions and they concluded a treaty with the king of France a month ago; the Protestants of Geneva have come to an agreement with the king of France, who was a great help to them last summer, the kingdom of England has not broken its alliance with the Netherlands concluded at a time when only the Roman Catholic religion was practised there, nor with the king of Denmark; Scotland keeps its alliance with France, now 800 years old; these provinces keep theirs with the Empire and the Empire with us; the Teutonic towns are allied among themselves, although having different religions; the German princes have together chosen the emperor as their chief, although he is not of the same religion as the majority of the electors and other princes of the Empire; the churches of Poland have chosen a king who is not of their religion either;Ga naar voetnoot4 the Vaudois allied with the king of Bohemia; the inhabitants of the valleys of AngroineGa naar voetnoot5 with the duke of Savoy. Thus I must ask to be excused if I dare not condemn so many, nay all the churches of Christendom. However, I will always be of the opinion that whatever accord is concluded, it must guarantee, as far as is in our power, the safeguarding of religion. I think these arguments should be considered carefully for our relations with the duke of Anjou raise serious difficulties because of the difference of opinion among the towns. If we decide to seek an agreement with the duke, there is a danger that some towns may secede and if we decide not to negotiate, there is a danger that other towns, feeling that they are left alone and helpless, will seek support wherever they can. This deserves careful consideration... [If we refuse to be reconciled with either the king of Spain or the duke of Anjou we must adopt the third course and] defend ourselves without any outside help. If we decide to do this, we should realise that we are first of all badly in want of native commanders and soldiers because many of them have been killed in the war and the country is small. The enemies have not only large numbers of native soldiers but also the greater part of the soldiers born in the Netherlands, who formerly served the king of Spain. An additional cause of our difficulties is that the people of this country tend naturally more towards trade than towards the military life. So we are faced with the fact that we need a sufficient number of foreign soldiers. However, we have treated them rather badly in the past and it | |
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will not be easy to find foreigners prepared to serve here unless we guarantee that they will get their pay. Nor will it be easy to find out where we can raise soldiers. But we can discuss this later when we have decided to take this course of action. This much, however, is certain, those of the religion are always more trustworthy than others. As to money, we know how difficult it has been in the past simply to pay the garrisons: it is surprising that so far we have kept our fortresses without disturbances. Money is indeed the sinews of war and if it is lacking, everything we decide is in vain. So, if you want to take this decision, you must appoint - if you wish only for a limited period - one leader or more, who must be sure of being really obeyed, not only in words but in deed, and establish a council of worthy people. After this, every one must confine his activities to his own task and business without seeking to interfere in affairs of state and of war, and rely upon the persons we have elected. These men will conscientiously and honourably do what must be done and they will have to be obeyed without contradiction; their orders must be promptly executed and only after obeying them shall we have the opportunity to make the comments we think appropriate. But these measures will serve no purpose, if the means to obtain enough money are not readily to hand; and we must be able to show the councillors we hope to appoint that such means are indeed available, if we wish to induce them to take on this task and to fulfil it voluntarily and dutifully... Though I do not want to criticise people who say that one has to trust God (for that is right and true) I am quite sure that when one wants to attempt something without money, and what is worse, when the money is withheld through avarice, this is not trusting but tempting God. Trusting God is to use the means it has pleased Him to offer us and to pray Him for His blessing. Gentlemen, I have now discussed at some length the various courses open to us; if you ask me my own opinion, I reply that whatever decision we come to, we must first of all and very quickly supply money. Whatever our decision, an agreement about this must not be postponed one hour. So far appropriate measures have clearly not been taken. With regard to the three possible courses of action which I have discussed, I declare that it is the third that I prefer and have always preferred, and which made me take so much trouble, four years and more back, to keep all the provinces together on the basis of a solid agreement.Ga naar voetnoot6 And, notwithstanding the | |
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power of the king of Spain, we would with the help of God, have driven Don John and others out of the country if the provinces had not become disunited much against my advice and for reasons which are well-known. But when I noticed that the members of the States and even those who had undermined the union, were saying that they did not have the means to defend themselves, I changed my mind and decided that we ought to look for aid elsewhere. I was not the only one for others too, who originally did not want to send for a foreign prince, now opted for that plan. But as I have already said, I do not think that a man endowed with wisdom will be prepared to act as our leader unless the conditions I have enumerated are complied with. Otherwise we shall only be making empty speeches without effect, and causing the destruction of many fine churches; we shall destroy them while intending to save them. We must keep in mind the fact that we are obliged to care for other churches just as much as those of Antwerp. And even if we set aside the question of whether the churches of Antwerp would be safe if the others were lost (which God forbid) we must remember that God loves the small churches as much as the large ones. If this proposal is not agreeable to you, although I do not believe this can be so, or should there be too many difficulties in carrying it out, I state openly that I will never approve of negotiating with the Spanish king. But if we have to come to an agreement with the duke of Anjou, we must ensure that none of the towns is put in danger and that we get soldiers, and especially commanders of whom both the States and His Highness's council approve. However, as I have said, if the third course of action is feasible, I would infinitely prefer it but upon certain conditions, for otherwise we run the risk of ruin, together with many worthy people. |
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