Politieke theorie en geschiedenis

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Rowen's De Witt^*

John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1625-1672. By Herbert H. Rowen. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. Pp. xiv+948.

This scholarly and distinguished work follows closely on the English translation of J. Den Tex's biography of Oldenbarnevelt (2 vols; Cambridge University Press, 1973) and just as the latter, John de Witt is a very long book. Oldenbarnevelt has almost 800 pages in the shortened English version (which contains about two-fifths of the Dutch original); De Witt has over 900 pages. How are these epic proportions to be explained? Both Den Tex and Rowen write narratives of immensely complicated events; both delight in analyzing in minute detail diplomatic negotiations of considerable intricacy; both finally try to cover the whole field on which their subjects moved and at times come near to writing a political history of the nation. The result is that we now possess in English a very elaborate political history of the Netherlands from the late sixteenth century to 1672, as seen through the eyes of two political leaders. However, there is a gap from 1618 to 1650; J.J. Poelhekke's recent biography of Prince Frederick Henry, which covers this for the larger part, is not available in English.

The works of Den Tex and Rowen have much in common. Both are self-assured, straightforward political narratives totally undisturbed by modern fashion; neither social history nor psychology plays a part in their story. Moreover, both Oldenbarnevelt and De Witt appear in these books as eminently solid men, reasonable and flexible conservatives without illusions and averse to adventure. Their political ideas were uncomplicated and unambitious. They were practical men absorbed by the problems of day-to-day politics which they dealt with in a supremely intelligent and often constructive way. Thus the consolidation of the new Dutch state and its rise to world power were not the result of imaginative thinking but of hard work and level-headed caution. Rowen characterizes De Witt as calm, steadfast, intelligent, at once friendly and haughty; uninterested in philosophy, neither a Cartesian nor a Spinozist; a deeply religious Calvinist but reluctant to take dogmatic disputes seriously; a lawyer by training, a mathematician by inclination, and a subtle tactician

* Lijst van publikaties, infra 492, nr. 117 (1981).

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in his political craft. Rowen admires De Witt for these qualities. As the author knows his material extremely well, has a perfect grasp of Dutch history, is exceptionally well informed about seventeenth-century Europe generally, and writes easily and smoothly, his account is persuasive enough. Moreover, it does not differ much from the interpretations put forward by the Dutch historians Japikse and Geyl - which does not mean of course that Rowen did not draw his own conclusions and did not offer a personal view based on his scrupulous study of all the available sources.

Yet there is in this book, as there was in Den Tex's biography of Oldenbarnevelt, something which may disturb the attentive reader. If indeed both Oldenbarnevelt and De Witt were such matter-of-fact pragmatists, how then is it to be explained that their lives ended in deep tragedy, in a degrading execution in the case of the first, in an abominable assassination in the case of the second? Why did their policies fail to achieve what at the end of their lives was for both of them the major objective: the warding off of war? Why were they so dramatically misunderstood and so vehemently hated? It is questions like these which make one wonder whether we are able ever fully to understand the motives, ideas, and prejudices of statesmen working in that dogmatic, hard, violent age. In some respects they may seem very modern. Yet they are very distant from us and unfathomable.

De Witt was just twenty-five years old when Stadholder William II, who was eight months younger, died in November 1650. In December 1650 he became ‘pensionary’ of Dordrecht. In 1652 he started to act as the substitute of the Grand Pensionary of Holland; in September 1653, not yet 28 years old, he himself obtained that office, the most important in the Netherlands. He lived in a young man's world. The political circumstances were unprecedented. From its inception as an independent nation the Republic had been led by Princes of Orange. When Oldenbarnevelt came into conflict with Prince Maurice he had lost. Maurice's successor, Prince Frederick Henry, was the most powerful and the most monarchical of all Holland's stadholders. In 1650 this tradition suddenly broke off. William III was born after his father's death. Thus for the first time in the history of this young nation, there was a real chance for the adversaries of the House of Orange to eliminate its political influence. This was what De Witt tried to achieve. His political system was called ‘True Liberty’. The term ‘liberty’ was used in the classical sense of libertas and stood for what we now call a republic - a term which, however, the seventeenth century could not use because republic then meant ‘state’ generally. Of course this system was far from traditional; to uphold it, and to uphold it in such a dogmatic way as De Witt did, was, so it seems, not a work easily done by a conservative. Not only the internal situation, however, but also the international position of the Netherlands was in De Witt's period

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totally new. For the first time this Republic was by force of circumstance obliged to act as a great power but as a great power with a distinction, namely as one that was fundamentally unwilling to do so and even considered itself unable to play that role. With incomparable lucidity De Witt succeeded for many years in maintaining his domestic and foreign system but eventually his policies broke down. In spite of De Witt's superior handling of the problems which faced him, the odds were far too great. Under the earlier stadholders the country had served to break Spanish hegemony. Under William III it served as England's ally to break French hegemony. Under De Witt it tried to act as a great power with the sole ambition of serving its own interests. Perhaps one must call this pragmatism, realism, conservatism, or whatever term one wishes to use to indicate that De Witt was a practical man, not given to daydreams about Dutch greatness or the ideal state. Yet, whatever he may have allowed himself to think, his government was untraditional, unconventional; it was an adventure. This is the impression left by Rowen's admirable work, although he himself is surely unwilling to subscribe to it. Good books, however, have the merit of forcing the reader to discuss matters with the author. This is a good book.