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Summaries

Jeroen Duindam, Historians and war: the metamorphosis of a traditional theme.

This introduction describes the cold relationship between most academic historians and the field of military history. It argues that historians can no longer leave aside military history in considering the history of the state in Europe, European expansion, and a variety of other social and cultural themes. Special attention is given to the emergence of a social history of warfare and armies, and to the military revolution debate. Finally, a discussion of the exceptional position of the Low Countries as a ‘school of war’ puts into perspective the other contributions to this volume.

M.A.G. de Jong, Military reforms in the State army and the growth of the arms industry, 1585-1621

This article looks at the consequences of the military reforms carried out under Prince Maurice of Orange upon the demand and supply of arms and munitions for the State army, especially the infantry. Five key aspects of these military reforms were examined: the increasing use of firearms; the standardization of arms; the growth of the State army; the increasingly important role that sieges had come to play in warfare; and, regular payments to the troops. When combined, these developments influenced the scale and nature of the demand made by the army in particular and, subsequently, the development of the arms industry as a whole. In their efforts to address this rapid increase in demand, a clear tendency towards concentration became evident among the entrepreneurs in the arms industry. The increased level of production that was required led to a number of important changes in the structure and organisation of the arms industry: standardization, granting buyers credit in the form of raw materials, fixed contracts, the distribution/dispersal and division of labour. During this process, the Dutch authorities consistently played an expressly guiding role. Through the direct link between the troops of the State army and the suppliers of arms on the one hand, and the provincial authorities on the other, the decentralised state system could furnish the State army with its requirements in an efficient and effective manner.

Olaf van Nimwegen, The Dutch army and the early modern military revolution

Since the 1950s, all studies into warfare during the early modern period have been

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dominated by the idea of a military revolution. The Dutch army plays a pivotal role in this debate. The reforms introduced by Maurice of Orange and his cousin, William Louis of Nassau, are hailed as the beginning of the modern army. In this contribution, the author endorses the importance of the Nassaus' tactical reforms, but challenges the assumption that they also ushered in army reform. As long as the government wanted to keep its involvement with the army as indirect as possible, army growth was limited and the knowledge and expertise gained in wartime was quickly lost in peacetime. It was only after the 1670s that the armed forces of the Dutch Republic were transformed into a standing army made up of professional troops. It was following an attack by the French in 1672, whose forces were far superior, both in terms of sheer numbers and organizational prowess, that the Dutch were forced to restructure their army. With this, the Nassau tactical revolution became embedded into a much farther reaching organizational revolution.

Etienne Rooms, The salaries, provisions and quarters of the Royal troops in the Spanish Netherlands

Spain wished to play a leading role in Europe and, for this reason, the strategic location of the Southern Netherlands was of the utmost importance. Consequently, everexpanding armies had to be stationed in the Southern Netherlands. In addition to this, military exertions were also necessary in Italy, the German Empire, on the Iberian peninsula and in the colonies. From the seventeenth century onwards, it became increasingly obvious that Spain lacked the financial capacity to carry out such an ambitious policy. As a result, troops in the Southern Netherlands were paid on an irregular and partial basis. Supplies also left a lot to be desired and there was no money left over to provide the soldiers with winter quarters. In order to avoid mutiny and pillage, the local authorities often had to step in and assume responsibility for these matters. The quality of the royal troops therefore fell to an all-time low. In the end, Spain had no means to defend the positions in the Southern Netherlands against French aggression. The only reason why Louis XIV could not annex the Southern Netherlands to his kingdom was because England and the Dutch Republic gave their full military support to thwart this annexation.

J.P.C.M. van Hoof, New methods, strong borders. Menno van Coehoorn's building plans and contribution to improving the defence system

During the years 1680 to 1685, Menno van Coehoorn (1641-1704) designed a remarkable fortification system. It provided a sound alternative to both the traditional

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Dutch system of fortification, which reached its peak during the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648), and the French method, which had been used in our country since 1680. In his capacity as chief engineer, Coehoorn played a leading role in modernising the fortifications located along the borders during the years 1698-1702. With his design for the protection of Dutch territory by using lines of defence, he also created a new defence structure. His role as consultant to the policy-makers of the time meant that his views had a decisive influence. At the same time, he took a keen, personal interest in implementing and executing his own building plans.