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Modern Liberalism (1982)

Modern Liberalism

(1982)–Frits Bolkestein–rechtenstatus Auteursrechtelijk beschermd

Vorige Volgende

Concluding remarks

+ ‘Liberalism is an attitude more than a doctrine,’ says Rey. Federspiel agrees with him: ‘In Denmark we never considered Liberalism as an ideology but rather as a way of life.’ What is this attitude? Deniau provides an answer: ‘A spirit of tolerance, the acceptance that there are various currents of opinion in a country, respect for the opinion of others.’ In this sense Liberals may be found in all parties except those of the extreme right or left. However, the stronger the ideology - the more closed the view of the world - the less likely one is to encounter Liberals.

 

+ But Liberalism is more than an attitude. As Malagodi put it: ‘Modern Liberal thought is the only one that can really bring into focus the new synthesis which is necessary between public intervention and the initiative, the autonomy of the individual.’ ‘We do not believe,’ he adds, ‘that you are a Liberal only if you believe in an absolutely free market.’ This old-fashioned and restricted interpretation is now mainly used by political opponents. Liberalism still has this connotation in France. Deniau: ‘The French take it somewhat as: laisser faire, laisser passer. One gives free rein to anonymous mechanisms.’ It is the unacceptable face of Liberalism.

 

+ Malagodi admits that the mechanisms of the market can be brutal. ‘Liberals try to build institutions which

will countervail this brutality but we know that to some extent it is unavoidable. The Church imagines that it is avoidable.’ So do Socialists, at least they did until recently. Deniau puts it the other way around: ‘The economy is a stern judge. But at the same time one cannot base a Liberal vision simply on a respect for economic laws. A social element must be added.’ To what extent is the brutality of the market unavoidable? What is the social element that must be added? These questions go to the heart of the matter. No answer is valid for all countries and all time.

 

+ Rey has defined the duty of the state with the admirable succinctness that characterises his thought. It is as general as any could be: ‘Neither laisser faire nor to act itself but to control and to protect.’ Again: how much control should there be, how much protection? At present there is too much protection: ‘We cannot extend the personal social services any further,’ says Grimond; and Federspiel: ‘A good deal of social legislation has gone beyond its natural limits... Many people are perfectly satisfied to live on public grants.’ The safety net has become too much like a hammock, at least in Northwest Europe.

 

+ Pruning the excesses of the welfare state is necessary in order to preserve its substance. The Benelux countries, Denmark and Italy live far beyond their means. No welfare state is possible in an economic cemetery. Deniau: ‘The more one intervenes, the further one is obliged to intervene, and to intervene in detail.’ Bureaucracy becomes stifling and, in the end, self-defeating. State intervention obeys the law of diminishing if not negative returns.

 

+ ‘Absolute security means a prison... It means the loss of creativity, of the sense of responsibility,’ says Deniau. The trade-off between more security and more

responsibility is fundamental to our present dilemma. In Northwest Europe, the pendulum has swung too far towards security. It is individual responsibility that now ought to be stressed.

 

+ Deniau wants to distinguish between risks that are unacceptable, because they are too great, and those that must be borne individually ‘because they are essential to freedom and democracy’. He rightly says that the budgetary criteria are insufficient - that liberals ought to define those risks which should be left up to the individual. Grimond defines the unacceptable risks as ‘totally unforeseen or largely unforeseeable matters’. This would not cover raising children, so do away with family allowances and thus run counter to the demographic policies dear to many governments, above all the French. Surely only risks of importance should be borne by the state. Federspiel: ‘People should be responsible for their own lives. Only when... they are reduced to poverty owing to developments of society, or at least to a living standard below what they would normally expect, is it a duty of the community to assist them.’ Federspiel's ambiguity is revealing, for there is a lot of difference, usually, between poverty and the living standard people have been conditioned to expect.

 

A Liberal answer depends upon the country and the time. In a country like The Netherlands, people can bear a greater measure of responsibility than they do now. Dutch illness benefits cover the period of absence right from the start. As a result, absenteeism is considerably higher than in countries which leave the first few days unpaid. A proposal for a modest personal contribution towards the cost of every prescription obtained under the state health scheme was thrown out by the last Parliament. Yet the minimum wage has reached a level which makes such personal risks bear-

able. Parliament's hesitation is unnecessary: these are measures which the electorate is ready to accept.

 

+ Which services should the state provide? ‘Services which everybody requires and which give solidity to the community,’ is Grimond's answer. The problem is how to know which services ‘everybody requires’. A majority vote of elected representatives may not be conclusive, as politicians may increase services for ideological or electoral reasons. Even if their vote were representative of the majority of the electorate, the minority would be compelled to finance services it might not want. It is therefore preferable that at least those services of which the benefits can be attributed individually should as much as possible be paid out of+ prices rather than taxes. This ‘benefit principle’ would increase public welfare, as user charges would force individuals simultaneously to reveal preferences and willingness to sacrifice. Thus governments would possess hard and continous information about these preferences and could tailor their supply accordingly. A decrease in public expenditure would be the result.

 

An often heard objection to the benefit principle is that it runs counter to the wish to narrow income differentials. Yet subsidies to subjects perform this function - assuming one would wish to do so - more effectively than subsidies to objects, which have a habit of leaking away to people for whom the goods in question are not primarily intended. A Dutch study concerning housing and education concludes that the better paid profit relatively more from subsidies in these areas than those at the bottom of the income pyramid[1]. Similarly, a UK study on the National Health Service found that professionals, employees and managers had 41% more spent on them than was spent (in 1972) on semi-skilled and manual workers. These findings indicate that cultural differences deter-

mine access to medical care, and that the middle classes are doing better out of the welfare state than the working classes[2].

 

+ Even where it is decided that a collective service should be provided, it need not follow that the government must see to it. Grimond calls attention to the possibility of privatisation. He mentions the stock example of refuse collection but obviously there are more possibilities.

 

+ Federspiel was confronted with the question: ‘Should the government restrict itself to alleviating obvious evils and abstain from fostering happiness?’ The implied answer seems plausible but is incomplete. Does education alleviate an obvious evil - ignorance - or does it foster happiness? It certainly creates the conditions for awareness and enjoyment, apart from providing an essential basis for society. A system of purely private education would have obvious drawbacks - even if the state set minimum standards and maximum fees. According to the ‘merit goods’ argument, certain goods deserve to be subsidised by the state because they elevate the mind. Some say that paternalism either achieves its purpose, in which case the subsidy in question becomes superfluous, or fails, in which case its continuation would be throwing good money after bad. This argument does not stand up as it takes no account of the succession of generations. Merit goods ought to be regarded with a good deal of suspicion, however, for the welfare state is by nature elitist. The more consciousnesses are raised, the fewer merit goods are needed - except by bureaucrats in search of a raison d'être.

 

The marginal trade-off between more security and more responsibility is not the only one. Another exists between more equality and more effectiveness. There

+ is considerable agreement that equality has by now been overstressed. Federspiel is quite blunt about it: ‘Equality can never be a human right.’ Masani complains that in India public schools are not considered compatible with socialism. ‘In other words everyone must have an equally rotten education.’

 

+ The trade-off between equality and effectiveness is particularly acute in the labour market. The difference between minimum wage and modal income in The Netherlands is now about £80 per month after tax. Moreover, the conjunction of progressive taxation and benefits that are inversely related to income gives rise to ‘marginal integrated rates’ that for a number of low and middle income earners exceed 100%. A lack of functional mobility is the natural consequence (as a lack of geographical mobility results from subsidised housing and the possibility for unemployed people to refuse work beyond a certain distance).

Rousseau said that the dream of equality is the most powerful engine in the world. Tocqueville added that the more equal one becomes, the more equality one wants. So, too, Toxopeus: ‘This narrowing of wage differentials has not done anything to diminish envy.’ Some have deduced from this that the government should leave incomes to be decided by the market since no incomes policy is likely to find favour - but this station has been well and truly passed.

 

+ Liberals are unlikely to be enthusiastic about an incomes policy. They feel that trade unions should have a meaningful rôle to play. They also attach importance to the freedom of contract. Thirdly, incomes policies tend to make the labour market rigid. These arguments have weight. However, parties to a collective bargaining agreement may be in a position of oligopoly, if not monopoly. It is a sound Liberal prin-

ciple that governments must counteract such accumulations of economic power, or at least alleviate their effects. Where contracting parties have become so large that their agreement influences the whole economy, governments must arm themselves with the means to intervene. An incomes policy may be necessary to ensure a better division of value added between consumption and investment.

 

For those who do not fall under a collective bargaining agreement the law of supply and demand should be left to work, provided no restrictive practices occur. ‘I think the market will have to decide that,’ says Toxopeus. Fiscal and parafiscal measures will thereafter see to a distribution of the welfare state's burden commensurate with income. For this the case is well established. The case for a government policy that aims at equality of income per se is more difficult to establish. Beyond a certain point the distribution of welfare becomes a hindrance to its generation. Some socialists seem to think that people are not so much interested in what they get themselves as in what other people do not get. It would be unwise to base an incomes policy upon such a generalisation of envy.

Toxopeus is amazed ‘that nobody complains when soccer players like Cruyff and tennis players like Borg earn a lot of money’. The matter is indeed intriguing. Could it be that their lifestyles and personal histories are such that many derive vicarious enjoyment from the good fortune of these stars? Or is it felt that the pleasure which they give to such multitudes warrants a very large income? There is certainly more empathy with these top performers than with the director of a corporation or an outstanding lawyer.

 

+ Most Liberals will be wary of positive discrimination. According to Federspiel, there should be equality of opportunity and nothing else. So, too, the Liberal De-

claration of 1967 (see appendix B), which urges equality of opportunity, both for individuals and for nations. It is a good principle. Such equality, however, is the exception rather than the rule. Hence the importance of education: to equalize chances as much as possible. Extra attention for children from a deprived environment? Yes, as long as no standards are lowered. No quotas but preference for minorities (including women) where qualifications are alike. Certainly not the situation in Madras as described by Masani: ‘The non-Brahmin, no matter how dull, is given priority over the Brahmin.’

 

Grimond draws attention to the paradox that, on the one hand, we have become more egalitarian while, on the other, ‘people look at one another far more according to their rank and what organisation they belong+ to.’ It has been said that European civilisation has shown the change from status (of pre-capitalist days) to contract (of classical capitalism) and that we+ now witness the change back from contract to the status within organisations. It is this development that Grimond has in mind: ‘We are... like a late medieval state.’

 

Western societies are to a considerable extent dominated by large organizations: government, corporations, farmers, unions. Galbraith may be wide of the mark in the solutions he has proposed - he has a point when he says that we have never taken proper account in our economic thinking of these large organizations.

 

+ Trade unions should have a meaningful role to play: that was the first argument against an incomes policy. There is a considerable amount of unease, however, about the power which unions have been able to accumulate. Rey: ‘Trade unions have passed the stage of beneficial action and entered that of exaggeration.

Evidently we are in a period of danger.’

 

It is not surprising that he should voice such a strong opinion: Belgium is the most heavily unionised country in Europe. He and Federspiel fear the increasing political weight of unions. In Denmark, ‘trade unions (have acquired) political dominance almost equal to that of Parliament.’ In Belgium things are even worse: ‘Parliament is too weak to resist the pressure of trade unions.’ Both men regret the hold of unions over political parties. Nor does Grimond mince his words: ‘What the unions have been doing to the economy cannot be too strongly attacked.’

 

In Germany and The Netherlands unions seem to show more restraint. How does one foster it? Grimond pleads for a change in the law relating to trade unions. He also wants unions to take an interest in running industry.

 

+ This opens a Pandora's box of what is variously called industrial democracy or workers' participation. The Stuttgart Declaration (see appendix C) calls for the participation of workers in the management, control and profits of undertakings. One should distinguish between (a) participation by the employee in decisions that immediately affect him; (b) participation - either by the works council or by unions - in decision that are taken at board level; and (c) co-ownership - either by the individual employee or by unions.

 

All Liberals are in favour of (a). Most would also be in favour of works councils having the right to be consulted before important management decisions are taken. The Dutch Companies Act of 1973, which prescribes equal influence for shareholders and employees on the composition of supervisory boards, was introduced by a Liberal minister. When Toxopeus says:

‘The more one involves works councils in the running of companies, the more support they will give,’ he is in that tradition. He adds that works councils are understandably reluctant to get involved when personnel has to be laid off. This inevitably limits the scope of their intervention. No participation by unions, however. As Federspiel puts it: industrial democracy should remain ‘within each company's own domain, without direct or indirect interference by the trade unions.’

 

+ Co-ownership in the sense that employees own a piece of the business in which they work is an old Liberal ideal, even though in case of bankruptcy they would lose both their jobs and their savings. It lies at the heart of the Danish cooperatives mentioned by Federspiel as well as the Spanish Mondragon experience so admired by Grimond. There is a difference of opinion, however, about a Yugoslav-type system of self-management: Masani being in favour, Toxopeus against. The differences in development between India and The Netherlands probably account for this. On the other hand, there is general agreement that a central fund built up out of payroll levies and managed by the unions with the purpose of acquiring control over businesses is undesirable. Federspiel quite rightly says that this idea is ‘strongly resisted by a very large section of the workers themselves, who absolutely prefer available earnings to be added to their wages rather than place power in the hands of the union bosses.’

 

However much Grimond may be in favour of worker participation, it would be a delusion, he says, to think ‘that the whole human race wants to sit around discussing how its work or life or the organisation of public services should be run.’ He distinguishes between those who are prepared to sit around and dis-

cuss - the professional participators, one might say - and those who are not but want to be kept informed and to have the right to express their views. That is fair enough. Within a wider context, however, Toxopeus is more sceptical: ‘People are fed up with participation. They have neither the time nor the inclination to discuss government plans in abstract. They will do it when it comes nearer home.’ He has decisions within the public domain in mind. In The Netherlands legally prescribed participation in such areas as town planning has often made it very difficult to take measures. Here, too, there is a trade-off: between more participation and more effectiveness.

 

+ The matter of participation in industry is a prickly one. Much of Japan's success is attributed to its industrial relations. Some Japanese companies are run by ex-bosses of the company union. This is less likely to happen in Europe. In the twenties, however, Japan had the most violent labour relations of any industrialising country. (It shows how quickly social behaviour can change - at least in the East). Japan's economic development was then stormy too. It would be unwise to take Japan as our example: its culture and experience are too different. In The Netherlands the ‘harmony’-model of industrial relations is contrasted with the ‘conflict’-model. Most Dutch union leaders would say that they strive for harmonious, not adversarial, industrial relations, although of late the harmony has been wearing somewhat thin. German unions also avoid adversarial industrial relations. Yet the Dutch economy is much worse off than the German - it would, in fact, be in as bad a shape as the Belgian if it were not for the mixed blessing of a lot of natural gas. French industrial relations are every bit as adversarial as British, yet the French economy performs much better. Obviously, the state of a country's industrial relations can not, by itself, ex-

plain economic performance. Equally clearly, harmonious industrial relations are to be preferred by far+ to acrimonious ones. Participation stimulates industrial harmony - up to the point where it begins to stymie management.

 

‘Trade unions have more or less achieved their objectives,’ says Federspiel. Their dilemma is certainly great for there is no longer anything to share out. Hence the search for alternative gains. Dutch unions have called+ for ‘immaterial benefits’, which basically amount to employment guarantees and more participation. Unfortunately, jobs can no longer be guaranteed. Moreover, whatever joys may be left in participating in management decisions would be experienced by a small minority of employees. The rank and file are unlikely to accept participation by others as a substitute for their own cash. Also, such participation is likely to create a rift between those who participate and the employees they represent, because present consumption must now be sacrificed for future expectations. Union leaders in times of crisis and faced with decreasing memberships are not to be envied.

 

Certainly every effort must be made to get their agreement - tacit or explicit - to the economic medicine+ that is now unavoidable. Consensus is a great good and it must be striven for. How much do we compromise for the sake of consensus? What does one do when consensus is beyond reach? Governments must govern. Some unions demands are unrealistic, given the present economic situation. They must be resisted. French society is intensely confrontational. Yet France has made enormous progress in the past 25 years because, in the end, decisions do get taken there.

Apart from the extremes of right and left there are now only two political philosophies in Europe: Social-

ism+ and Liberalism. Socialism appears to be in as deep trouble as the unions. ‘The Socialists, even when they are Social Democrats, are by now barren,’ says Malagodi. Federspiel echoes him: ‘The Social Democratic Party has probably peaked out.’ The British and Dutch Socialist parties are deeply divided. The former has split - see Grimond's accurate analysis. The latter is unlikely to do so but still has no idea where it wants to go. The debates within the German and French parties are intense. In Germany at least this has electoral consequences.

 

What are the reasons for the difficulties of socialism? Partly it is a matter of style. Grimond: ‘The Labour Party has become the party of the establishment. It has become conservative,’ which recalls Malagodi's description of Italian communists as political bureaucrats. The main reason, however, is economic. ‘Democratic Socialism was a parasitic growth which depended on a liberal political and economic society. But it gradually weakened this society,’ says Grimond. Now that the economy is in difficulties - now that there are no more ‘nice things for left-wing people’ (in the Dutch phrase) to be shared out - Socialism is in trouble. Socialist parties find it difficult to decide what sort of marginal trade-off they want in the dilemma that is now basic to the welfare state. It is the dilemma between the creation and the distribution of wealth. Socialists want to distribute wealth in a way that frustrates the creation of it. They will have to choose and moderate Socialists will want to create more wealth. ‘The history of the Italian Socialist Party, as of other Socialist parties in Europe, is a continuous infight between a moderate wing and an extremist wing,’ remarks Malagodi. Which current will come out on top will obviously depend on the country and its circumstances. In Italy the Socialist leader Mr. Bettino Craxi has moved towards the centre.

+ What are the characteristics of Liberalism today? Liberals and Socialists share the ideal of a society in which no-one suffers undeservedly and in which security+ enlarges the scope of freedom. The Liberal Manifesto of 1947 (see appendix A) calls for security from the hazards of sickness, unemployment, disability and old age. What distinguishes Liberals? Basic for them is their desire for freedom. ‘Freedom is a fundamental human right and that is the basis of all liberal thought,’ says Federspiel quite rightly. Socialists would make the same claim. Yet the instrument they use - government in its many shapes - has become blunt and counterproductive. In the most important trade-off of all - between more equality and more liberty - it is more liberty that is now required, at least in the Benelux, Germany and Scandinavia.

 

+ The second characteristic, intimately connected with the first, is the primacy of the individual. Grimond bemoans the power of organisations which damages Britain. ‘The sad thing is that individuals know this but will not re-assert themselves.’ The change from contract to status ought to be resisted. Hence the importance of an independent mind. It is not surprising that the non-conformist churches have been ‘tremendous breeding grounds for Liberals’ in Great Britain.

 

+ Decentralisation comes third. Here difficulties become formidable, both in practice and in principle. A practical problem is that centralisation is almost impossible to reverse. ‘The central Civil Service was determined not to give up an inch of either its numbers or its powers,’ says Grimond in speaking of devolution in Great Britain. He proposes: ‘Raise standards of the poorer communities. Give them money but don't tell them what to do with it.’ Toxopeus tried to do just that, as Minister for Home Affairs, but ran into the determined opposition of his Christian

Democratic colleague for Social Work. ‘The net result was and still is nil.’

 

Another difficulty results from the media, in particular television. Toxopeus: ‘People in the north want the same thing as those in the south.’ (It is not the only complaint about the media either he or Grimond has). Third is a problem that is inherent in the electoral contest. No democratically elected politician can afford to create the impression of inactivity, even though idleness could well be more beneficial than a centralising activity.

Fourthly, decentralisation means loss of control over standards. The maladministration of Italian hospitals has become legendary. How can the central government in The Netherlands guarantee the safety of the American consulate-general in Amsterdam when authority over the police rests with the mayor of that city? Decentralisation may mean replacing the benign despotism of the central power by the local bully, although this is more likely to happen in a vast federal country like the United States than in Europe.

 

In spite of all these difficulties, decentralisation will remain a Liberal ideal because it diffuses power and brings it closer to the people, so making local democratic control possible. Grimond, himself a Scot, is in favour of a considerable measure of autonomy for Scotland and Wales. Liberals in Germany and The Netherlands favour a strong regional policy within Europe. The European nation-states have become both too large and too small. They have become too small because the major problems of the economy and of security can only be tackled at a European level. They have become too large because many other problems can only be handled satisfactorily at a local level.

+ Their ideals of freedom and decentralisation make liberals give strong support to free and private enterprise - freedom under responsibility and within the law. Masani: ‘We Liberals believe in the small entrepreneur, the self-employed man being the salt of the earth.’ Of course the public sector supports the productive capacity of society. But it must also be paid for. There is nothing sacred about private enterprise, however; it is merely a means. Only ends can be sacred. Here the end is: the opportunity to enjoy freedom under conditions of (relative) affluence. Free and private enterprise is an important means, both for reasons of efficiency and because it underpins civil liberties. Grimond rightly says: ‘The only really effective economy is a free enterprise, market economy.’ Wherever private enterprise has been abolished the same fate has struck civil liberties. Conversely, wherever civil liberties are truly respected and all citizens can have recourse to due process of law, affluence has been the result. This goes to show that the classical human rights give birth to the social human rights and not the other way round, as is sometimes maintained.

 

It is thus no contradiction that liberals tend to be right wing in economic affairs and left wing in matters appertaining to civil liberties, for the one stand supports the other. Thus Grimond: ‘There are many people who may be right wing in the sense that they are Friedmanites but who would be highly liberal on some other issues,’ such as immigrants, abortion and crime and punishment. It is Socialists who are inconsistent when they claim to be left-wing in both spheres, for a concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucracy sooner or later limits the freedom of the citizens. It is this inconsistency that forms the internal contradiction of modern Socialism.

+ A fifth characteristic appertains to the work of Parliament. Liberals prefer general rules to specific measures. Of course, this is no definitive guideline. An act of naturalisation is specific yet unexceptionable. At the other extreme, bills of attainder are since long obsolete. There is no doubt, however, that parliaments become ever more preoccupied with specifics. ‘Parliament tends more and more to act as the Municipal Council of The Netherlands,’ says Toxopeus. The legislative power encroaches upon the executive and exhibits the same law of diminishing returns.

 

It is not the only encroachment. The revolution of rising expectations has become that of rising entitlements. What used to be a discretionary power of government is now a right of the citizen. The inexorable expansion of government services in conjunction with the quest for justice engenders both a juridification of the administration and, increasingly, a policy-making role of the judicature. Thus the dividing line between the executive and the judicial power becomes vague. An ever more detailed legal network attemps to provide ever greater legal protection yet the attendant bureaucracy calls forth the Ombudsman.

 

Pseudo-legislation in the form of regulations and circulars escape parliamentary control. The intricacy of society and the demands of participatory democracy have turned legislation into an ever more cumbersome process. In consequence, much of it is now of an instrumental character. It is clear that this pseudo-legislation strengthens the power of the executive to the detriment of Parliament and of the citizen, as circulars may be modified by simple executive fiat. The legislative power hampers government while the executive power usurps legislation.

 

+ Their love of freedom has made Liberals resistant to

Communism. ‘We do represent a strong opposition to Marxist ideas and to the risk of Communist infiltration,’ says Federspiel. He states that Denmark is a firm member of the Atlantic Alliance and does not want a free ticket. Both Denmark and The Netherlands have small radical-liberal or semi-radical parties which are strongly influenced by pacifist ideas ‘to the effect that we do not need any defence or armed forces because we can look after our safety by political means.’ Indeed, many people believe that dialogue can serve as a means of defence and that problems can never be solved by force. Liberals should beware of this delusion. They must remember what the price of freedom is.

 

The reason is given by Malagodi: ‘The sixteenth century was the turning point of Italian history. We then lost our political independence but also our spiritual independence.’ Federspiel is not entirely reassuring+ when he tries to explain that the word ‘finlandisation’ is misunderstood: ‘Finland watches Russion reactions and always acts before the Russians put any pressure on them. They instinctively know how far they can go without getting into trouble.’ That is precisely it. Although the word ‘finlandisation’ is a slur upon a courageous country - probably the least finlandised of Scandinavia - and its adroit diplomacy, the phenomenon is real enough. It means a marginal loss of independence owing to the political pressure that results from military intimidation. At present the marginal loss is small, for Western Europe is armed and not neutral. If neutralist ideas were to gain ground in Western Europe, the marginal loss would become substantial. At the end of that road lies the independence of Vichy-France.

 

Mischnick confirms that ‘there exists no significant political group (in Germany) which today would want

to leave the European Community or NATO in order+ to pursue a policy of neutrality.’ Yes, the division of Germany is unnatural. Germans want to ‘transcend one day the boundaries which are now prescribed... by the constellation of power politics’ - but only as part of a strengthened European Community. The European Community is thus both an outlet for and a limit to German ambitions: ‘One can call this desire - to have all of Germany as member of a united Europe - a national vision.’

 

+ Mischnick is wise not to expect a reunited Germany within the next few decennia. No East German Communist government is likely to survive it, certainly not if this Germany were to form part of an enlarged European Community. Nor are the governments of France and the USSR likely to allow it. Mischnick may be right in saying that ‘a reunited Germany would be an integrating factor within Europe, a stabilising factor that would not strive for hegemony.’ The view from Paris is different. Any talk of German reunification will make alarm-bells ring in the Quai d'Orsay for a long time to come.

 

+ The matter of Europe continues to preoccupy Mischnick and Federspiel - who have not been members of the European Commission - as well as Rey and Deniau - who have - and, of course, Thorn, its current President. Of all political formations in Europe, the Liberal one is most in favour of its unification. The Stuttgart Declaration of 1976 unambiguously aims at a European Union. Deniau says, however, that the mere aim of constructing Europe will not mobilize popular support: we must say that ‘we are going to build Europe in order to achieve this or that object.’ He mentions three+ purposes: (1) to fight the economic crisis together; (2) to aid the Third World; and (3) to reunite East and

West Europe in order to achieve a ‘Europe from Brest to Brest Litovsk’.

 

+ It is difficult to fight the crisis together if opinions differ how to go about it. In particular the difference between the accomodating policy of Paris and the stricter approach of Bonn is likely to make the coordination of economic policies difficult. Most Liberals will opt for a sort of neo-classical approach. Indeed, what else can one do when the government deficit amounts to 15% of GNP and one has to borrow at 20% p.a., as in the case of Italy; or even when the deficit is 10% of GNP and one must borrow at 12% p.a., as in the case of The Netherlands? Thorn regrets the tendency to think that one can stimulate the economy by an injection of purchasing power. Nothing that smacks of postponing today's problems by making tomorrow's worse can be congenial to Liberals.

 

The economic divergence between France and Germany will put the European Monetary System under increasing strain. The EMS is one of the five recent achievements of the European Community mentioned by Rey. The others are: (1) the direct election of the European Parliament; (2) the accession of Greece; (3) the Tokyo-round which liberalised trade and in which the European Community took a prominent part; and (4) the second Lomé-convention. This agreement between the European Community and about 60 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific is the+ only treaty of structural development assistence. It furthers Deniau's second aim: to aid the Third World.

 

These achievements are real yet Europe is in considerable difficulties. Deniau looks to institutional reform for a way out. In his book L'Europe interdite he has proposed that the European Commission should be amalgamated with the Council of Ministers and that it

should not be responsible to the European Parliament. His proposals are in the French tradition for they are based upon the firm reality of the nationstate. The recent ideas of the German and Italian foreign ministers Genscher and Colombo go somewhat in the same direction but give, as a counterweight, much greater importance to the European Parliament. Rey finds himself at the other extreme. He wants the Treaty of Rome to be applied. It is hard to disagree with Rey and Thorn that much would be achieved if one did apply the provisions of the Treaty. The latter adds, however, that we should not be afraid of changing it if this widens our possibilities. One tends to agree with him, although the nagging suspicion remains that no revision can cope with resurgent nationalism.

 

Both Rey and Thorn reject Deniau's ‘Europe of variable geometry’. Rey also rejects a two-speed Europe. Thorn is less categorical. He mentions the possibility of two concentric Europes. A core group of countries would have ‘a common vision and a greater degree of integration’. Around this core there would be a larger ring of less integrated countries. This essentially amounts to a two-speed Europe. There is little doubt that Thorn's suggestion will have to be taken seriously if further integration is to take place, especially after the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal and in view of the differences between Britain and the core group in interests, outlook and temperament.

 

Deniau's third aim - a re-unification of East and West Europe - is as unlikely to happen soon as Mischnick's re-unification of Germany: they are part of the same+ problem. The history of Finland after the second World War is a sort of miracle, says Deniau. ‘I don't think that (the Soviets) would agree to give the status of Finland to their satelites if Western Europe remain-

ed strong, armed and attractive.’ Our freedom and prosperity are a constant challenge to Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. What can one do to further Deniau's third purpose? Federspiel: ‘I doubt that we can do very much except do everything in our power to keep the people in Eastern Europe informed of what is going on.’

 

+ ‘Europe should again be given a world rôle,’ Deniau insists. Of course, rôles are not given but gained. That is why he considers the ‘military dimension’ of Europe an imperative: ‘If we do not have a certain autonomy and a certain responsibility in the military field, in particular in the area of nuclear weapons,+ there will never be a political Europe.’ Deniau may well be right yet it is to be feared that he tries to square the circle. The French and the British are unlikely to pool their nuclear deterrents. The Germans are under international obligation never to possess one. Deniau admits that we cannot do without the American nuclear umbrella, even though this guarantee has ‘the tendency to foster a certain form of irresponsibility among Europeans.’ What then? Firstly, we must coordinate the manufacture of conventional arms. Secondly, we must define the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. Both aims are important but they are best pursued within the framework of NATO, not the European Community.

 

‘Are there still Europeans who feel themselves to be such and who are ready to act as such?’ Deniau's question is important and valid. The answer probably+ is: very few. Deniau admits that decolonisation can contain ‘an element of resignation, of not believing anymore in oneself and in one's vocation.’ Yet, when it is done properly - as in black Africa - he calls it a ‘success of the will and not a failure’. It is interesting that an Indian should look at it from the other side.

Masani: ‘Mountbatten did an excellent job for Britain and a lousy job for India, and that was what he was sent to do, to scuttle... A great power must stay and see its responsibilities through.’ No doubt Rey is right when he says, referring to the former Belgian Congo, that the transfer of power was absolutely inevitable. Let us not pretend, however, that this transfer necessarily increased respect for human rights. Self-determination often took place at the expense of the poor. Decolonisation is nevertheless in the Liberal tradition. It is part of what Malagodi calls ‘the great title of honour of the Liberal elite’, which is that ‘it opened the doors of power to masses which it knew were not born liberal’. This applies to the Third World as much as to Italy.

 

In Italy the Liberals formed an elite but ‘with influence out of proportion to their numbers’. Rey says the same thing: ‘Although Liberals are not very numerous, they are essential.’ Malagodi and Rey may be understating the popular appeal of Liberalism today. Its message of freedom is gaining ground and not only in The Netherlands. Ever more people, in Northwest Europe, want less bureaucracy and more freedom.

 

Freedom first, the primacy of the individual, the wish to decentralise, support for private enterprise and a preference for general rules not specific measures - these are five characteristics of modern Liberalism. In addition to this - and now we come back to attitudes - Liberals prefer to look at the world as it is, not as they would like it to be. ‘We like to say that we stand for+ common sense,’ says Federspiel; and Toxopeus: ‘Liberals are more realistic than politicians of other currents.’ It is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength because seeing the world as it is, helps to deal with it and to avoid the sort of dead-end street in

which socialists now find themselves. It is also a weakness because it may mean a certain anemia, a lack of passion or vision, which limits electoral support.

 

As Mischnick explained: ‘This is the main problem for Liberals: how to translate their insight organisationally in such a manner that they reach the mass of voters. It is necessary for the intellectual insights of Liberals to get translated emotionally somewhat more strongly.’ If Liberals are to make use of the opportunities now open to them, they must complete the transition to a mass party. Malagodi refers to the same+ problem: ‘How does one broaden the base of Liberalism when the masses have been captured by visions of total power and of total prosperity?’ The only way in which one could do so is by offering a competing vision.+ Toxopeus: ‘What I mean by vision is a certain concept of society. Every political party must have one.’ The inherent difficulty of Liberalism is precisely that the very openness of its worldview makes it hard to promote ‘a certain concept of society’. The Liberal vision is one of freedom and tolerance, of balance and self-restraint. As Rey expressed it: ‘Liberty destroys itself if it does not find in itself the principle of its own limitation.’ It is the old message: nothing in excess.

F. Bolkestein


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