Modern Liberalism

[p. 37]

Per T. Federspiel
(Copenhagen, 13 June 1981)

[p. 39]

[p. 41]

Born:	9 April 1905
Education:	Harrow School, England, and University of Copenhagen (law).
1931-32:	London correspondent to Danish newspapers.
1932-33:	Assistant to Danish Council at the International Court of Justice in the Hague in the dispute with Norway on sovereignty over East Greenland.
Since 1937:	Legal practice in Copenhagen.
1945-47:	Minister for Special Affairs in the Danish liberal minority Government.
1946-49:	Member of the Danish Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly.
1947-48:	Member of the UN Palestine Commission (Partition Commission).
1947-73:	Member of the Danish Parliament. 1970-71 Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee.
1949-71:	Danish representative on the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.
1953-60:	Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Council of Europe.
1960-63:	President of the Assembly.
1960-73:	Chairman of the Foreign Policy Society of Denmark.
1973-74:	Member of the European Parliament.
1963-70:	Vice President and member of the Executive of the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva).
1970:	Honorary member of the ICJ.

Patron of the Liberal International.

Honorary Governor of the Atlantic Institute (Paris).

Member of the West European Advisory Group of Radio Free Europe (Radio Liberty).

[p. 43]

Interview with Per Federspiel

1. The Welfare State

Bolkestein: It seems that the internal dynamics of the welfare state are such that it proves practically impossible to reduce the share of the public sector in national income. Is this also true of Denmark?

Federspiel: We have the same problem. A kind of momentum develops. There is no doubt, not even in the ruling Socialist Party, that a good deal of social legislation has gone beyond its natural limits. It is difficult to judge whether the social system works as it should, as a kind of safety net under those who, for reasons beyond their control, fall below a normal standard of living, or whether we have developed a system of rights where people simply can claim from the public purse a number of benefits which they could well afford to pay for themselves.

Bolkestein: The problem, of course, is to determine where these natural limits are.

Federspiel: It has always been my belief that people should be responsible for their own lives. Only when their efforts fail and they are reduced to poverty, owing to developments of society, or at least to a living standard below what they would normally expect, then it is a duty of the community to assist them. Unfortunately we have reached the point where many people are perfectly satisfied to live on public grants. It is one of the dangers of the welfare state that it tends to eliminate personal responsibility for maintaining one's own standard.

Bolkestein: Liberals often say that they don't want equality of results

[p. 44]

but of opportunities and that education is one of the means by which one enables people to have those equal chances. If one follows that line of reasoning one ends up with positive discrimination. What is your opinion about it?

Federspiel: My feeling is that there should be equality of opportunity and nothing more. It would be unnatural for a society to expect everybody to be equal in every respect.

Bolkestein: Many would agree but equality of opportunity becomes somewhat theoretical if one compares people from radically different backgrounds.

Federspiel: We should have equal opportunities of education so we can develop our abilities and talents for the benefit of ourselves and of society. This, of course, implies that in our system neither teachers nor fellow-students discriminate on grounds of social background.

Bolkestein: It is sometimes said that the welfare state is, by definition, elitist because it sets certain ideals and tries to educate people to embrace those ideals. Should the Government restrict itself to alleviating obvious evils and abstain from fostering happiness?

Federspiel: The Government should take care of the ordinary conditions of community life and ensure for the citizens the right to develop their life in freedom and see that its services are running properly. There is a development of the trade union movement which is a threat not only to the independence of Parliament but also to the integrity of the Social Democratic Party. In the past trade unions have done a magnificent job in improving material conditions of work but today trade unions have more or less achieved their objectives. That leaves them in the position of representing a vested interest. They also constitute a political force, which they never should do. Trade unions acquiring a political dominance almost equal to that of Parliament form a very dangerous element of society. It puts pressure on the welfare system in directions which have very little to do with what we would normally call welfare. The political threat, of course, is that in these trade unions you get militant groups whose only political interest is to undermine existing society

[p. 45]

by non-parliamentary means, maybe even over the heads of sensible and reasonable trade union leaders, because their control over the movement has got out of hand.

Bolkestein: Will it lead to a form of corporate state?

Federspiel: I don't think so but the curious thing is that originally the trade union movement dealt with industrial workers. Today they are gradually switching to claim that they represent all wage-earners. Wage-earners are very nearly 80% of the working population which means that people who are politically not socialists get involved in the trade union movement because they think it is their interest group. You now get academics and government workers, even up to the higher grades, involved in exactly the same methods of pressing claims as trade unions have done.

Bolkestein: If we may for a moment come back to the matter of equality, I think it was Tocqueville who said that people can put up with inequality in an authoritarian society but that the more egalitarian a society becomes the more equality people want. If one follows this line of reasoning, people will not be happy until there is complete equality which is, of course, an illusion but it would indicate that there subsists a reservoir of resentment because of those differences that will always remain.

Federspiel: Equality can certainly never be a human right. Freedom is a fundamental human right and that is the basis of all liberal thought: to be free to develop your own personality, to develop your own work as long as you can do it with respect for other people's freedom. That is why in Denmark we never considered Liberalism as an ideology but rather as a way of life and an approach to thinking. Over a hundred years ago in my party we coined the word: freedom under responsibility. You must respect the rights of others but you must certainly stand on your own right to be a free man or woman - and that takes me again back to the question of equality. Every two years we have labour market agreements. In the present recession one arrives at a point where even the trade unions agree that one must show moderation in one's claims, but then everybody gets soft in the eyes and says: ‘We must do some-

[p. 46]

thing for the lowest paid’. That is where the economy gets grounded because it means that a good many jobs simply don't get done as the minimum wage will not cover them. For a short time we had near-full employment. We had foreign labour coming in. Now the trade unions are very keen to see that migrant workers get the same pay as Danish workers, which is only fair. But with a minimum wage that the economy simply cannot bear, unemployment is increased both for national and migrant workers.

Bolkestein: Denmark has the reputation of being one of the most egalitarian countries in the world. Has this created frustrations? How important is the party of Mr. Mogens Glistrup?

Federspiel: The Mogens Glistrup Party entered parliament some eight years ago, almost on a parity with the Liberal and Conservative Parties. They attracted the most varied groups: disappointed Conservatives, some Liberals and even some Socialists and other left-wing people but mainly people who were dissatisfied with the performance of the existing political parties. Their original programme was, of course, a drastic reduction of taxes and abolition of the foreign service, the defence forces and a number of other public services. Now they are taking up individual cases, sometimes not without skill. In the more recent opinion polls they are gradually losing ground. I don't think they will disappear altogether because there will always be people that are critical of the performance of traditional parties. I think that they will become more acclimatized to parliamentary work and that, if we get the possibility of forming a non-Socialist government, they would be on the side of such a government. They never managed to develop a rational programme but they are definitely a kind of catalyst in the political system.

Bolkestein: You don't think that the frustrations of modern industrial society together with the economic difficulties of the moment will give rise to a call for a strong man.

Federspiel: That is very definitely against the Danish mentality. You would never get such an appeal across to the Danish population. We are fundamentally a debating and arguing people, but with no taste for absolute power.

[p. 47]

2. Socialism

Bolkestein: Socialist parties have been virtually dominant in Scandinavia for a very long time. Why is that?

Federspiel: With industrialization workers move from the country into the towns and get absorbed in industrial organizations. The Social Democratic Party didn't really emerge until the early part of the century. Before that the interests of the workers were taken care of by the Liberal Party which in the nineteenth century was in opposition to the conservative oligarchy. It wasn't really until the trade unions began to develop that the Social Democratic Party found that it had interests which were different from those of the Liberal Party. The first socialist government was formed in 1924 but its policy was a very moderate form of socialism.

Just after the Second World War some 75% of our export income came from agricultural products and the rest from industrial products. Today about 80% of our trade revenue comes from industrial exports and less than 20% from agricultural exports, even though agricultural exports have not diminished either in value or in volume. There has been a spectacular industrial development which naturally helps the Social Democratic Party. In Sweden this has gone a good deal further. In Norway very much the same kind of development as in Denmark has taken place. You do get these quite considerable changes in the social democratic electorate, though. In the last opinion poll they lost very nearly 10 seats. Where these voters go, is very difficult to assess because there is a floating vote of about 20%. I should think that the Social Democratic Party has probably peaked out and that in the next few years we should experience the return of a good many voters who have supported the Social Democratic Party to the conservative and liberal camps. Some will, no doubt, move further to the left.

Bolkestein: You explain the dominance of the Social Democratic Party in Scandinavia by industrialization. This, of course, has also occurred in countries where there has been an alternation of parties.

Federspiel: There has been a very long stretch of Socialist government in Sweden, about 40 years, ending about five years ago when a non-Socia-

[p. 48]

list coalition took over, which is still in office. In Denmark we definitely had variations. We have had in some periods the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals working together. Since the war, however, we have had no less than four non-Socialist governments, which does show that there is a need in the electorate for change.

Bolkestein: It has been said that the Danish socialists are of a very dogmatic sort. Is that fair criticism?

Federspiel: I would not call them dogmatic. They had a long tradition under Mr. Stauning, who was off and on Prime Minister from 1924 until the war, of definite pragmatism and little respect for socialist dogma. In the years immediately after the war the Socialists were not in any way possessed by Marxist ideas. They were possessed by the interests of the labour movement. In more recent times the left wing has gained force and the moderate part of the Social Democratic Party has made more concessions than perhaps they really want, in order to keep the Party together. The same thing happens in England.

Bolkestein: Where do the radical Marxists in Parliament go?

Federspiel: The Communist Party is out of Parliament. The so-called left-socialists or Socialist People's Party, the old Communists who disagreed with Moscow over both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are represented in Parliament and then you have right out on the left a Socialist Workers Party, which is pure revolutionary Marxism. The Communist Party is faithful to Russia: they are not Eurocommunists. Inside the Social Democratic Party, even among members of the government, you will find some people who are extremely theoretical in their approach. This has led to frequent contradictory statements of policy by Ministers and leading members of the party, which creates confusion in the electorate and doubts whether the present government is capable of formulating a policy to deal with the acute problems of to-day.

3. Liberalism

Bolkestein: In many countries Liberals find themselves in the middle,

[p. 49]

which is an uncomfortable position. Look at the British Liberals (of course, their predicament is also caused by the electoral system), at the Italian and the French parties. Do Liberal Parties in Denmark also occupy this uncomfortable position?

Federspiel: I would rather say that other parties have stolen some of our thunder. What we have stood for as liberal policy has been taken up by others. The Liberal Party has not compromised on its original ideas of social justice and fair treatment within a system of free enterprise but that, of course, is not a particular programme. It is not an ideology, it is a way of life. Some people will tell you that the Liberals form the most conservative party. That is not really the case but we do represent a strong opposition to Marxist ideas and to the risk of Communist infiltration. We like to say that we stand for common sense.

Bolkestein: How would you describe the difference between the Liberal Party and the Radical Liberal Party?

Federspiel: The difference is traditionally one of foreign policy and defence. The Radical Party split off from the Liberal Party in 1905. One reason was the creation of a small-holder movement, backed by the Radicals, that aimed at a policy of land-redistribution. That is now out of date. The other reason was defence. They firmly believed in neutrality and thought that this country should have no armed forces except to patrol the border. They are still very pacifist and believe in neutralism.

Bolkestein: There has been a shift to the right in political terms over almost the whole western world. Is this taking place in your country too?

Federspiel: There is a trend towards a more open Liberal approach in politics, which will ultimately lead to a switch away from Socialism.

Bolkestein: The Dutch Socialist Party has two dominant themes. One theme is: more control over society in its various aspects. The other is: more equality. These two themes are now singularly inappropriate. The Socialist Party has no answer to what you might call the internal contradictions of the welfare state. It is therefore bound to lose influence and

[p. 50]

votes. One of the criticisms that is leveled against Liberals is that in economic policy they appeal to the materialist instincts of people while Socialists say that they appeal to the better instincts. Against this one could say that it is one of the ironies of history that sometimes people who start with the best of intentions end up with a terrible solution whereas people who start with a sceptical view of human nature often arrive at a more democratic and open society.

Federspiel: We reject egalitarianism as we reject most ideologies but we do believe in cooperation. Denmark is one of the cradles of the cooperative movement and not only in agriculture. The whole of our real estate credit system is based on the cooperative idea. In this country there is a very short distance between classes. In fact, some of the real distinctions subsist in the working class. If you go to a construction enterprise you may see skilled workers refusing to have their meals together with the unskilled, whereas you find managers being perfectly happy to share a table with anybody. That is also why the system of participation in the boards of companies has worked well in this country. It is perfectly natural in Denmark to work together at all levels. That is where the hope is for the future, that we get also the trade unions to realize that it is no use having one group pressing its claims - we have to work together to put the country on its feet again.

4. Industrial Democracy

Bolkestein: Which model of industrial participation do you have?

Federspiel: The system is fairly simple. In companies (public or private) with more than 50 full-time employees a majority can demand representation on the board. Election is by secret ballot and the numbers correspond to one half of the members elected by the shareholders. If this is an uneven number the next higher even number is the basis. Eligible are only employees, who have worked continuously in the company for at least one year. The members so elected have without exception the same rights, duties and responsibility as the shareholder-nominees.

Bolkestein: Your system of participation is much less radical than the

[p. 51]

German or the Dutch system.

Federspiel: It is true that our system is less radical than some others. An important point for the Liberal and Conservative Parties was to keep the system as a local affair within each company's own domain, that is, without direct and indirect interference by the trade unions. Generally speaking the system has worked satisfactorily. To my knowledge there has been no serious case of disloyalty on the part of employee members. On the other hand the voice of the man or woman on the floor has frequently been useful to board and management and opened their eyes to innovations.

Bolkestein: Have the unions put forward the demand that the works council should have a say in the company's investment decisions?

Federspiel: The unions have certainly raised the idea of what they describe as economic democracy. The idea is to build up a large central fund out of part of annual company profits or alternatively a levy on pay-roll, for the purpose of reinvesting capital in the companies and thus gradually acquiring control of the business world. This idea has in principle been taken up by the Social Democratic Party, but is strongly resisted by a very large section of the workers themselves, who absolutely prefer available earnings to be added to their wages rather than place power in the hands of the union bosses.

5. The European Community

Bolkestein: How firmly a member of the European Community is Denmark?

Federspiel: If you read the opinion polls you will probably get the impression that there is a trend towards opposition to membership of the EEC. That is very largely because the question asked is: how would you have voted in 1972 (when we voted ourselves into the Common Market) if you had known the conditions of today. Naturally there have been many disappointments in the EEC. If they would ask whether today you would vote to get Denmark out of the EEC, you would probably find that people would say: no, let us give it a chance. There is

[p. 52]

not really any fundamental change. Of course, the EEC is not a question of butter prices or green currencies or even of agricultural markets or fisheries. The origin of the EEC is to get the European countries to work together and avoid the terrible wars we have had for centuries. In that respect it is not difficult to convince the Danish people that the EEC has been succesful. The quarrelings within the EEC are not different in principle from the quarrels in our own Parliament. This doesn't mean that we are not critical of many things in the Community. Denmark keeps close control at the parliamentary level of what is happening in the EEC. Right back in 1960 or 1961 when we first applied for membership we set up a parliamentary committee to deal with Common Market affairs. When we joined in 1972 there was a very strong minority in Parliament which insisted on keeping this committee going with a view to discussing with the government any measures to be taken in the Council of Ministers of the EEC so that they wouldn't be pulled down over Parliament without it having had any influence. That has really worked quite satisfactorily. Naturally, you don't go into every detail but it does give government the assurance that if it goes to the Council of Ministers either to vote for a proposal or to reject it, it has the necessary parliamentary backing.

Bolkestein: How does it work in practice? If there is an all-night session, do Danish parliamentarians in Copenhagen sit through the night too and talk to Brussels?

Federspiel: Even before these discussions start the Minister would get the opinion of the Committee on the various options. Of course, you may get a very clear-cut issue where parliamentary consent is explicit, possibly subject to specific conditions. Only if the situation changes substantially the Minister will have to refer to Copenhagen and consult the Committee which can be called at short notice. After all, it is only an hour's flight from Brussels to Copenhagen. So from a practical point of view the procedure hasn't really been an obstacle. The theoretical objection to it is that a parliamentary organ in an individual country becomes, so to speak, a part of the decision making process in the Community.

Bolkestein: It does imply what in The Netherlands is called a monist as

[p. 53]

opposed to a dualist theory of government: Parliament looks over the shoulders of Ministers to take decisions in Brussels together with them.

Federspiel: It is true only in very controversial cases. Normally, the Minister will know the positions of political parties.

Bolkestein: You said that if people had to vote again they would give the Community a chance. Are these feelings also reflected in the Socialist Party? One of the interesting things about socialism is that having started out as an international movement it has degenerated into a collection of nationalistic parties.

Federspiel: There is very much the same trend here. The anti-EEC movement is a very curious body, ranging from the communists, who have no other interest than to disrupt society, to fanatical nationalists or ‘little Denmarkers’. They hold meetings all over the place but they form a quite incoherent body and could never form a political party. Whether they can keep up their momentum in the long run I very much doubt. The mistake we made in 1972 prior to the referendum was that we argued about all kinds of economic advantages and not the essential point that this was a way of getting the European nations together so they would not go on fighting meaningless wars against each other. The two sides were really arguing on the opposite side's premises: the anti-EEC people arguing the political aspect and the friends of the EEC stressing the economic aspect.

Bolkestein: Is the ‘little Denmark movement’ gaining strength within the Socialist Party as the ‘little England movement’ does in Britain?

Federspiel: I should think not. There is much dissension within the trade unions but the present Prime Minister is a very convinced European.

Bolkestein: Do you think there is a chance that Norway and Sweden will apply for membership of the Community?

Federspiel: If Spain and Portugal come in, the EFTA-rump will have less and less importance and possibly find difficulties in negotiating new agreements with the Community. If the EEC develops in a better way

[p. 54]

than it does now I should think they would be interested in joining. There was a strong movement in Sweden but it never came to anything. If it hadn't been for the mistake we made of having the Danish referendum a week before the Norwegian, I think Norway would have come in.

Bolkestein: Are the people that are now on the European Commission of the same calibre as those that were there 20 years ago?

Federspiel: On the whole the standard of the Commissioners has been pretty high, and still is, but the question is whether their working conditions are satisfactory and whether their contacts with the individual countries and governments are as good as they should be. This is really where I see a role for the European Parliament. Now that Parliament is elected by general franchise it should attain a powerful position. After all, in most countries there was a satisfactory poll which means that those elected to Parliament have substantial popular backing. If there really is in the European people the will to preserve what they have created over a thousand years and the realisation that this can only be done if they put their strenghts together, Parliament would be in a strong position to put forward demands. It hasn't really done that because it has been overloaded with very often quite trivial matters. From time to time I have tried to move the idea that the two new institutions, namely the European Council (the so-called Summit Meeting) and the directly elected Parliament, should be matched as a new dynamic force by holding regular conferences, say 2 or 3 times a year, to debate in depth the vital problems of the European Community. This would give the Council a platform, which it does not have at the moment, and it would give the Parliament an opportunity to express the coordinated will of the European peoples.

There was a certain precedent in the Council of Europe. The original opposition there came from Britain, where Ernest Bevin was horrified at the idea that European Parliamentarians would criticise the British Government in Strassbourg. He only accepted the Parliamentary Assembly on the condition that it would be purely consultative. Naturally, in an Assembly comprising Winston Churchill, Harold MacMillan, Herriot, Paul Reynaud and a number of other responsible parliamentarians with governmental experience, you couldn't just muzzle them. Therefore a

[p. 55]

Joint Committee was set up which in the early years was rather an absurdity. When the Committee put forward questions or recommendations and requested the opinion of Ministers, the secretary of the Committee of Ministers shoved up a piece of paper before the Minister who happenend to be chairman of the Committee and he read out the seven or eight lines and that was the Minister's answer. You really got no discussion going.

In 1960 we negotiated this with the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers who at that time was Averof. At the end he realized that we must get a proper dialogue on essential questions going between Ministers and Assembly. So we established the ‘Colloque’ which was held twice a year and where there was an absolutely free discussion. The meetings were entirely off the record. We got some very valuable information about what Governments were thinking, which enabled the Committee in working out new proposals to see what was politically possible. There is absolutely no reason why a similar thing shouldn't develop between the European Parliament and the European Council.

Bolkestein: The Dutch Prime Minister tried to give an account of the European Council meeting at Maastricht to the European Parliament but ran headlong into a French veto. De Gaulle wanted his ‘l'Europe des états’ and it seems that he is getting his way.

Federspiel: It was exactly the experience we had in the early days of the Council of Europe. These things must be argued out patiently and not in formal meetings.

Bolkestein: Should we not move as quickly as possible to a system of majority voting and not by unanimity?

Federspiel: One of our troubles is that in the 1970 campaign to the referendum the Government which was quite definitely afraid of a negative vote stressed that we always had the veto of the Luxembourg Agreement. The idea of the veto is still predominant in many circles. There is, of course, especially in a small country, a fear of being overruled on a question of vital interest. I don't think there will be many difficulties in persuading people to accept majority voting in questions which are not of essential interest.

[p. 56]

Bolkestein: The idea has been put forward that the European Political Cooperation should be given a Secretary General with a small staff in a central location and that one should combine the function of Secretary General of the EPC with that of Secretary General of the Council of Ministers. Does this idea appeal to you?

Federspiel: The European Political Cooperation has developed quite satisfactorily. It has given an image to the idea of cooperation in Europe. I don't think it should have a large staff but it should have a secretariat for the purpose of sorting out what has happened and to see that decisions are transmitted properly.

Bolkestein: With the accession of Portugal and Spain to the Community the number of Commissioners will increase rapidly. The process of decision-taking in Brussels is becoming ever more difficult. Should one restrict the number of Commissioners to one per country?

Federspiel: I can't see that it makes a lot of difference if there are nine, thirteen or seventeen commissioners. We have seen how the number of portfolios in Governments go on increasing without diminishing the government's efficiency, even under collective responsibility.

6. Neutralism

Bolkestein: There appears to be a sort of Scandinavian view of the world situation which is, perhaps unjustly, typefied by the Swedish view of Third World affairs and East-West relations. Is there such a thing as a Scandinavian view?

Federspiel: There is an idea in other parts of the world that Scandinavians are particularly neutralist when facing the dangers which exist today. I don't think it is true. Sweden, of course, is one of the most heavily armed countries in Europe and certainly well aware of its defences. It also knows which way it must look. Norway and Denmark are firm members of the Atlantic Alliance.

There are two facts which underlie the isolation, in a way, of the Scandinavian countries in international politics. We have always been consulting together, since 1920 also with Finland and after the Second

[p. 57]

World War with Iceland when it became independent. Also, we speak not quite the same language but we don't translate from one language to another. In 1936 there was a thing called the Oslo-group of which the idea was that small countries, the Benelux countries, Switzerland and Scandinavia, must look after their interest.

There is perhaps a redundant neutralist tradition in Denmark because for two hundred years we had absolutely no other policy than to remain neutral and to keep on good terms with the strongest power in the Baltic. The ‘balance of power’ presupposed that Great Britain could always intervene if one of the groups got too strong and this was considered a kind of guarantee. However, no country in its senses would guarantee the independence of Denmark as the guardian of the straits into the Baltic. So we had no other possibility than that of being neutral. This led to certain radical ideas, to the effect that we didn't need any defence or armed forces because we could look after our safety by political means. That is the historical side of it.

After the war, somebody coined the word ‘Finlandization’, which is grossly misunderstood, the implied idea being that Finland is simply a puppet of Soviet Russia. Finland fought a very succesful war against Russia and got into awful trouble with both the Russians and the Germans during the war. Quite a number of Finnish statesmen knew Soviet Russia well, not because they were communists but because they had been to university in Russia. Finnish politicians follow closely what is happening there. They signed a mutual assistance pact but nonetheless Finland is pursuing an absolutely independent policy in close cooperation with the other Scandinavian countries. It watches Russian reactions and always acts before the Russians put any pressure on them. That is the reason why you hardly ever hear of Russian demands upon Finland because they instinctively know how far they can go without getting into trouble. The word Finlandization is an unfair term.

Last year we heard a similar term, viz. Denmarkization. Owing to some very injudicious remarks by certain members of Government the idea got around that Denmark wanted a free ticket in security matters and that wasn't really the case. The Government was hard pressed by the economic situation and had to cut down on everything, even on defence. In actual fact we have cut down no more on defence than most other countries in Europe. The will to defend the country as a full member of the Atlantic Alliance remains undiminished.

[p. 58]

Bolkestein: In The Netherlands there is a rising tide of neutralism. Do I take your words to mean that in Denmark this does not exist?

Federspiel: I don't think so. What does exist is a certain fear of nuclear weapons, which has given rise to the demand that in time of peace we will have no missiles on Norwegian or Danish territory. Of late somebody has developed the idea, probably communist inspired, of a non-nuclear zone in the Scandinavian countries. That is a thing we reject as completely unrealistic. In this country we are definitely conscious of the communist danger, perhaps because we can see Russian, Polish and East German vessels traveling around our waters with bugging devices, checking up on almost everything in this country. We, on the other hand, keep a close watch on them and we are making no secret of it. We publish reports on nuclear preparations in the Baltic by the Russians and warn people that there is a risk.

Bolkestein: Are people in Denmark concerned about the changing public mood in The Netherlands and in Germany, not least as inspired by the churches?

Federspiel: The Church is not causing any difficulty in Denmark. The Church keeps aloof from politics. We are definitely worried by the trend in Europe to weaken defence awareness. One of the reasons for Sweden being neutral, though, is that it is one of the best safeguards for an independent Finland. Now you have a Swedish-Finnish neutral zone but certainly with a strong Swedish military apparatus.

7. Eastern Europe

Bolkestein: That line of reasoning could lead to the thought that if Western Europe were as neutral as Sweden, it would become possible for Eastern Europe to become Finlandized.

Federspiel: I doubt it. The Russians have managed as a result of the unfortunate Yalta agreements to get complete domination over Eastern Europe and very nearly got it in Austria too. I don't think they will slacken their grip on Poland or Czechoslowakia and leave them to Finlandize.

[p. 59]

Bolkestein: As Talleyrand said, one can do many things with bayonets but one can not sit on them. Nothing lasts for ever. The military domination of the Russians over Eastern Europe is also bound to disappear. Of course it may last for a very long time. How can we speed up the break down of the party-state in Eastern Europe?

Federspiel: The attempts that have been made at Helsinki and in Madrid to establish a certain respect for human rights in communist states don't leave much hope. After all, that is a first condition of any liberalization in those countries. Until you get the Russians interested, by coercion, by bargaining or by sheer persuasion, I can't really see that there is any hope of their slackening their grip on Eastern Europe.

Bolkestein: According to some, the fact that the Russians let Austria go was a result of West Germany entering Nato. If that is correct, it would lead one to suppose that if one adopts a firm stand vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it responds with concessions. What is your view of those events in Austria?

Federspiel: I remember having a talk with Figl who negotiated the Austrian treaty of 1955. His view was that when the Russians had Switzerland and Austria as a neutral barrier between the Northern and the Southern flank of NATO, that was really sufficient for them. Whether that is an adequate explanation, I don't know.

Bolkestein: An interesting question is whether Russian Communists are changing from being historical optimists to historical pessimist, since their economic difficulties are enormous and communism as an ideology has lost all credibility. If true, this would be very important because it might lead them to the conclusion that they should act before it is too late.

Federspiel: I know very little about Russia from the inside. In fact, I have never been there. I have been invited several times but I have always declined the invitation. I have met, of course, Russians like Gromyko and others in the early years of the United Nations. Their belief in the truths of Lenin and Marx was certainly strong and I suppose that is very much the case today. They haven't seen many results

[p. 60]

for the seventy years of it. The more important thing, however, is not whether they are pessimists or optimists but how much power they have to stick to their positions and to retain it in spite of rising public opinion and how much they can control public opinion. I wouldn't be surprised if there comes a time when dissident opinion becomes so strong in Russia that they somehow or other have to compromise. I see no signs of it at the present time, though.

Bolkestein: Indeed, it seems that the dissidents in Russia regrettably form no more than a marginal phenomenon and that Russia itself is a stable society which can continue for a long time as it is. Eastern Europe is a different story. Eastern Europe looks West and not East. It is the achillesheel of the Soviet Empire. Once again, what can one do to hasten the process of liberalisation in Eastern Europe?

Federspiel: I doubt that we can do very much except do everything in our power to keep the people in Eastern Europe informed of what is going on. There are various means of doing that: not so much by the spreading of literature because that is easier to control but broadcasts by the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty - no propaganda but factual information of what is going on both inside their countries and in Western Europe. We do know that these radio stations in spite of being jammed are listened to and that what is broadcast is discussed.

Bolkestein: Is it your view that the new American administration is overreacting in trying to achieve advantages of a military nature that are uncalled for and perhaps even harmful?

Federspiel: I don't think they are harmful but there is a good deal of diplomacy that could be done more skilfully than what is happening now. A running dialogue with the Russians is certainly important. Whether you can get that dialogue going by continuing to say that you only want to negotiate from a position of strength is something I very much doubt.

When you get a new administration in the United States, it has to depart on something new. That is unavoidable and, of course, in Washington you don't have a strong central administration as in France

[p. 61]

or Great Britain, where there is a consolidated opinion which doesn't vary much from one government to another. Here you have all the top posts changed, which does mean new departures but in the long run American policy will remain fairly constant.

8. The United Nations

Bolkestein: Some people feel that the United States has taken a lot of nonsense in the United Nations and from a number of countries in the Third World such as India. The number of people who believe uncritically in the United Nations is diminishing. I think even the Swedes are waking up. I am not saying that one should not have to invent the United Nations if it did not exist but it is not the same organisation as in 1950. How could it be improved?

Federspiel: I doubt how much it can be improved. I was on the Danish delegation to the United Nations in its first four years and the second time I represented Denmark was in 1968 or 1969. There was a tremendous change. In the early years decisions could be taken and were accepted. In the sixties and seventies the United Nations became a sort of safety valve for foreign policy. It was a forum where you could put your finger on what different countries were thinking but decisions were of no importance. Whenever an important decision could be taken it was vetoed in the Security Council. The Assembly resolutions have no legal significance and their political importance is very small owing to the fact that each vote obviously doesn't have the same weight.

Bolkestein: Decisions taken by the General Assembly have no binding force. Don't these resolutions have some importance, however, as they become constituent elements of the international political discourse? When one looks at the way in which Israel has been isolated in the United Nations or South Africa has been prevented from speaking out or resolutions that condemn fascism without this term being at all defined, it is difficult to escape the feeling that they do have some importance because they set the vocabulary and define thoughts.

Federspiel: It often is a false political vocabulary, of course, to speak of racism or imperialism or neofascism without going into what you mean.

[p. 62]

It gives a certain background to political propaganda but I don't think it is terribly important. The use of the United Nations is as a kind of safety valve where you deflect the forces which might otherwise cause an explosion and instead of going into open warfare you go into open resolutions which don't mean very much.

Bolkestein: Does this also apply to Unctad, Unido and Unesco?

Federspiel: An improvement in the North-South dialogue is certainly needed but whether the United Nations is the proper forum for that is something I very much doubt. So many of these developing countries want to shape their societies on the pattern of the West which had hundreds of years to develop its present shape. It is necessary that these countries find the means of developing by themselves and in freedom. Perhaps one of the most important things is to implant in them a real concept of human rights, political freedoms and the liberation of popular forces so they can find out what their needs are. Are these to go to towns and build big industries and create new slums or are they to develop their agriculture to be able to feed themselves better? Here policy seems to be completely haphazard. Whether this is best done by the World Bank or some other institution I don't know but it is quite definitely not the thing which the United Nations will be able to cope with.

Bolkestein: The American Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan was ambassador to the United Nations in the early seventies. He took issue with the hypocrisy and double standards of the United Nations and by placing himself intellectually outside the U.N., he tried to have some influence on it. Do you think he was a Don Quixote, tilting against windmills, or do you think he stood for an ideal which one should fight for?

Federspiel: He stood for waking up American public opinion. After all, the United States could have a very considerable influence in the United Nations but they more or less accepted it as just another international organization which they didn't attach all that much importance to. I never met Moynihan but I thought his criticism was quite justified.

[p. 63]

9. The Middle East

Bolkestein: You were a member of the United Nations Commission for Palestine in the late forties. What can Europe do in the Middle East?

Federspiel: The main thing is to stabilize the Egyptian-Israeli treaty because that is the one bit of progress that has been made. It has, of course, caused this Arab move against both Israel and Egypt but there is a strong difference of opinion between the different groups of Arab states. Whether that can be used politically is doubtful since one group is extraordinarily strong because of oil. The thing I fear most is a Russian move through Syria into the Lebanon. Whether the present Baath regime in Syria can survive again seems doubtful. There is no strong pressure to get the Arab countries to accept the existence of Israel. If they did that I don't think the delimitation of frontiers would be so difficult. Whether you should go back exactly to the 1967 frontiers is uncertain, simply for security reasons. Before 1967 the Syrians were shelling Israel from the Golan heights, which obviously should not continue. The situation has lasted from the forties until now without political progress except the Egyptian treaty. I doubt whether the Venice declaration of the European Governments has any importance.

There are three conditions for putting political ideas through. One is that you bring something new and constructive into the discussion. There is nothing new in the wish to get the PLO to sit down at the negotiating table. Apart from that, it is just Resolution 242. The second condition is that you have something to offer and the Europeans have nothing to offer the Arab States in the way of added security. The third condition is that you have power - not necessarily military power but political prestige and influence. None of these conditions can be met by the European countries. The Russians have very cleverly exploited that and said: now we must have a new Geneva conference, where the European nations with their Venice declaration would be on the defensive. The only hope is that one of the Arab groups recognizes Israel, which might bring the other Arab groups not necessarily into an agreement but at least place them in a weak position and put more pressure on them. One of the weaknesses, of course, is that the situation was not created by the United Nations but as it were developed out of itself. In international law you can't blame the Arabs for opposing what is happening.

[p. 64]

10. International Law

Bolkestein: The international legal system is not progressing. You have been connected with the International Commission of Jurists. What action should one take?

Federspiel: It is essential that we do everything possible to plead the rule of law and respect for the political, civil and human rights on the basis of an international code or standard. That was easier in the early days of the United Nations with 48 members. The concept of law is now in danger of being diluted. One of the important things is to get the Universal Declaration of Human Rights built out into binding treaties. I have never been a friend of sanctions because they always hit the people who are innocent but a system where one could get the greatest possible means of enforcement of civil and human rights would set a better standard of what you can and can not do. That is what we are trying to do in the conference at The Hague on the right to development, which is a very knotty problem: whether the right of undeveloped countries to be developed is one of the fundamental human rights.