Texts concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands

45 Remonstrance made to the deputies of the States General at Antwerp, by the prince of Orange, 9 January 1580 ¹

The prince wanted the deputies of the provinces at the States General in Antwerp to impress upon the various provincial States the urgency of taking binding decisions on administrative reform. Shortly after this he left Antwerp for a journey to the Northern Netherlands.

We do not think it necessary, gentlemen, to expatiate on the articles of peace sent to you,² for all the provinces together have unanimously and

1 Vertooch ghedaen aen myne heeren de ghedeputeerde van de Staten generael by mijn heere den Prince van Orangien (Knuttel, no. 524).

2 From Cologne in 1579, see Document 40, note 5.

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without any objections judged that these should not be adopted or approved of as they are not in any way conducive to the safety or prosperity of the country. Therefore we shall (as we should) regard them as a matter on which your masters, the provincial States, have taken a definitive decision; at present, we do not want to oppose this resolution nor contest it, but feel obliged to declare that we think it praiseworthy and useful.

Because after mature consideration and deliberation you have resolved not to approve of these articles whereas the articles sent by you have been rejected by the enemy, it is obvious and already manifest, that the enemies want to attack you openly and to persecute you by main force. As peace is out of the question, gentlemen, it will be necessary to take the other course and protect ourselves by force of arms. It is not necessary to waste more words on this, as we believe and have understood that at present you make no objections to this conclusion.

Nevertheless it is surprising that although all of us think it advisable to take up arms to secure the freedom of the country, our possessions, honour, wives and children and are convinced that precise decisions on the special problems facing us are urgently required, we should usually injure and even wreck our cause by taking wrong decisions when dealing with those particular aspects of an action which we think in a general way to be absolutely necessary. Consequently all our labour and efforts are so purposeless and fruitless that the total destruction of the country and of ourselves is inevitable.

Your first and foremost mistake is that as yet neither you nor your masters, the provincial States, have established any assembly or council on behalf of the States,³ which has the power to take decisions beneficial to the whole of the country. Everyone in his own province or town acts as he thinks is beneficial to himself and his particular affairs without realising that when some town or province is under attack, it may be useful not to help it for the time being so that in the end the whole country, including these towns and provinces, may be saved.

That is why we are forced to fight not in areas chosen by ourselves and indicated by the interest of the country but in areas determined by the enemy who attacks one part of the country this time, and another part the next time, so that we must follow him as if he alone has the power to decide both on the time and the place to give battle. As a result we are always compelled to stay on the defensive without daring to attack because each

3 At the time the prince was striving to establish a general council composed of representatives of the provinces to serve as a central administrative body.

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time it is difficult for us to use more than the army of a single province. This of course is not sufficient to resist the forces which the enemy can easily concentrate while our army is scattered.

The cause of this unhappy situation is the fact indicated above, that you have not established a superior body or council which should be obeyed by the subordinate authorities. Such a council may meet dangers as they occur; these may be frequent and great in some places and absent in others. The result of your particularism is that if some provinces are attacked, they ask us for help (though often in vain); the others, that are no longer threatened, want to get rid of the soldiers either by disbanding their troops altogether or by transferring them to the charge of other provinces which are already heavily burdened. As soon, however, as they perceive the slightest trace of the enemy, they immediately want to be given aid and assistance, as if it were possible for us to extract the soldiers, first dismissed, out of the ground by stamping our foot.

You know well enough, gentlemen, how often we have told you, all of you as well as each province separately, that some horse and foot should be kept in readiness. We should have been able to bring them together at short notice and draw them up in order. If we had managed to persuade some province to accept five or six companies of German horse, the districts of Tournay and West Flanders would without doubt not be in the desperate state they are in now.⁴

Last year when we received reliable information that the enemy had raised many soldiers and made them ready to attack us, we asked several times that orders should be given to keep our soldiers in service for some time at least, waiting for the enemy to strike first. We would then have destroyed his army or divided it. But we did not succeed in persuading you to do this, and thus we lost the town of Maastricht, which could have been relieved had soldiers and some means been available.⁵

But it is impossible to levy any soldiers or raise an army for lack of authority from Your Honours to rally the army once it has dispersed and also because of lack of means, should each town or province immediately after the enemy's departure, wish to get rid of the soldiers. Meanwhile the towns which could be defended by a small garrison, should a field army able to stop the enemy be raised, are looted and completely ruined by excessively large garrisons which it would be fatal to remove, since there is no other army to protect those places. This is a very grave abuse.

4 Tournay was closely threatened by Parma's troops. It was the only Walloon member on the side of the Union at this time.

5 The town of Maastricht fell into Parma's hands on 29 June 1579.

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The field army, raised to oppose the enemy, would also serve to defend the towns and could live mostly off the enemy's territory instead of eating up, plundering and ruining our own country. The best solution is to establish a supreme council with power over the army.

Various honest persons with little understanding of the essence of state affairs, think it strange that so many misfortunes take place every day, that towns or whole provinces are lost or rise in revolt, that the country is ransomed and pillaged by the enemy, that many leave us and side with another party,⁶ that others become less zealous and no longer display their earlier ardour, but are flagging like a sick body that is drying up. This malady, gentlemen, comes from the deepest corners of our own body. Looking beyond our own borders, we see that no monarch, king or prince or foreign nation is well-disposed towards us or tries to obtain our friendship or alliance,⁷ and that no one leaves the ranks of our enemy to come over to our side. All this we see daily and, as was said before, with astonishment; most people do not know who is to blame, but often criticise those who are least to blame. But the true cause of all these disorders is our own indecision. We meet often enough and deliberate long enough, but are as negligent in implementing our decisions as we are diligent in deliberating at length. Yet, gentlemen, there are undoubtedly still many pious and honest inhabitants in this country; it is like a fire smouldering under the ashes: if you take them away it burns high again but will soon be dead if you let it consume itself.

6 Many nobles and clergymen from the southern Netherlands (the duke of Aerschot, abbot Van der Linden et al.) went over to the Spanish side after the failure of the Cologne peace negotiations.

7 The negotiations with the duke of Anjou were still in progress, mainly through the prince of Orange.