Cold war or détente? The Soviet viewpoint

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Preface

Books on contempory international relations have one common quality, as I have found out: work on them never ends. Events follow each other so fast that by the moment you seem to have completed the work, you feel an almost irresistible urge to add something. But there ought to be a final full stop at some point. There were several such points during the work on this book, and then each time I would yield to the temptation to try and add yet another final touch. My latest attempt of this kind resulted in this short preface to the American edition written in late December of 1982.

I would like to begin by mentioning the latest important events.

On the tenth of November my country suffered a great loss: the death of Leonid Brezhnev, whose presence in this book will be felt by the reader through my many references to his words. I am aware that many people around the world, including many Americans, are wondering what Soviet foreign policy will be like after he is gone. The answer to this question was given in the very first statements by the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of our Party, Yuri Andropov. He has emphasized the continuity of the Soviet foreign policy, stressed that peace and cooperation will remain its overriding goals, and expressed unequivocally our attitude toward détente as a permanent value that will ultimately triumph. Our position on Soviet-American relations was also made clear enough: we want normalization of those relations, successful talks on arms limitation and reduction, development of cooperation on the basis of equality, reciprocity and absence of preconditions.

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In particular, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the new proposals on nuclear disarmament unveiled by Yuri Andropov in his speech on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR, December 21, 1982.

He stated that the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union at the talks in Geneva envision substantial cuts in all categories of nuclear weapons now in the possession of the two sides. We are ready to reduce our strategic nuclear arms by more than 25 percent, that is, by hundreds if the United States agrees to cut its arsenals accordingly, so that the two sides would have equal numbers of strategic delivery vehicles. We also propose that the number of nuclear warheads be substantially lowered and that improvement of nuclear warheads be maximally restricted. After such an agreement is reached, the Soviet Union will be ready for still larger mutual reductions of the strategic arsenals. And, as stressed by Andropov, while the talks are in progress, it would be wise to freeze the existing arsenals of strategic weapons.

Concerning nuclear weapons in Europe, Yuri Andropov has reiterated that we are prepared for an agreement to remove all types of them from this continent, which would, in effect, make Europe a nuclear-free zone. As a step toward this goal, he stated Soviet readiness to agree to retain in Europe only as many medium-range missiles as are kept there by Britain and France. This means that the Soviet Union would reduce hundreds of missiles, including dozens of SS-20s. Along with it there must also be an accord to reduce to equal levels the numbers of Soviet and NATO medium-range nuclear delivery aircraft in Europe.

I would like the American reader to understand correctly our position on these issues. We are prepared to go very far down the road of arms reductions and seek mutually acceptable solutions. But it is important that people in the West also understand that no American arms buildup will ever force us into unilateral disarmament. Confronted with attempts to win a military superiority over the Soviet Union, we will have to counter this challenge not with new concessions, but development and deployment of corresponding weapons systems of our own.

We would hate the events to take such a course. But if Washington's policy makers consider their new weapons as their ‘trumps’ at the talks, let them know that these ‘trumps’ are false.

As a matter of fact, there should be no reason why one should ask questions about the main content of the Soviet foreign policy, even in connection with such an event as the change of the General Secretary of our Party.

Peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and international cooperation have been and remain the fundamental objectives of Soviet foreign policy. I cannot imagine a Soviet official who would say that the West should choose between changing its system and war, or that a nuclear

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war between the USSR and the United States would kill ‘only’ 10 percent of the population, and ‘if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody's going to make it.’ Such statements are absolutely unthinkable in my country, if only because her people and her leaders do know what war is all about, and they know it not only from movies and novels, but from their own experience. For such a people, peace is the highest value and the top national priority. And here (this subject is also discussed in our book) is one of the main asymmetries between the Soviet Union and the United States. This asymmetry does color the approaches of both sides to vital problems of today's world. And past years have shown that such asymmetries can play a serious negative role.

I hope that this and other asymmetries can be overcome. Today, it is difficult to be optimistic about the near prospects for Soviet-American relations. And yet, I do not exclude a possibility that the U.S. policy may become more realistic soon. After all, life must teach people something, must it not?

I am fully aware that some lessons may at first enrage. I am referring to the two biggest upsets Washington seems to have suffered in the last year or two. One has to do with Poland. Some people in America hoped for the most dramatic turn of events in that country (a civil war, appearance of Soviet troops, etc.). I can see why, and the reader will find discussion of this subject in the book.

The other upset has to do with the change of leadership in my country. It was widely expected in Washington that this change would produce a political crisis in the Soviet Union that might be taken advantage of. And I can bet that quite a few contingency plans for this event had been prepared long ago. But they had to remain on paper.

Thus, neither of the two expectations materialized, which was a blow to the extremists in Washington. I do not expect them to turn into moderates as a result, but in broader policy-making circles and among the public at large more realistic attitudes might have been strengthened.

There are quite a few things that awake hope. After all, everything in this world tends to change - people, their views, and governments. And these changes may help everyone understand that without peace, development of normal relations, and disarmament, humanity has no future. Sooner or later we all shall have to recognize this truth in all its fullness. And it is vitally important that we do it soon enough - before it is too late. The goal of survival demands efforts by each and every one of us.

Half a century ago, talented Soviet writer Bruno Yasenski, who witnessed the tragic world events of the twenties and thirties, gave very wise advice:

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Do not be afraid of enemies - at worst they may kill you.

Do not be afraid of friends - at worst they may betray you.

Beware of the indifferent - they do not kill and they do not betray, but it is only by their silent consent that murder and treachery exist on Earth.

Indifference.... We cannot afford it in the nuclear age.

Georgi Arbatov

Moscow

December 1982