Texts concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands

47 Emanuel and Ernest. Dialogue of two persons on the state of the Netherlands, 1580 ¹

Gerard Prouninck, alias van Deventer, who emigrated to Utrecht from his native town Bois-le-Duc, which had taken Parma's side, is probably the author of this work. He makes a strong plea for accepting Anjou as sovereign of the country and therefore promotes Orange's policy. Cf. Document 64 for a later version of Prouninck's theory.

eman.: If we agree that because of the inequality of the inhabitants a popular government is impossible here, would there be any objection to the States governing the country in an aristocratic manner?

ern.: I have already given you part of my answer, Sir Emanuel, but will now develop it further. If the Spaniards estimate the time this state can be expected to last by looking at the corruption of the people, they may set their greatest hope on the corruption of the States. I was in Cologne when the States General assembled in the town of Antwerp.² All worthy men rejoiced at it, the Germans even said that almost the whole of Christendom looked forward to the outcome of this honourable and very solemn assembly. But the king's adherents held quite a different opinion. They maintained that the assembly would turn out to the king's advantage. Firstly, the States would spend nearly all their time there in disputes and contentions; the niggardliness of some and the cowardice of others would prevent effective decisions on war-finances; the provinces, jealous as usual, would not agree to establishing one single Council of State, but would have several with equal authority in several places. But even to these councils they would not grant powers and commissions as comprehensive as necessary. The cause of all this is their irresolution. And this

1 Emanuel-Erneste, dialogue de deux personnages sur l'estat du Païs Bas (Knuttel, no. 545).

2 In April 1579 (see Document 39). At Cologne the peace negotiations were started in May with the emperor as intermediary.

[p. 207]

irresolution is the simple consequence of the fact that they were too weak to unite into one strong body. Moreover, the king's adherents said, it would be impossible for the States to keep anything secret; there were far too many people there and some of the members were elected not because they were experienced in state affairs, but because they were enormously stubborn and particularly good at fighting for the rights, exemptions and advantages of their towns and provinces. For a long time one had been used to sending to the court, where most of the time the issue was whether one should grant subsidies, people bold enough to refuse taxes and to defend the interests of their towns and provinces. It was not to be expected, the king's adherents said, that the Netherlanders would act differently in the present situation because they like to stick to their old ways.

eman.: Good heavens, how right they were! Obviously they were well informed.

ern.: Certainly. The king spares no expense on spies and scouts. Soon we learned at Cologne that the States had sworn not to leak any information about their work. Yet we were told that some provinces almost refused to take part in the discussions if the replacement of the king was not put first on the agenda. We also learned that when the power to be granted to the new Council of State came to be discussed, as well as on other occasions, the representatives of Holland and Zeeland were not prepared to give up any of the rights obtained by them at the Pacification of Ghent, and even began an extremely intemperate dispute with some of the deputies of Flanders. And many such reports on the smallest details reached us daily.

eman.: What did the king's partisans say about all this?

ern.: Of course, they were delighted. They were particularly glad about the behaviour of the deputies of Holland. They fear nothing so much as to see Holland unite its power with that of the other provinces, so nothing is more pleasant for them than to notice that mere trifles give the Hollanders, who started the revolt, cause for getting angry with people to whom they should be a spur and an example. I heard a gentleman of some importance (who seemed to be angry at this confusion, because he loved his country) say this: By what misfortune, what ignorance, what blindness have these people been struck? Their whole future, their state, their honour, their reputation, or their shame and total ruin depend on whether or not they succeed in remaining united. I pity, he said, the poor prince of Orange, who is a slave to their confused minds and destined to lose his life as well as his honour there. He will be severely criticised for all the evil conse-

[p. 208]

quences that are bound to follow - for certainly they will not achieve good results. As to the prince of Orange, the others answered, we must confess that the king has greatly erred by so ill-treating him. No monarch in the world would not deem himself exceedingly happy to have at his side so accomplished a man, endowed with such rare virtues. His patience is surprising, his mind is unbelievably brilliant. Though people keep chattering to him from early morning until late at night and though we have often expected that he would break down or at least get exhausted by the constant stream of unpleasant new developments and evil tricks he has to deal with, in fact his mood has always remained cheerful, his mind lively, his judgment well-considered. What would become of the States if the prince were not at the helm? Although the prince is the king's and our enemy this we must say to his honour that never since the creation of the world has any other seignior been able under an aristocratic government to preserve against a monarch as powerful as King Philip a country that so short a time ago decided to refuse obedience to its legitimate prince and is so divided by faction and full of self-seeking. There were others who attempted something similar but no one else achieved such results and no one else remained firm and cool among such baffling vicissitudes. The king and the whole Council of Spain are profoundly astonished. Had they understood that the prince of Orange's policy could secure order in such confusion for so long a time, they would doubtless have offered peace on more favourable terms. This, Sir Emanuel, is, briefly put, the opinion of the king's adherents, and really, they are right. For the nobility in this country possesses idiosyncrasies which are incompatible with an aristocratic government. In the first place they are too corrupt, too envious, too partial; they have lost the virtues which were the strength of their forefathers. Secondly their power, rank and jurisdictions are too unequal.³ And finally they are so used to being ruled by a superior authority, that is to say, by their prince, that their manners and qualities are adapted to a monarchical form of government and unfit for an aristocracy.

eman.: I agree with you, Sir Ernest, and the more so when I also take into account both the power of the king of Spain and the fact that in such a new state one usually makes few friends and many enemies for obviously such innovations are prejudicial to a number of people who forfeit both the glory and the profits which they drew from managing the king's affairs. Neither the people under a popular government to which they are not accustomed, nor the nobles in an aristocratic state which is

3 The opposite is maintained in Document 32.

[p. 209]

equally unfamiliar, will be able to surmount these difficulties. What we need is a prince. But this prince should be a person of great authority, wise, brave and virtuous. Only such a man will be able to resist attempts against the state and to reform our totally corrupt government. This is not the sort of work which can be done by a group of people for they are likely to disagree among themselves and to despise one another. One single man must take up this task.

ern.: Your discourse, Sir Emanuel, makes me admire the wisdom and foresight of our forefathers. There is a law in the province of Brabant which their Duke John ordered to be proclaimed in the year 1421 saying that ‘in case he, his heirs or successors should fail to observe the rights, franchises and privileges of their subjects, the subjects were to be absolved from their oath and obedience and the States enabled to choose a regent or protector of the country, whom the inhabitants would be bound to obey as their own prince, until and in so far as the errors and infractions should have been duly redressed’.⁴ This law reflects the wisdom of the prince as well as of the States. Although the nature of the people and the nobles was at that time less debased and corrupt than it is now, it was realised that a country used to being ruled by a prince, could in those difficult circumstances not survive without a protector endowed with the same power, greatness and authority...

ern.: You are right, Sir Emanuel, but many people wonder whether the legitimate prince can be deprived of his old patrimony. The argument that the prince is a tyrant, they say, can only be directed against conquerors. In His divine providence God sends us good or bad princes to chastise us or to restore us to grace. The bad ones remind us of our sins and God employs them to make us repent. He calls them His servants, and He wants us to obey them even if they compel us and our children to be their slaves, to plough their ground, to reap their harvest, to give them a tithe of our arable land and vineyards and even if they take the pick of our vineyards and olive-groves and wheat and take and use our servants, male and female, and our cattle and asses for their own ends.⁵ The Lord Himself has predicted that the world will end amidst many such tyrannies.⁶ Shall we resist His ordinance? How will the Scriptures be fulfilled?

eman.: You are perfectly right. When a monarch starts so to torment his subjects, they must nevertheless obey him because he is their sovereign

4 John IV of Brabant was temporarily deposed as duke in 1420 and replaced by his brother Philip of St Pol as regent. Thus a wider interpretation was given to the stipulations of the Joyeuse Entrée of 1356.

5 1 Sam. viii, 11-18.

6 Matt. xxiv, 21.

[p. 210]

prince. They must wait patiently for the promised time to come when Almighty God who directs the hearts of kings and the fate of kingdoms, removes the scourges by which we are chastised and replaces them with rulers who will do justice to the oppressed. But there is a great difference between a sovereign monarch or prince and a prince to whom the people themselves give jurisdiction. For the people make the princes and not the princes the people. If the people willingly give all power to their princes without retaining any themselves, there is no reason for them to complain, even if they have afterwards to endure a government as severe as that which at God's command Samuel predicted for the people of Israel: kings totally sovereign and the people totally subject as was current in the neighbouring countries, whose example Israel, in asking for a king, wished to follow.⁷ But if the people have retained the right to give jurisdiction to the princes, the princes cannot overrule this jurisdiction and usurp sovereign rights and power such as those predicted for Israel's children. The people have no obligations beyond the limits of the power they have given to their rulers. And these, Sir Ernest, are the limits within which the people of the Netherlands, who declare they have been a free people since time immemorial, wish to remain. The duke of Brabant (to take the leading province as an example) does not by any means have the right to compel the inhabitants of this province to plough his ground, and reap his harvest or to do any similar servile work.⁸ He swears to keep all their rights, franchises, liberties and privileges...

eman.: [If the duke of Anjou were to die] the States of the country should, I think, forthwith make it an elective principality, because for their recovery and maintenance they need successors no less powerful and competent than the predecessors have been. For one prince's life-span, however long it may be, is hardly sufficient to restore a state abounding with factions and abuses. Two or three excellent princes succeeding each other (the surest way to achieve this is by election) would be sufficient to consolidate the state and to free it from its imperfections, and even to raise it to the summit of greatness. The new prince will have no cause for complaint. There are very many kingdoms and seigniories, there is even the Empire, where leaders are appointed by election. And even if their children apply themselves to virtuous works, they should not be preferred to others. This will not only incite them to exert themselves still more but will remind them anew of the benefits and honours conferred upon them. This much is certain: nothing is so efficacious and beneficial to a free

7 1 Sam. viii, 20.

8 On the grounds of the Joyeuse Entrée.

[p. 211]

seigniory, or one endowed with many privileges, as elective princes. For if the most recent ruler committed faults or were deceitful, this can be redressed by a new election and should no other remedy be found, the States may gradually and easily transform the principality into a true aristocracy. If election cannot be introduced, I would at any rate like to see the Salic law established by a solemn and irrevocable decree of all the States of the country, on such terms that in default of a male heir, capable of ruling the state, the States would be entitled to appoint the prince whom they thought would be most beneficial to the country. Thus the principality would not come into the power of a person who governs as the Spaniards governed.