Modern Liberalism

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Wolfgang Mischnick
(Bonn, 15 January 1982)

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Born:	In Dresden on 29 September 1921.
Education:	Technische Hochschule, Dresden.
1939-45:	War Service.
1945:	Co-founder of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD).
1946-48:	Member of the municipal council of Dresden. Member of the Central Committee of the LDPD.
1947:	Elected deputy chairman of the LDPD in Sachsen but prevented from serving by the Soviet military administration.
1948:	Escape via Berlin to Frankfurt am Main. Youth secretary of the FDP in Hessen. Engaged in journalism.
1950:	Employed by FDP secretariat in Hessen.
1954:	Member of the regional parliament of Hessen.
1955:	Secretary of the FDP members of the regional parliament of Hessen.
1954-57:	Chairman of the Young Democrats.
1956-71:	Chairman of the FDP in Frankfurt am Main.
1956-61, 1964-68:	Floorleader of the FDP in the municipal council of Frankfurt am Main.
Since 1954:	Member of the Central Committee of the FDP.
Since 1957:	Member of the Federal Parliament.
November 1961-October 1963:	Federal Minister for refugees and veterans.
1963-68:	Deputy floorleader of the FDP in the Federal Parliament.
1964:	Deputy chairman of the FDP.
1967-77:	Chairman of the FDP in Hessen.
Since 1968:	Floorleader of the FDP in the Federal Parliament.

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Interview with Wolfgang Mischnick

1. Moral Leaderschip

Bolkestein: Mr. Helmut Schmidt has repeatedly criticized the idea that a politician must be expected to exercise moral leadership. Do you agree with him?

Mischnick: A politician who bases his acts upon certain premises naturally also exercises a certain moral leadership. The Chancellor wanted to make clear that he is not the moral leader of this country, i.e. that through his opinions he cannot determine the intellectual and moral development of the Federal Republic of Germany and in fact does not want to do so. For a liberal politician it goes without saying, however, that his political acts spring from the fundamental mental attitude of liberalism. Thus all decisions he takes follow from this fundamental attitude and so exercise a certain moral leadership.

It would be wrong and in complete contradiction to a liberal point of view to consider one man to be a moral leader whom all should follow. It goes against premises which I consider basic. Of course every government exercises a certain moral influence on the attitudes of people. But precisely in a liberal and democratic state one must be able to differ in opinion about the moral premises of politics. There should never be the feeling that the government's proposals are beyond doubt. On the other hand, one should always remember that for someone who carries political authority the debate about daily political decisions comes first, although he can only take them if they are founded upon a sure moral basis.

Bolkestein: Socialist and Conservative politicians have a closed view of

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the world. Liberals, on the other hand, have an open view of the world. Does this make it more difficult for Liberals to provide intellectual leadership - an inspiration or an orientation - than for Socialists or Conservatives?

Mischnick: Liberals have the advantage of being open to any discussion with people who hold other points of view. They have the disadvantage of not being able to provide their colleagues with a political catechism for the daily debate. In that sense it is easier for Socialists and for Christian Socialists or Conservatives to ensure conformity between leadership and followers. This advantage Liberals have of being free in their discussions makes them less frequently end up in an ideological dead-end than Socialists or Conservatives. For the latter it is more difficult to let go of a point of view once they recognise that it is mistaken. Such a correction is easier for a Liberal because of his open world view. The disadvantages of Liberals are therefore not as important as their advantages, which consist in the ability to adjust more rapidly to developments and to draw the right conclusions from them.

Bolkestein: In order to have success, Liberal politicians need a fairly highly developed electorate because Liberalism is more difficult to understand than Socialism or Conservatism. It is a subtle philosophy and therefore harder to put across than other political philosophies. That is particularly noticeable where Liberal Parties are hemmed in by the two other main formations as in Germany and Italy.

Mischnick: Of course it is less difficult to mobilize the masses when one can propose to them a concept that is easy to grasp - a concept that may not be sensible yet will find ready acceptance. German Liberals have always exerted themselves to increase the voter's mobility, i.e. his willingness to decide not on the basis of tradition or of constraints which he may have outgrown but through analysis of the actual situation. In this we have had a considerable measure of succes. At the same time it has the drawback that at each election we must fight anew for the vote of those who could have been our faithful supporters. Greater mental mobility means a greater exertion to keep the Liberal vote. To that extent it means a heavier burden on our party. I still hold our strategy to be right because in the long run it increases the chances of Liberals, as this

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country shows. Moreover, it also means that it is easier for Liberals to master changing politicial situations, as long as they succeed in giving their mental mobility organisational shape. This is the main problem for Liberals: how to translate their insights organisationally in such a manner that they reach the mass of voters. It is necessary for the intellectual insights of Liberals to get translated emotionally somewhat more strongly, without these emotions serving as the basis of political decisions.

Bolkestein: In an interview with ‘Evangelische Kommentare’ the Chancellor discussed German youth. He said that teachers and other educators have neglected their duty to give an orientation to young people, largely out of cowardice. According to him, complaints about the permissive society should be directed to those who carry responsibility. Do you agree with Mr. Schmidt?

Mischnick: Although I do not share his opinion in every respect, one often sees that parents are quite prepared to leave everything connected with the education of their child - including political discussions - to its school and that schools, in turn, leave it up to the politicians. Here only a mutual and continuing cooperation can help. An open discussion is natural for a Liberal, certainly about matters which occupy the younger generation. But I consider it absolutely wrong to believe that one can convince young people by running after them and their opinions. On the contrary, one should acquaint them with the facts and talk with them about their often idealistic ideas in the light of real possibilities. My own experience with young people has shown me that they have the willingness to discuss on the basis of facts. All-important is whether they feel that the older person they are talking with discusses from inner conviction or whether he merely puts forward his party's programme or manifesto. The more I am willing to call into question my own points of view, the readier young people will be to discuss with me. This does not mean that we should take their opinions as the basis of our own considerations but that we should be willing to submit our point of view to be re-examined, if in fact they have reached a better insight. Conversely, I am not prepared to reconsider the standpoint which I hold to be true simply because young people have a different opinion. They will quickly recognise this as a weakness. It is also important that one should take

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into consideration the natural differences between generations. This means that in his discussions with young people a politician must compensate for what their parental home and school have neglected, namely why certain situations of today have arisen - situations which one can only understand through their historical developments. A large part of the young generation lacks this knowledge. That is why so many refuse decisions which are necessary. I am thinking, for example, of matters like the NATO double track decision, the European Community and the Third World. In these matters their opinions are often based upon illusions, which are soon dispelled when one clearly sets out the determining facts.

2. The New Class

Bolkestein: In his book ‘Work is done by others’ (‘Die Arbeit tun die Anderen’), Helmut Schelsky writes about the new class of ‘salvation-brokers’, of those who preach the social gospel. Mr. Helmut Schmidt has spoken of people who preach a sort of patent ethics (‘Patentethiker’), who do not understand the economic process and who deprecate the welfare state. Is this new class as much in evidence as once it was?

Mischnick: I would not go so far as to speak of a new class. That might create the impression of a large number of people whose importance might be exaggerated. There are, in fact, people who hold such opinions and who create confusion. Usually, however, when one forces them to debate their point of view, they have to admit that they do not have any prescription and that criticism is their only strong point. They fail to put together a workable proposition. In our discussions with these ‘social evangelists’ it is necessary to make clear what the possibilities and the limits in reality are. I am certain that this is possible when one is prepared to carry the discussion to its conclusion. In the student discussions at the end of the sixties there were comparable ideas which to my mind were completely unrealistic. In those discussions it became rapidly clear that when they had to give concrete expression to their ideals, they were forced to correct them. It is a serious thing that the willingness to run after such utopians is today greater than yesterday or the day before. On the other hand, one should not consider them as a constant plague, as a

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natural phenomenon: a Liberal above all should engage in a discussion about these matters and carry it to its logical conclusion. I am thinking in particular of ecology, which plays such an important rôle in the discussions with these young people. If one compares here the possible with the impossible, what is utopia with what is feasible, one can convince many people. There will always be a group that will chase utopias and need a lot of time before attaining a reasonable point of view. I feel that somebody who chases utopias at the age of 18 or 20 should no longer do so when he is 30.

Bolkestein: Don't you think that there is an element of luxury in this whole discussion?

Mischnick: Of course there is a connection. Our economic difficulties and our unemployment have given some romantics food for thought, in particular those who are prepared to do a normal job and suddenly realize that their job could be at risk if people lend an ear to certain siren songs. Those who want to opt out completely, who would really prefer to do nothing, will not allow themselves to be impressed even by that. But they are so few that in the long run they will have no significant influence. In the whole area of ecology and energy - the use of nuclear energy, for example - a more realistic point of view can be noticed. This does not mean that dangers are not heeded but rather that the possibilities of taking safety measures against them are seen in a more realistic light. To that extent I believe that the more difficult economic situation has given rise to a more realistic way of thinking. This should not make people with political responsibilities leave aside everything that has to do with ecology, however: they should take it just as seriously as before. In my view one can link economy to ecology in a sensible way and so give the vast majority of the people the assurance that one will not let nature go to waste on account of the economy.

Bolkestein: In the Netherlands there used to be an anti-industry mentality, especially in the seventies. This has changed now. Has it also changed in Germany?

Mischnick: That trend of thought existed and to a certain degree still exists. With the change in the economic situation it has changed, too. It

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is beyond doubt, however, that for example with respect to industrial sites purely commercial considerations, such as industrial taxes received by municipalities, have been stressed for too long. The planning of industrial sites, the upkeep of recreational spaces and the separation of living and working areas have been neglected for a long time. At present planning and consultations concerning these respective areas are emphasized much more strongly. To that extent it was a shock therapy, which now shows its positive effects. I do not think that a durable aversion from industrial activities will arise. The realisation grows that the more decisions one wants to take in favour of the environment, the more one should see to it that certain financial conditions are fulfilled. This can only happen if the economy runs smoothly and is not throttled by ecology.

3. The Peace Movement

Bolkestein: Günther Grass has remarked in connection with the peace movement that fear is the only growth area left in Germany. What is the religious background of the peace movement? Why does it appeal more to Protestants than to Catholics? Is it a desire for peace or an alibi for the unification of Germany?

Mischnick: The peace movement has various roots. The desire for peace is so widespread in Germany that one should not distinguish between those who demonstrate and those who don't. However, many people have made use of the present desire for peace and have tried, from various motives, to give it a different organisational shape. Without doubt the people of the church that are connected with it recognised the original desire for peace but not that it was made to serve a different political purpose. It is a pity that there are forces which try to make use of it for another political end. They are of the most varying persuasions - some are Communists, others belong to groups that are rather anarchist.

This movement has struck a chord among people of the Evangelical Church more than among Catholics because the Evangelical hierarchy is more liberal than that of the Catholic Church. The Catholic hierarchy is more government-minded than the Evangelical one. The Evangelical Church has always admitted a greater degree of diversity because it con-

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sists of different currents such as the Lutheran and the Calvinist ones.

The peace movement wishes to prevent and avoid all war and everyone shares this ideal. That the methods which are advocated are often unrealistic is a different matter. No movement for the unification of Germany is behind it, however. In the Evangelical Church of the German Democratic Republic the desire for peace exists just as much as here. Today it finds greater expression than before, not because the desire did not exist formerly but because the agreement between church and state in the German Democratic Republic has given the church greater freedom of expression. It would be wrong to deduce something else from this. The people who are active in this field have very different points of view. There are those who have never had the idea of re-unification and probably never will have it either. We know very well that in the Federal Republic of Germany the wish exists to arrive at a unification one day but also that a realistic appreciation of the chances of bringing this about exists too. This re-unification can only come to pass if the whole European problem is also solved. Whoever suspects neutralistic ideas behind it, such as a departure from the Alliance or an independent German line in opposition to the Alliance, is talking nonsense.

4. Re-unification

Bolkestein: Let me quote from an article by Wolfgang Pohrt in ‘Die Zeit’: ‘Nothing in Germany is harmless, especially not when a peace movement is the catalyst of a German awakening; the people [“das Volk”] do not form a definite concept but are the lie of an obligatory togetherness of those who must submit to an enforced national collectivity.’

Mischnick: I do not exclude that there are people who believe this. To think, however, that a great unification movement without regard for the facts of power politics is at present under way would be a mistake. The division of Germany is an unnatural situation and it is right that people in the Federal Republic and in the Democratic Republic feel themselves to be just as German as before. The 35 years since the war have made clear that nothing can be achieved by merely verbal declarations about re-unification. I repeat that people who are serious about

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this possibility know very well that it depends upon a solution of the whole European problem, which is at hand neither today nor tomorrow. Nobody knows whether unification will come at some later date. Whoever believes that there is a movement which strives to make a re-united Germany neutralist or communist, ought to know that there is not the slightest support for this in the whole population of the Federal Republic. Perhaps a few indulge in such fantasies. Every election proves that they have no chance of getting into Parliament.

Many people feel that Europeans should understand how a close and durable cooperation is in their common interest. In the long run it cannot be a good thing that the most important political decisions are always taken by the two superpowers. The weight of Europe ought to increase because in the long run that will be the best guarantee of peace in Europe. That is why behind much of that sort of thinking there lies the wish to arrive at a wholly European position rather than a German nationalist one.

Bolkestein: If I were a German politician, the division of Germany would be a constant factor in my thinking. Do you believe there are many politicians here who feel that way?

Mischnick: It is evident that the division of Germany is a factor which plays a rôle in every decision. But it is also clear that owing to the normative effect of facts, possibilities in this respect are seen in a more realistic light today than 15 or 20 years ago. Developments have shown that the mere declaration of our long term goal to lessen tension achieves nothing. On the contrary, it fosters estrangement. If we want to lessen tension, we do so in order to keep up contacts. We should not stress present borders, we should not increase present difficulties and so put at risk such substance of the German nation as still exists. Whether this will continue over the coming decennia is something I cannot say. It is clear, however, that the desire to have more contact and so improve our relationship is as strong now as before and is even on the increase. But one should not conclude that this is because Germans want to broaden and strengthen their position. It is the obvious desire of Germans to associate with each other as others do. The division of Germany these past 35 years has as a consequence that many cannot even conceive what this means because they have never known it themselves. ‘Time is

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the great healer’ - that is true; but time will not change the realisation that this division is artificial. Nor will it, on the other hand, give rise to forces that wish to change the situation by violent means.

Bolkestein: Metternich said in 1815 that Germany and the German people form abstract concepts. Why is the division between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany artificial but the border with Austria not?

Mischnick: Because of the stormy developments of the 20th century, a relatively short period of existing together as one state has, of course, had a stronger effect than in the past, when one existed together over longer, but less intense, periods of time. For example, during the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, communications were much less frequent than now. When Germany was divided in 1945, aspects of geography and the borders of communities were not at all taken into account. What used to be Prussia was cut in two. The regions of Saxony, Anhalt and Thüringen did not keep their former shape. Territory which lay outside our borders remained separate and so no comparison with Austria can be made. Austria was a state and has again become the state it was between 1918 and 1938. An additional factor was our common fate: the need to rebuild our country completely after the war and the flight of millions who were displaced or sought freedom in the West.

One may ask, of course, whether after all this time the bond still is sufficiently strong. I am convinced that it is. Whether it will remain so in the long run is a question nobody can definitely answer. That is why an all-European solution would make things easier. Still, I wonder how other states and countries would react if they had lived together for 30, 50 or 100 years before being divided by force. The Polish people are automatically allowed to have their national identity and borders. One wonders why the German people are not.

Bolkestein: History has shown that a united Germany is too strong for Europe.

Mischnick: What remained of Germany after the war is much smaller than what it historically has been. Therefore such historical comparisons are no doubt incorrect. Secondly, if Germany were re-united, it

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would so much form part of a European settlement that the concerns which used to exist not possibly recur. Thirdly, the willingness of Germans to keep and strengthen the European Community is at least as strong as that of the other countries, so this would also be a positive factor. Fourthly, I believe that a re-united Germany - I repeat that I do not foresee it in the next few decennia - would be an integrating factor within Europe, a stabilising factor that would not strive for hegemony. On the contrary, I think it would consolidate Europe as it would straddle the present division between East and West. Germany would occupy an important, but not the most important, position.

5. Between East and West

Bolkestein: After the war Adenauer took the decision that Germany should throw in its lot with the West. That was a historic departure from the ‘switch-politics’ of Bismarck, which were intended to prevent an alliance between France and Russia but which also turned Germany into a bridge between East and West. Do you think that in the coming decade Germany will turn its back on Adenauer's decision and return to Bismark's ‘switch-politics’?

Mischnick: We have not become a member of the Western Alliance, or rather, we have not decided in favour of the system of the Western Alliance, as a temporary impulse but out of the deep conviction that an integration of the countries of Europe will follow, if possible beyond the limits which we must observe today. That is the main thing. Let me repeat what I have just said: especially when one does not reject the idea of re-unification, one should wish for a solution for all of Europe. At the same time this means that the bond with the European Community will not be in jeopardy. On the contrary, we are working for its constant strengthening.

The proposals of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the President of the FDP, are intended to go beyond the European Community as a purely economic affair and to arrive at a common position in matters pertaining to foreign policy and security also. Nobody in a responsible position would now wish to declare these areas out of bounds. On the contrary, he would want to strengthen the Community and so help a steadily more united Europe to attain an importance which would enable it to play a rôle in world politics that would be possible even today if only a greater

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unison within the community existed. I realize that this will be very difficult because many national points of view come into play. It does make clear, however, that the concern that Germany might turn away from the European Community is simply not justified and that there are no relevant political groups which want to go that way. As part of a community so strengthened, we would rather want one day to transcend the boundaries which are now prescribed to us by the constellation of power. Whether we shall succeed is a different matter. All our deliberations are aimed not at a departure from the Community, but at undertakings which may be possible beyond present limits. Whether that will be feasible depends on developments within the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon. But there exists no significant political group which today would want to leave the European Community or NATO in order to pursue a policy of neutrality.

Bolkestein: President Kennedy said in 1963: ‘Ich bin auch ein Berliner’. Last year 50.000 people demonstrated in West Berlin against General Haig. Why the change?

Mischnick: The cooperation between Germany and France and the convergence within the European Community have caused relations between the Federal Republic and the United States to be judged within the framework of the Alliance and not outside it. But that has nothing to do with anti-Americanism. The demonstrations which took place in many different areas in 1981 have drawn a lot of attention. When one considers their numbers in relation to the total population, however, they represent a small minority. I admit that the demonstration in Berlin against the visit of the American Secretary of State has displeased me as much as others. On the other hand, one should not overestimate the importance of those who went from federal territory to Berlin. The overwhelming majority of the people of Berlin and in federal territory see the Alliance in the same light as before.

Of course the new American administration has given rise to a measure of uncertainty through a number of not very coherent decisions and declarations. This now seems to be clearing up. It was a phase in which one was uncertain whether or not anything would come of the arms control negotiations for the intermediate range. When it became clear that these negotiations would take place, the minds of many people were

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set at rest - people who were worried that the Americans would backpedal on the negotiations and emphasize only rearmament. That was also the reason why many took part in the demonstrations, although basically they were not some sort of engaged anti-Americans.

Bolkestein: William Borm, who is member of the Central Committee of the FDP, has said that the protest of the people against the USA has become a national duty and that Germany is no atomic colony of the USA. What does that mean?

Mischnick: William Borm is not representative of the FDP. Of course there are people in the FDP who share his opinion but they form a minority. William Borm has not assessed the situation correctly and his effectivity has therefore not increased but decreased. He is held in esteem by many young members because of his senior position in our party. This should not be exaggerated, however. His motives are pure but his analysis is faulty, in my opinion, and therefore his point of view is unlikely to be adopted by the majority of the party.

Bolkestein: Günther Grass has said that politically and culturally, Germany, as it were, abdicated after the war - that it considered the USA as an ‘Ersatzvaterland’ (surrogate Fatherland). Do you think the time has come for a more pragmatic arrangement between Germany and the USA?

Mischnick: To say that there has been a mental identification between the Federal Republic and the United States would be going too far. I would rather call it a phase of aping the Americans. That there has been an Americanisation of daily life does not mean at all that the basic approach of Germans has become American. The consciousness that American aid was decisive in the reconstruction after the war is as alive now as it used to be. But that does not mean an adoption of the American way of life. It made sense to consider our relationship in a pragmatic way, as I have always done. There may be some who looked upon this relationship more euphorically and who are disappointed now that the euphoria has disappeared. A pragmatic way of looking at things is preferable because it is less subject to change and therefore more durable.

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I think that relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, the European Community and the Alliance will continue to be conducted in this pragmatic way. The decisive bond, however, will as always be our common and fundamental love of freedom. This bond will not disappear. Even individual instances of mutual difficulties will not be able to break it. We may differ about tactics - for example, whether or not to apply sanctions against the Soviet Union or Poland - and there will also be differences of opinion concerning conflicts of interests. This does not mean, however, that our fundamental wish to preserve our freedom is impaired.

6. The Matter of Germany

Bolkestein: It has been said that the two main questions about Germany are these: what are the limits of German ambitions and, secondly, what is Germany's national idea? After the war the Germans found the limits of their ambitions in Europe. We have not managed to achieve political union in Europe, which has led to a disappointment here as elsewhere. As far as a national idea is concerned, the filmmaker Hans-Jürgen Silberberg has said that a Germany without vision would be horrible. Ralph Dahrendorf has spoken of a national purpose for the Germans. The German Socialist Party believes that no political action is possible without an utopia. How do you feel about these matters?

Mischnick: It is true that in the early fifties the desire to arrive at one great European solution was stronger in the Federal Republic of Germany than elsewhere. Many people said that it was a sort of surrogate philosophy that took the place of the impossible unification of Germany. At the beginning of this debate that may have been so. I am convinced that the German willingness to see a European Union as a goal - also a national goal - finds wide support in the country. The hopes and endeavours directed towards this goal are stronger in Germany than in other European countries. The concern that this goal may be beyond reach exists but does not prevent us from pursuing it. This means that the many adverse developments and problems in the European Community do not lead to negative opinions as quickly as elsewhere, although of course we too see them. One must be patient.

One of the most interesting phenomena since the war is that Germans

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used to be reproached for moving too fast and being too impatient with political developments. That is no longer true. In my view Germans show more patience than many others. We shall pursue this goal even if the lack of decisions gives rise to concern about the way Europe is taking shape.

This means that we do not switch back and forth between a national idea and a European one, so that if, for example, things don't move in Brussels, a sudden wave of nationalism brings forth the idea of German unification again or vice-versa. These ideas are parallel. The more we are able to achieve a European Union, the greater will be the chance of bringing about national unification one day.

In my view one can call this desire - to have all of Germany as one member of a united Europe - a national vision. At the moment it would appear very unrealistic. But it would persuade a large majority that it pays to pursue the further development of the European Community as a long term goal, in spite of all disappointments. I believe this to be the only durable possibility of reconciling national considerations and European necessities.

Whether this will still be the case in 10, 20 or 30 years I cannot say. The further we leave the negative experiences of the last war behind us, the less our memories and our own experiences will play a rôle and the more other influences may gain strength. That is why all who carry political responsibility want to consolidate the European Community as much as possible - to prevent other influences from carrying us in a different direction in future. That is also why our European partners are well advised to take this point of view into consideration when they think about a European Union, which it transcends. I have the impression that nationalism is much stronger in the other European countries than in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Bolkestein: Alexis de Tocqueville has remarked that Germans have a genius for getting enthusiastic over an abstract idea. Is that still so? Why do Germans need a national idea? Is it not enough to be an economic miracle?

Mischnick: As a pragmatic person I believe that the need to realize an ideal irrespective of its costs is much less present than it used to be. It is not impossible that this need may become stronger the less other ideals,

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about which I have spoken, become reality. I should add, however, that I cannot imagine people's lives being determined exclusively by pragmatic considerations. On the contrary, many emotional factors play a rôle too. Perhaps I may remind you or our writers, our scientists and our philosophers. What is decisive is that these ideals are not misused for purposes of power politics. I exclude this danger. Intellectual currents should not be seen in the light of a possible risk of misuse, as has happened once. The wish to seek the meaning of life not merely in affluence and in our everyday existence will not be translated into power politics nor will it create risks. We Germans have been cured of that and I am sure that the value of this experience will last a long time. It will even be difficult to unmask others who give their political purposes idealistic forms, such as communists or other exponents of a social gospel.

Bolkestein: Are the Germans contented?

Mischnick: The vast majority of Germans is contented, in spite of all economic difficulties. Interestingly, all opinion polls confirm that most people consider the general situation to be worse than their own. This shows that the overall situation is rather better than it is made out to be. Feelings of satisfaction with our overall development also find expression in the fact that the three political parties accumulate almost all the votes. I am convinced that these feelings are the cause of our rejection of all radical influences, even in these days of economic difficulties.