Briefwisseling en aantekeningen. Deel 1

CCLXVII.
De Hertog van Newcastle aan Willem Bentinck.

[B.M., Add. 32810]

Newcastle Ho(use), 25 Dec./5 Jan. 1747/8.

(Over het plan Rocayrol wordt beraadslaagd.)

As to the affair of the garrisons, which is the chief subject of your letter to H.R.H.¹⁾, I am heartily sorry, that anything should be started, and that so late, that should occasion any difference of opinion between the King and the Stadtholder. It is a point purely of a military nature, upon which the Ministers cannot pretend to give any opinion, except that any alteration, which might have been thought material to be made in the Convention, from what was agreed to and stipulated the last year, should have been sooner proposed, or not now insisted upon, so as to delay or prevent the conclusion of the convention, which has been much too long defer'd already.

I have always taken the liberty of telling you my thoughts freely, relating to our respective conduct, in the present critical conjuncture, founded on a firm persuasion, that we have the same wishes for the safety and

1) Niet aanwezig. Het ging over een wensch van Nederlandsche zijde, dat versterkingen van garnizoenen indien noodig door beide bondgenooten geleverd zouden worden: zie P. Geyl, a.w., blz. 256 vlg.

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prosperity of both countries. I am sorry to say the alarms here as to the imminent danger the Republick is in of some sudden attack this winter, or, at farthest, of some most fatal blow being struck early in the spring, before a sufficient force can be got together to prevent it, begin to prevail extremely, and that not only amongst those who were timorous, jealous, and diffident from the beginning, but even with those, who flattered themselves that from the late happy revolution in Holland such measures of activity and vigour would be immediately taken as would effectually secure the Republick from any attack this winter, or even in the spring, and add such strength to the allied army in the Low Countries as would remove the fears of the further progress of the arms of France, and put us in a condition of carrying on the war with a prospect of success, if peace could not be had on safe and reasonable terms. But, I must own, in this our expectations will not have been answered, if facts, most strongly asserted here and yet not sufficiently contradicted, have any foundation of truth.

1^o.	That no orders were given for recruiting the Dutch corps.
2^o.	That the whole force of the Republick does not, at present, amount to more than 35000 men.
3^o.	That no general officers are yet appointed by the States to take charge of those troops.
4^o.	That no part of the mony raised by the late tax of 2 percent, on all effects etc., has been yet expended, either towards putting the Republick in a condition of defence, or towards any one necessary service for encreasing or putting their troops in motion.
5^o.	That little or no addition has yet been made, in reality, to the number of troops the States had the last year.
6^o.	That sufficient care has not been yet taken to put the places of the Republick in a proper state of defence.
7^o.	and lastly: that no justice has been done upon those who have either traitorously or ignorantly given up the strong towns of the Republick, in order to prevent the like behaviour for the future.

From all which it is inferred that those advantages, which were expected from the late happy turn in the

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Government of Holland, and which gave so much encouragement to the King and his nation, to go on in the most vigorous measures, have not yet happened according to expectation. Upon these suppositions it is feared here that the force at present may not be sufficient to prevent the French from making themselves absolute masters of the Republick, before either the troops, to be stipulated by the convention, can be compleated, or the Russians can arrive and join our Army.

The great delay in concluding the Convention, without which the respective contingents are not ascertained and the Queen of Hungary and the King of Sardinia cannot be in a condition to recruit their respective Corps by the subsidies to be paid for that purpose, adds much to the danger and uncertainty of our situation. And I am sorry to observe, that the difficulties that still remain, viz. the point in dispute about the Dutch garrisons and the affair of the King of Sardinia's command in Italy, are yet far from being adjusted, and that there is little probability of doing it, if necessity and the common interest of all the Allies, do not determine them at once, to pass those points in the manner they were settled last year.

I have now laid before you the great and general apprehensions here upon the present situation of things. You may easily imagine the remedy that is proposed, viz.: the putting an end to the war in the best, that is the most expeditious manner possible. I should be very sorry to see that necessity so great as to oblige us to accept unsafe and dishonorable terms. But the only way to avoid it is to correct our mistakes, to unite in the necessary measures for our defence first, and then for such further operations as the season of war may make advisable. But without a sufficient force that cannot be done and that sufficient force cannot be had, except every power can and does bring into the field, by the time stipulated, their respective contingents in effective men and in this we must not amuse ourselves with expectations and promises, but depend only upon facts.

I have said nothing of the state of the war in Italy, where the Allies take more pains to blame each other than to oppose the common enemy, so that the most

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reasonable expectations of a powerfull diversion on that side have hitherto been disappointed.

But tho' the apprehensions mentioned in this letter, should not be founded, at least not in the utmost extent, we cannot, I am afraid, be so sanguine as not to admit that our situation is bad; that many accidents may happen to make it still worse and therefore it is high time to agree amongst ourselves upon the terms of peace, that we would accept. But those terms must be better, or worse, according as we shall be in any or no condition to resist the force of France and support the war.

I am afraid I have tired you with a melancholy account of our fears and apprehensions. They are certainly pretty general here, and therefore I hope nothing will be omitted on your part or that of the other Allies that may be necessary to remove them.